

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00251: 20070704; Use of Forge Triple Canopy NEC

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00066

Impact:

Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070704, Use of Force Triple Canopy
NEC

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-03373

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Hammond

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore	ASAC	BAGHDAD
Hammond, Kory H	ARSO	BAGHDAD
Motley, David	DUTY AGENT	BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On July 4th, an unidentified number of suspects engaged Triple Canopy guard force members with directed small arms fire. Two guards returned fire and the status of the assailants is unknown.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
07/04/2007	On July 4th, 2007, I was no...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
TC Guard Statement	Image	99 kB
TC Guard Statement	Image	116 kB
TC Incident Report	MS Word	112 kB

Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

07/05/2007	OPEN
08/25/2007	CLOSED
09/02/2007	OPEN
09/02/2007	OPEN
09/02/2007	CLOSED

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RS-2007-00261: 20070706 EOF, Kirkuk REO

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REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00071

Impact:

Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info**Case Title:** 20070706 EOF, Kirkuk REO**Status:** CLOSED**Case Type:** ADMINISTRATIVE**Program Type:** REGIONAL SECURITY**Categories:**

■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04656**Optional Case Info****Impact:****Principal Judicial District:****Due Date:****Countries Impacted:****Violations:****Nexus:****TECS Lookout:** No**Case Origin/Source****Source Organization:** RSO Baghdad**Name:** Hammond**Phone:****Source Comments:****Personnel Assignment**

Carpenter, Theodore	ASAC	BAGHDAD
Hammond, Kory H	ARSO	BAGHDAD
Motley, David	DUTY AGENT	BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On July 6th, 2007, members of a Kirkuk RSO PSD were involved in an Escalation of Force incident.

Primary Subjects**Case Reports**

Date	Snippet
08/25/2007	Attached are documents prov...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
20070706 Kirkuk PSD Shooting	MS Word	95 kB
20070706 ROI SR and Stateme...	HTML	5 kB
20070706 Spot Report-06 Kir...	MS Word	272 kB
20070706 Statements EOF Kirkuk	Adobe PDF	2,012 kB

Related Cases**Outstanding Warrants****Status History**

08/25/2007	OPEN
08/25/2007	CLOSED
08/25/2007	OPEN
08/25/2007	CLOSED
09/02/2007	OPEN
09/02/2007	OPEN
09/02/2007	CLOSED

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(R)

From: Hislop, John T (Kirkuk)
Sent: Saturday, July 07, 2007 8:58 PM
To: Martinec, John B (Baghdad); Hammond, Kory M (Baghdad)
Cc: Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad); Rowe, James AJ (Kirkuk); Backstrom, Paul M (Baghdad)
Subject: ROI, SR and Statements EOF Kirkuk 7/6/07

~~expedited~~

U0003

Attachments: Statements7607EOF Kirkuk.pdf; Spot Report 070607-06 Kirkuk EOF.doc; 06July2007Kirkuk PSD Shooting.doc

John and Kory,

Please see the attached published S/R from Kirkuk's EOF incident on 7/6/2007. The ROI is also attached as well as the statements from the four individuals in the follow car that witnessed the aggressive vehicle and/or the shooting.

As we all know PSD members operate under the same EOF procedures through out theatre however; operating in Baghdad and here in the North are two separate animals. The PSD teams that drive in Irbil and Kirkuk operate in a manner that is quite docile compared to else where in Iraq. This was evident by this teams limited use of force (1 round) and the previous EOF that occurred in June. This and the June EOF happened while the PSD teams were stopped at a "red light" in traffic. With that said, the teams here would rather continue to operate under the rules and regulations (they don't counter flow traffic and wait at red lights etc.) but this may have to be looked at if these type of EOF's should continue (hoping for the lesser of two evils here.)

Additionally, when was the last time we the RSO or Embassy looked into all the other contractor PSD elements running around Iraq? I'm hearing stories of quite a few PSD elements moving from Mosul to Irbil firing up to 50 rounds per move and using bullets like we use hand and arm signals, flashers or a water bottle. Do we have any concrete documentation that this is in fact happening and if so what action is being taken against them? Of course all of these teams are labeled as "COM elements" as they drive in Black or White Burbs and the US Embassy constantly has to defend themselves.

Keeping the peace in the north,
 John

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RS-2007-00269: 20070709 EOF, Kirkuk REO

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00075

Impact:

Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070709 EOF, Kirkuk REO

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04657

Synopsis

On July 7th, 2007, members of a Kirkuk RSO PSD were involved in an Escalation of Force incident.

Primary Subjects**Case Reports**

Date	Snippet
08/25/2007	Attached are documents prov...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
20070709 EOF	Adobe PDF	2,332 kB
20070709 EOF PowerPoint	PowerPoint	916 kB
20070709 Kirkuk PSD Shooting	MS Word	96 kB
20070709 SPOT REP-02 Kirkuk...	MS Word	272 kB

Related Cases**Outstanding Warrants****Optional Case Info**

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Hammond

Phone:

Source Comments:

Status History

08/25/2007	OPEN
08/25/2007	CLOSED
09/02/2007	OPEN
09/02/2007	OPEN
09/02/2007	CLOSED

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore	ASAC	BAGHDAD
Hammond, Kory H	ARSO	BAGHDAD
Motley, David	DUTY AGENT	BAGHDAD

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RS-2007-00191: Escalation of Force Baghdad - 07152007

REGIONAL SECURITY
BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00048

Impact:
Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: Escalation of Force Baghdad - 07152007

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:
■ GENERAL

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-03613

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Swoyer

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Farrington, David S SA BAGHDAD
Swoyer, Ed RSO BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On July 15, 2007, a COM PSD fired one round into the grille of an aggressive vehicle that was approaching the motorcade at a high rate of speed. The driver of the vehicle ignored visual and verbal warnings to stop. The driver did not appear to be injured.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
07/15/2007	See ROI in Attachments
07/15/2007	See ROI in Attachments

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
AAR	Adobe PDF	2,196 kB
ROI	Adobe PDF	1,627 kB
SPOT Report	MS Word	273 kB
Statement 1	Adobe PDF	2,784 kB
Statement 2	Adobe PDF	3,064 kB

Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

07/16/2007	OPEN
07/30/2007	OPEN
07/30/2007	CLOSED

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RS-2007-00263: 20070716 EOF, Kirkuk REO

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REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00072

Impact:

Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070716 EOF, Kirkuk REO

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04658

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Hammond

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore ASAC BAGHDAD

Hammond, Kory H ARSO BAGHDAD

Motley, David DUTY AGENT BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On July 16th, 2007, members of a Kirkuk RSO PSD were involved in an Escalation of Force incident.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
08/25/2007	Attached are documents prov...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
20070716 Spot Report-07 Kir...	MS Word	272 kB

Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

08/25/2007	OPEN
08/25/2007	CLOSED
09/02/2007	OPEN
09/02/2007	OPEN
09/02/2007	CLOSED

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RS-2007-00245: 20070717 EOF, Kirkuk REO

REGIONAL SECURITY
BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00063

Impact:
Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070717 EOF, Kirkuk REO

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:
■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04662

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Hammond

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore	ASAC	BAGHDAD
Hammond, Kory H	ARSO	BAGHDAD
Motley, David	DUTY AGENT	BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On July 17th, 2007, members of a Kirkuk RSO PSD were involved in an Escalation of Force incident.

Primary Subjects**Case Reports**

Date	Snippet
08/27/2007	Attached are documents prov...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
20070717 ROI PSD EOF KIRKUK	Adobe PDF	988 kB
20070717 SL check point sta...	Adobe PDF	844 kB

Related Cases**Outstanding Warrants****Status History**

08/27/2007	OPEN
08/27/2007	CLOSED
09/01/2007	OPEN
09/01/2007	OPEN
09/01/2007	CLOSED

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

From: Sincavage, Justine M
Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2007 7:24 AM
To: Martin, Darin T; Richter, Jean C; Isaac, Paul C
Subject: FW: Condolences Pay

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Justine M. Sincavage
Director
Office of Overseas Protective Operations
1801 North Lynn Street, Rosslyn, VA 22209
Telephone:
571-345-2395 (direct)
571-345-2400 (fax)
202-345-0680 (cell)

This email is unclassified based on the definitions provided in E.O. 12958, as amended

From: Hipp, Mark J
Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2007 6:57 AM
To: Gibson, Gary M; Starr, Greg
Cc: Sincavage, Justine M
Subject: FW: Condolences Pay

Gary/Greg,
FYI...It appears that our personnel in Irbil divert a sticky situation is the escalation of force against a local judge. After direct negotiations with the judge, the matter was resolved in a professional and satisfactory manner to all involved. Mark

From: Miller, Earl R (Baghdad)
Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2007 6:20 AM
To: Hipp, Mark J
Cc: Bennett, David R; McDermott, James P; Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad); Hanni, Robert W (Baghdad)
Subject: FW: Condolences Pay

Mark: There was an Escalation of Force incident in Irbil on July 16 (Spot Report 071607-07) that resulted in our PSD members firing into the grill of a vehicle driven by a local civilian affairs judge. We are investigating the incident and it appears to have been an entirely justified use of appropriate force.

Note the superb diplomacy of Zach as he deals with this incident. Great initiative and leadership for a FS-04.

I will deal with the repercussions, if any, here. I briefed the Ambassador and DCM the day of the incident and am ready to brief again our solid and proven EOF policy, etc. if necessary. FYI - over the past six months in Baghdad alone RSO provided protection for 1174 moves and had only 28 EOFs. Considering our murderous VBIED and IED threat that is not bad.

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Zach

From: Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad)(Baghdad)
Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2007 8:32 AM
To: Zittle, Zachariah (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO)
Cc: Swoyer, Edward J (Baghdad)(Baghdad); Miller, Earl R (Baghdad)(Baghdad)
Subject: Condolences Pay

If you have a mechanism for getting the cash up there before your meeting with the Judge, the DCM has authorized an immediate \$1000 payout. If no, get the paperwork done and we will get you the cash.

Rick

Rick Colon
Deputy Regional Security Officer
U.S. Embassy Baghdad - Iraq
GSM: (914) 360-4549 / DSN: 239-5907
Email: ColonR@state.gov
ClassNet: ColonR@state.sgov.gov

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

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U.S. Embassy Baghdad

July 23, 2007



SPOT REPORT- 072307-01

SUBJECT: RPG Attack Against the Basrah Regional Embassy Office**REPORTING OFFICE:** RSO Basrah, Iraq

SUMMARY: On 07/23/07, at approximately 0105 hours, a RPG was launched against the REO front gate. The RPG fell short of the REO front gate. REO security forces fired several well aimed bursts at the firing point. Enemy KIA/WIA are unknown. No damage or injuries were sustained.

RSO ACTION: REO Basrah is on a continued state of alert. The RSO continues to coordinate with coalition forces regarding the daily attacks. All personnel are required to wear PPE while outdoors.

LOCATION: Regional Embassy Office (REO), Basrah, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: Ryan Evans, Watch Officer

APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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RS-2007-00243: 20070806 EOF, Kirkuk REO Spot Report.

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00062

Impact:

Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070806 EOF, Kirkuk REO Spot Report

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04664

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Hammond

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore	ASAC	BAGHDAD
Hammond, Kory H	ARSO	BAGHDAD
Motley, David	DUTY AGENT	BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On August 6th, 2007, members of a Kirkuk RSO PSD were involved in an Escalation of Force incident.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
08/27/2007	Attached are documents prov...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
20070806 Spot Report-01 EOF...	MS Word	271 kB

Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

08/27/2007	OPEN
08/27/2007	CLOSED
09/01/2007	OPEN
09/01/2007	OPEN
09/01/2007	CLOSED

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Case Summary

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RS-2007-00247: 20070806 EOF, Kirkuk REO

REGIONAL SECURITY
BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00064

Impact:
Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070806 EOF, Kirkuk REO

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:
■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04663

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Hammond

Phone:

Source Comments:

Synopsis

On August 6th, 2007, members of a Kirkuk RSO PSD were involved in an Escalation of Force incident.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
08/27/2007	Attached are documents prov...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
20070806 Kirkuk PSD EOF	MS Word	93 kB

Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

08/27/2007	OPEN
08/27/2007	CLOSED
09/01/2007	OPEN
09/01/2007	OPEN
09/01/2007	CLOSED

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore	ASAC	BAGHDAD
Hammond, Kory H	ARSO	BAGHDAD
Motley, David	DUTY AGENT	BAGHDAD

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United States Department of State
Claims and Condolence Payment Program

The Procedure for filing a claim is:

- 1) A family representative must fill out the attached form
- 2) The form and the listed supporting documentation must be provided to the U.S. Embassy, Regional Security Office Section;
 - Police report
 - Sworn statements
 - Medical/Hospital/Autopsy reports
 - Any available photos
- 3) The submission is reviewed by the Embassy Board
- 4) The Board evaluates and prescribes an amount and presents it to Management
- 5) The payment is made to the family and a receipt is obtained

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLAIMS AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENT PROGRAM

SUMMARY

The U.S. Department of State has approved a claims and condolence payment program in Iraq. The main goal of this program is to make payment to innocent Iraqi civilians who suffer certain kinds of losses (death, injury or property damage) as a result of the official conduct of Personal Security Detail (PSD) contractors. The Department of State (DOS) only will make payments for the actions of its civilian PSDs; it is not authorized to make payments on behalf of civilian PSDs not employed by DOS. Because the principal task of PSDs is to transport DOS officials throughout Iraq, claims are most likely to arise from PSD conduct while providing such transportation. The size of the payments will vary depending on the degree of fault, if any, of the PSD contractors and the degree of fault, if any, of the Iraqi civilians involved in the incident. For purposes of adjudicating such claims, DOS will make the final determination as to whether the conduct engaged in by the PSD contractors followed applicable rules and procedures, and as to whether the Iraqi claimant was in any way at fault. Nevertheless, because the purpose of the program is to make payments to innocent Iraqi civilians who suffer a loss, DOS will make payments regardless of whether PSD contractors follow applicable rules and procedures. The payment amounts will be roughly similar to the amounts that the United States Army pays under its Foreign Claims Program for similar losses arising from similar conduct by U.S. military personnel.

Iraqi civilians who believe that a DOS PSD contractor has caused them a loss should fill out a DOS claims form and provide all relevant documentation to support their claim. Claimants may obtain claims forms from Baghdad police precincts, the Iraqi Assistance Center at the Convention Center, or the Regional Embassy Offices [PRTs] throughout Iraq. Once claimants have completed a claims form, the DOS Regional Security Office (RSO) will investigate the incident to determine whether a DOS PSD caused the loss and whether any party is at fault for the alleged damage. The relevant RSO will prepare a Report of Investigation that the RSO at Embassy Baghdad will review to ensure its accuracy. If the claim merits payment, DOS will decide on an appropriate level of payment, taking into account both the existence of fault and the amount of damages claimed. DOS then will invite the claimant to receive payment. When the claimant accepts payment, he or she agrees that such payment constitutes a final settlement for the claimant, his agent or legal representative, and any person on whose behalf (or for whose benefit) the claim was presented, of any claims arising out of the incident that caused the loss. The claimant also agrees to release DOS, the contractor, the United States Government, or any U.S. Government or contractor personnel from future liability or claims based upon that incident.

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b7E, F

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 01 July 07

Location: _____

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

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↓

Date of Incident: 01 July 07

Time of Incident: 1128

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO _____

Personnel Involved: _____

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↓

Incident Synopsis: On 1 Jul 07 at 1128 hours, _____ a Tactical Support Team (TST) was on return to the IZ from a staging point when approximately four (4) rounds of Small Arms Fire (SAF) was directed at the motorcade. _____ was traveling south and in the vicinity of _____ when the passenger of a white pick-up fired the rounds in the direction of the motorcade. Due to the heavy concentration of vehicular traffic and pedestrians, _____ did not return fire and continued to the IZ without further incident. There was no damage to CoM assets or injuries to CoM personnel.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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(P)
b7E, F**INCIDENT REPORT***This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.***Date of Report:** 01 July 2007**Location:** _____**Task Order:** 6**Person Releasing Report:** Scott Bruggemann**Title of Person Releasing Report:** RTOC Commander

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Date of Incident: 01 July 2007**Time of Incident:** 1509 hours**Contractor Involved:** Blackwater**Detail Location of Incident:** 300 meters west of last bridge before _____**Personnel Involved:** BW _____ (TTT)

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Incident Synopsis: On 1 July 2007 at 1509 hours, _____ a Tactical Transport Team (TTT) comprised of _____ vehicles _____ was providing tactical transport duties from the International Zone to BIAP. As _____ drove about 300 meters past the last bridge before _____ a silver van containing 1 male occupant approached the _____ motorcade at a high rate of speed. The team members used verbal, hand and arm signals, and deployed pen flares, but the driver of the van failed to obey these signals to stop.

In an escalation of force, the turret gunner of the lead vehicle and an ERV vehicle fired a total of approximately twenty (20) _____ rounds from their _____ into the hood of the silver van, causing it to immediately pull over to the side of the road.

_____ reported that there were no apparent injuries to the occupants of the van. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. _____ continued to BIAP without further incident.

Outline injuries if applicable: N/A**Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence:** N/A**Personnel Notified of Incident:** RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief**Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident:** N/A**Additional Reports Generated:** DOS Spot Report.

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From: VanHorn, Aaron (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO) [a.vanhorn@state.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2007 7:23 PM

To: Hammond, Kory M (Baghdad)

Subject: RE: Use of Force ROI's

Attachments: Copy of 031907SIR.xls; Spot Report 031907 EOF Erbil.doc; ROI Erbil PSD Shooting.doc; 031907 EOF.pdf

Kory,
I will send an email for each date. This is for 3/19/07.

Aaron

From: Hammond, Kory M (Baghdad)(Baghdad)

Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2007 6:15 PM

To: VanHorn, Aaron (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO); Zittle, Zachariah (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO); Rowe, James AJ (Kirkuk)(Kirkuk); Hislop, John T (Kirkuk)(Kirkuk); Murray, Thomas (Al Hillah); Bachmann, Bryan T (Basrah)(Basra)

Cc: Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad)(Baghdad); Davidson, Jonathan H (Baghdad)(Baghdad); Martinec, John B (Baghdad)

Subject: Use of Force ROI's

Gentlemen,

The RSO would like us to ensure all PSD Use of Force/Escalation of Force incidents are centrally documented in IMS. The investigations office will get your information uploaded, but we need your assistance.

If you would please forward us any Spot Reports, ROI's, and Team Member statements you have for PSD shootings, going back to Jan 1st, 2007, we will get it into IMS. Additionally, any future Use of Force ROI's should be forwarded to us for inclusion as well.

Thanks.

Kory M. Hammond

Assistant Regional Security Officer
American Embassy Baghdad

Cell: [redacted]
Email: HammondKM@state.gov

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This e-mail is UNCLASSIFIED in accordance with E.O. 12958

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(P)

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DECLASSIFIED: *Boon*

Basrah REO, Iraq

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Time of Incident: 1615 hrs.

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b7E

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Direction/Distance: 315 degree / 400 meters from [redacted] position

Prior Course of Action: Observed Local Nationals that where making attempts to tamper with suspect vehicle prior to vehicle inspection by Iraqi Police Service. Advised to shoot the vehicle to detour Local Nationals from tampering with it before the area could be investigated by the Iraqi Police.

Incident Synopsis: Engaged the passenger side corner of the front bumper with one round from an _____ to detour advancing Local National. Upon hearing the impact of the round, the Local National continued NW from suspect vehicle on A bicycle.

Injuries if applicable: No injuries from DDM shot

Personnel Notified of Incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated:

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ENGAGEMENT REPORT

(P)

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Date of Report:

DECLASSIFIED

July 4, 2007

Location:

Basrah REO, Iraq

Date of Incident: July 4, 2007

Time of Incident: 1615 hrs.

Name of FSS Supervisor Involved:

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Detail Location of Incident/Post:

[REDACTED]

Weapon Used:

[REDACTED]

b7E

Estimated number of shots fired: 3 (three)

Direction/Distance: 315 degree / 300 meters from Post.

Target zone/area: Vehicle grill / Engine block

Prior Course of Action: Observed Local Nationals that were making attempts to tamper with suspect vehicle prior to vehicle inspection by Iraqi Police Service.

Advised to shoot the vehicle to detour Local Nationals from tampering with it before the area could be investigated by the Iraqi Police.

Incident Synopsis: Suspects approached vehicles on 3 separate occasions. Fired into engine block of suspect vehicle.

Injuries if applicable: No injuries from [REDACTED] shots

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Personnel Notified of Incident: GFC, RSO

Additional Reports Generated: No

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ENGAGEMENT REPORT

(P)

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b7C

Date of Report:

DECLASSIFIED 7/4/2007

Location:

Basrah REO, Iraq

U0019

Date of Incident:

7/4/2007

Time of Incident:

1545

Name of FSS Supervisor Involved:

[]

b6 b7C

Detail Location of Incident/Post:

[]

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Weapon Used:

[]

↓

Estimated number of shots fired:

10

Direction/Distance:

300 degrees/300 meters

Target zone/area

Straight out from [] right side of road

Prior Course of Action:

[] was engaged with SAF

Incident Synopsis:

SEE ATTACHED INCIDENT REPORT

Injuries if applicable: None

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO and chain of command

Additional Reports Generated: Incident Report

DECLASSIFIED

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

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Date of Report: 7/4/2007

Location: [redacted]

Task Order:

Person Releasing Report: [redacted]

Title of Person Releasing Report: Fixed Site Supervisor

Date of Incident: 7/4/2007

Time of Incident: 1545

Contractor Involved: [redacted]

Detail Location of Incident: Basrah

Incident Synopsis: As the Iraqi workers were leaving base, [redacted] received a heavy barrage of SAF from the vicinity of [redacted]. Once the gunfire stopped I instructed the workers to remain under [redacted]. I then manned tower [redacted] with TCN, [redacted]. A red car was driving counter-flow 300 meters outside of [redacted]. It stopped in the middle of the street, and 2 Iraqi males exited the car carrying AK-47's. I fired approximately 10 rounds out of the [redacted] at them. I hit the left most Iraqi as the one on the right side ran away. I observed the injured Iraqi crawl behind the vehicle. His accomplice pulled him from behind the vehicle, and out of sight. Neither men were seen again. The car remained in the road with it's doors opened, traffic continue as normal. Several "civilians" came to the scene in order to investigate, but were repelled with warning shots by DDM's. Iraqi police arrived on the scene approximately 45 minutes later.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: Remain vigilant while on duty at [redacted]. We should come up with a new plan for releasing the Iraqi worker because I think they were the targets of the insurgents.

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO and entire chain of command.

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: I believe [redacted] will continue to suffer SAF and IDF. The insurgents may retaliate with RPG attacks on [redacted]

0311:3070:30

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

1170798 (P)

b7E, F

Date of Report: 04 July 07

Location: Basrah REO, Iraq

Task Order: 007

Person Releasing Report: Jeffrey Huber

Title of Person Releasing Report: Project Manager

U0021

Date of Incident: 04 July 2007

Time of Incident: Approx. 1545 hours

Contractor Involved: Triple Canopy, Inc.

Detail Location of Incident: U.S. Embassy Compound

Incident Synopsis: On 04 July 2007, at approximately 1545 hrs, [] received automatic weapons firing. It was believed that these firing were targeting Local Nationals (LN) departing the REO after work. Fix Site [] personnel moved all LN's to a bunker located near []. A few minutes later a red car was spotted moving towards the [] against traffic and stopped approximately 300 meters from the gate. Two males exited the vehicle with AK weapons and showed aggression by aiming their weapons towards []. At this time Fix Site supervisor fired approximately 10 rounds from his [] at the individuals and injured one of aggressors. The injured person crawled behind the vehicle, the other individual moved to him, place their weapons in the vehicle and assisted the wounded by pulling him out of site of observation.

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It is believed that the first group that fired against [] was still in the area and that this last two were part of the team.

TCN QRF was deployed to [] and a [] vehicle QRF with Bearcat was stood up.

British was notified and requested to move to area and secure vehicle and weapons.

1559: Intel personnel from British showed up at []

1605: RSO requested British to deploy QRF due to possible wounded and weapons on scene

1608: British informed TC TOC that they would not deploy QRF, that it was an IP situation since it involved Iraqi citizens?????

1610: British advised that IP had been contacted

1610-1615: UKM's on separate occasions moved toward vehicle, well aimed shots fired at safe areas as a warning to stay away per RSO instructions

1615: IP's arrived

1733: UKM arrived, moved to vehicle, removed unknown items then moved and entered adjacent building.

1740: All personnel returned normal business

TO DO

Outline injuries if applicable: Believed wounded one aggressor

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: None

Personnel Notified of Incident: JEMPO

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: None

Additional Reports Generated: None

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LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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CRITICISM

(P)

Diplomatic Security Service
Baghdad

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

00022

DS Case Number RS-2007-00251	Case Title 20070704, Use of Force Triple Canopy NEC	ROI Type CASE FINAL	Report Date 04-JUL-07
Case Type ADMINISTRATIVE	Program REGIONAL SECURITY	Dates Investigated 04-JUL-07 - 04-JUL-07	
Case Impact	Case Status CLOSED	Open/Close Case Dates 02-Sep-2007 - 02-Sep-2007	

On July 4th, 2007, I was notified by personnel in the RSO TOC that two Triple Canopy Guard Force members had been involved in a use of force incident in the vicinity of the New Embassy Compound (NEC). There were no reported injuries to COM property or personnel, and unknown injuries (if any) to the suspects.

I responded to the guard force camp and spoke with the following individuals:

☐ Guard Force Member
☐ Guard Force Member
☐ Guard Force Supervisor
☐ Triple Canopy Site Lead

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and were the only two involved in the incident and they told me the following:

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While working foot patrol along the riverside behind the NEC Villas, they were suddenly engaged by several rifle rounds from an unknown individual(s) across the river.

The guards immediately ran for cover and took up a defensive position inside a bunker, looking toward the direction of the hostile fire from a small opening in the wall. While doing so they began to see muzzle flashes coming from an area across the river, and rounds began to impact on and around the bunker they were in.

The guards immediately began to return defensive fire toward the threat, which was in the dark and between six to eight hundred meters away. fired one round from his (his weapon malfunctioned and prevented him from firing), and fired nine rounds from his. The hostile fire ceased and the guards maintained a defensive position until support arrived. There were no injuries to CoM personnel or property.

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This incident was reported immediately to the RSO TOC and is within RSO Baghdad's use of force policy.

Reporting Official:

Hammond, Kory H
ARSO

Jul-04-07 00:00

Distribution:

Approving Official(s):

Hammond, Kory H- APPROVED
ARSO

Aug-25-07 10:30

INFORME N° 001

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To:

SITE lead

TE. [REDACTED] b6
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From:

SEC. GUARD TC. [REDACTED]

DATE: July 04 2007

I REPORT The Following:

1- AT 21:45 hrs Aprox. I WAS ON DUTY ON RIVER SIDE
VILLAS TOGETHER WITH THE SEC. GUARD [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WE WERE COVERING THIS POST. b6
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2- AT 21:48 hrs. WE WERE WATCHING AND KEEPING
OUR POSITIONS AND OBSERVING A SHOOT AT
THE LEFT SIDE A FEW METERS FROM US. IMMEDIATELY
WE PROCEED TO PROTECT OURSELVES IN A SEC.
BUNKER THAT WAS PRETTY CLOSE. FROM US
FROM THIS AREA WE OBSERVE THE LIGHTNING
AND COVERING WE OBSERVED A BIG LIGHTNING
COMING FROM THE FIRE COMING FROM THE
OTHER EDGE OF THE RIVER TO PERHAPS 2 TO
3 THAT THESE SHOTS WERE A FEW METERS
AT THE RIGHT SIDE OF OUR UBICATION.

3- WE PROCEEDED TO CHARGE THE RIFLE BECAUSE
WE HAD THE EXACT POSITION FROM WHERE THE SHOTS
WERE COMING WHEN I HEARD THE VOICE OF
FIRE. PERHAPS 3 OR 4 SHOTS. THAT'S WHEN MY
PARTNER [REDACTED] REPORTS TO ME THAT HIS RIFLE WAS
STUCK. AT ALL THE TIME I WAS OBSERVING
THE LIGHTNING THAT WAS CONSTANT AT THAT
POINT. MY PARTNER ASKS ME TO COVER HIM
SHOTS MORE IN THE

SHALE DIRECTION, REPORTING HIM THAT HIS RIFLE
WAS STUCK. AND I SAID HIM MY RIFLE TO
COVER ME. UNTIL THAT MOMENT I HEARD SHOOTING
AND HE ANSWERED THEM. WHILE I WAS VERIFYING
HIS RIFLE. LATER, AFTER A FEW MINUTES EVERY
THING WAS SILENT, WHEN THE SUPERVISOR ARRIVE
IN CHARGE OF THE PERSONNEL OF SUPPORT. AND
THE SITE LEAD TO REPORT ^{b6}
HIM THE INCIDENT AND TELLING HIM THAT MY
PARTNERS' RIFLE WAS STUCKED ALL THE TIME.
AND LATER THEY VERIFY THE INCIDENT.

4. Es Todo - THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO REPORT

SEC. GUARD TO: ^{b6}
^{b7c}

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INFORM # 001

~~SECRET~~

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To : ~~SECRET~~

SITE LEAD

T.C

U0024

From : ~~SECRET~~

SECURITY GUARD.

Topic: ASIT'S MENTION

DATE: July 4th 2007.

I Report The Following:

- 1.- AT 9:45 P.M. Approximatell. I WAS COVERING MY DUTY SERVICE AT RIVERSIDE POST. villas, Together with THE SEC GUARD ~~SECRET~~. I NOTICE THAT AT THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RIVER ON THE RED ZONE THERE WERE TWO POLICE CARS PASSING BY.
- 2- When we Heard A SHOOT AT THE LEFT SIDE, A FEW METERS FROM US. THE POLICE CARS, WENT BACKWARD AND POSSIBLY THEY RUN AWAY FROM THIS ZONE. BECAUSE I DIDN'T SEE THEM. ANY MORE. WHILE WE WERE HIDING IN A BUNKER MADE OF SACKS THAT WERE VERY CLOSE TO US. I REPORT TO MY SUPERVISOR THAT THERE WAS DIRECT FIRE AGAINST US. WHILE HIDING WE OBSERVE THE LIGHTNING FROM A SHOT COMING FROM THE FRONT OF OUR POSITION (RED-ZONE) PERHAPS RIFLES TWO OR THREE SHOTS, WHICH WERE DIRECTED TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF OUR POSITION. I GAVE THE VOICE TO MY PARTNER ~~SECRET~~ OF RECHARGE HIS WEAPON AND ESTABLISH A SHOOTING LINE.
- 3- AT THAT MOMENT WE HAD ALREADY HAD THE EXACT POSITIONAL FROM WHERE THE SHOTS WERE LEAVING

And when I GAVE THE VOICE OF FIRE. To my
Partner because I am veteran in Iraq
AND WITH MORE EXPERIENCE I HAD TO DIRECT THE
ATTACK THAT'S WHEN I NOTICE THAT MY RIFLE
WAS STUCK WHILE MY PARTNER WAS COVERING
ME AND I WAS VERIFYING AND CLEANING MY
RIFLE, I TOLD MY PARTNER THAT MY RIFLE WAS
STUCK, I MADE THE CORRESPONDANT CLEANING.
TOOK OFF THE MAGAZINE, RECHARGED THE
RIFLE, IT EJECTED THE AMMUNITION THAT WAS
INSIDE I PUT THE MAGAZINE AGAIN ON
I RECHARGED AGAIN AND THIS ONE CONTINUE
STUCKED, I REPEATED THE SAME PROCEDURE
FOR THE SECOND TIME AND I TOLD MY PARTNER
TO COVER ME AND I GAVE HIM MY RIFLE TO
RELEASE THE RIFLE. AND HE GAVE ME HIS RIFLE
AND I COVERED HIM, WHILE ~~HE~~ AT THE SAME
TIME WAS REPORTING ON THE RADIO TO MY SUPERVISOR
THAT THE FIRE WAS CONSTANT AND DIRECT ~~IT~~
SHOOTED WHERE THE LIGHTNING WAS COMING OUT
AFTER ~~SOME~~ MINUTES EVERY THING WAS CALM
AT THAT MOMENT MY SUPERVISOR ARRIVED
WITH THE PERSONNEL TO HELP ME AND ALSO
THE SITE LEAD VERY FLYING THE INCIDENT AND
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE RIFLE WAS STILL
STUCKED. THIS IS ALL I HAVE TO INFORM.



DECLASSIFIED

TRIPLE CANOPY
Secure Success.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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U0025

Orders For Baghdad Embassy Security Force
Contract (BESF)

Contract Number:
S-AQMPD-05-C1189

Effective Date:
01NOV05

Location: All Guard Force Personnel / IZ

Expiration Date:
31OCT06

Topic: Incident Report/Unusual Occurrence

Contractor: TRIPLE CANOPY

INCIDENT / UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE

Nature of Incident / UO	AK Fire Received by Villa Lagoon Patrol
Date / Time occurred	2145 hrs., 4 July 2007
Date / Time Reported to TOC	2149 hrs., 4 July
Person Reporting Incident / UO	<u> </u> Site Lead
Exact Location of Incident / UO	River Road Behind Villa 6
Company / Dept./ Group Involved	Triple Canopy
Personnel Involved	<u> </u> Complex Lead, TC# <u> </u> Site Lead, TC# <u> </u> Supervisor Relief, TC# <u> </u> Guard, TC# <u> </u> Guard, TC# <u> </u> MCI#
Contact information (Phone MCI/IRAQNA/COMMERCIAL) (e-mail)	<u> </u> MCI#
Witnesses to the Incident / UO	<u> </u> Guard, TC# <u> </u> Guard, TC# <u> </u> MCI#
Witnesses - Contact Information	

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INJURY TO PERSON (S)

Injured Person	N/A
Company	N/A
Nature of Injury	N/A
Equipment / Persons Causing Injury	N/A
Details of First Aid / Medical Attention / Hospitalization / Evacuation / Leave	N/A

Company / Person Responsible for Machinery / Equipment Involved	N/A
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PROPERTY - DAMAGE / LOSS / THEFT

Description of Property Damaged / Lost / Stolen	NA
Owner / Person Responsible for Property	NA
Nature of Damage / Loss	NA
Estimated Cost of Damage / Property (if available) with written confirmation	NA
Object / Equipment / Substance / Person Causing Damage	NA
Stolen Property Recovered	N/A

INCIDENT / UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

DESCRIPTION

Describe clearly and accurately how the Incident / UO Occurred.

On 4 July 2007, Approx 2145 hrs, I was contacted by _____ that the roving patrol behind the Villa's had received fire. I arrived at the post at 2147 hrs, and Supervisor relief _____ was on site and briefed me that the guards had received AK fire from the south across the river. I called Complex Lead _____ and the TC representative at the RSO TOC and informed them of the situation. Further information was translated to me by Supervisor _____. At approximately 2143 the guards (_____ Guard, TC# _____ and _____ Guard, TC# _____) were behind Villa 6 when they heard a round strike to the east of their position. They took cover behind a sandbag bunker and contacted their supervisor. Two more rounds struck to the west of their position. The guards then saw the muzzle flash from two weapons shooting automatic fire from across the river. The guards returned fire with ten shots aimed at the muzzle flashes. During the time the guards returned fire, there were two additional bursts of automatic fire. Once the fire ceased, the guards ceased firing. I called _____ and the TC representative at the RSO TOC and relayed this additional information. Complex Lead _____ arrived on site and had me secure the weapons and magazines and take the guards to the Jackson office to write statements on the incident. ARSO Kory Hammond was at the office when we arrived he talked with the guards. He requested that a copy of my report and the statements from the guards be forwarded to his office.

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ACTION

State what immediate Incident / Crisis Management measures were taken and any actions still under way or proposed.

- Guards _____ and _____ Immediately took cover and notified their supervisor.
- The guards returned fire once the threat was identified.
- The guards ceased fire when the threat was gone.
- They maintained their defensive positions until I arrived.
- I secured the guards weapons and magazines
- I took the guards to Camp Jackson to prepare their statements
- The guards talked to ARSO Hammond
- I wrote this report
- The guards are preparing their statements

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ANALYSIS

List what acts, failure to act and/or conditions caused or contributed to the Incident / UO.

TBD

PREVENTION	
Detail what actions have been taken or are recommended to prevent future recurrence.	
TBD	DECLASSIFIED

Submitted By:	bc brc
Position:	Site Lead
Date:	4 July 2007

ATTACH PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE IF APPLICABLE

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED

U0026



U.S. Embassy Baghdad

July 6, 2007



Spot Report 070607-06

Subject: COM PSD Team Fires on Aggressive Vehicle**Reporting Office:** RSO TOC - Kirkuk

Summary: On 6 July 2007, at approximately 1826, a Kirkuk [redacted] vehicle COM PSD motorcade [redacted] en-route from the Erbil USAID compound to the Kirkuk REO encountered an aggressive black 4 door sedan (possibly BMW) with two military age males. 67E, F

[redacted] was at a red light behind stopped traffic in a [redacted] preparing to turn right. The follow vehicle was running with hazard lights on and the well gunner had his window open signaling vehicles to stop. The right and left rear gunners had their doors open signaling vehicles of the motorcades presence. All vehicles were either stopped or moving slowly to the far right or left side of the convoy. 67E, F

To the rear of the motorcade, a black 4 door sedan was traveling thru the stopped traffic at a high rate of speed, passing and weaving in between all the other stopped or slow moving vehicles in the direction of the motorcade. The right and left rear gunners of the follow car continued signaling the driver to stop with hand signals, using a flashlight as well as throwing a water bottle in the direction of the sedan. The aggressive vehicle continued traveling and maneuvering thru the other stopped vehicles.

DECLASSIFIED

The right door gunner had eye contact with the driver of the sedan and prior to firing muzzled his weapon attempting to waive the driver off. Four to five car lengths out or approximately 35 yards from the follow vehicle, the right rear gunner fired one round into the grill of the sedan. The sedan swerved to the right and stopped. All occupants appeared to be uninjured.

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[redacted] continued through the intersection and continued to REO Kirkuk with no further incidents. One COM personnel was in the motorcade and no one was injured during the incident.

RSO Action: PSD members were debriefed and written statements are forthcoming. RSO will complete a ROI and provide documentation to the RSCC upon completion.

Location: Approximately 8 km south of USAID Compound, Erbil, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: John Hislop, RSO Kirkuk, Iraq
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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Report #:9 22-07	Incident-Casualty Report WPPS	Report Date/Time: 7 July 2007/0900
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REPORTING INFORMATION

6 July 2007/1820	INCIDENT LOCATION: ES Erbil, Iraq (38S MF 10969 01660)	
TOTAL # PERSONNEL: 4	KIA: 0	WIA: 0

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: Shoot to disable/Escalation of Force	
REPORTED BY: [REDACTED]	METHOD: Radio
POINT OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]	TEL# [REDACTED]

VICTIM INFORMATION

NAME (LAST, FIRST MI): Unkn	
SSN: None	DOB: UNK
NATIONALITY: Unknown (local)	M/F: Mx2
PASSPORT: UNK	ISSUED/EXP: UNK
NATIONALITY: UNK	BLOOD TYPE: UNK
INJURIES: None observed	
STATUS:	
PROGNOSIS: No injuries	
HOME OF RECORD: UNK	NEXT OF KIN: UNK

PROPERTY/EVIDENCE

CODE:	DESCRIPTION:	VALUE:	CURRENT LOCATION:
D	Black 4Dr BMW	UNK	Unknown. Last Seen at [REDACTED]

NARRATIVE

At approximately 1824 on 6 July 2007 a Dyn Corp motorcade was traveling from the Erbil International Airport to the U.S. REO in Kirkuk. As the motorcade approached the intersection at [REDACTED] the traffic was stopped because the traffic signal was red. After the motorcade stopped the left and right rear of the follow vehicle opened their doors to stop traffic from approaching the rear of the motorcade. The follow vehicle has a "warning, stay back 100 meters" sign posted on the rear of the vehicle in Arabic and English. The vehicle had it's hazard lights on, the left and right rear were using hand and arm signals and flashlights to keep traffic stopped approximately one hundred meters from the motorcade. After being stopped for a few seconds the left rear called out that a black, four door BMW was coming around the traffic and crossing over to the right side of the motorcade. The right rear saw the vehicle approaching and began using hand and arm signals, his flashlight, and displaying his weapon to signal the driver to stop. The vehicle continued toward the motorcade and the right rear fired one round from his rifle into the engine block area of the vehicle. The vehicle pulled over to the right side of the road and stopped. There

ADDITIONAL VICTIM INFORMATION

VICTIM INFORMATION

NAME (LAST, FIRST MI):	
SSN:	DOB:
NATIONALITY:	M/F:
PASSPORT:	ISSUED/EXP:
NATIONALITY:	BLOOD TYPE:
INJURIES:	
STATUS:	
PROGNOSIS:	
HOME OF RECORD:	NEXT OF KIN:

VICTIM INFORMATION

NAME (LAST, FIRST MI):	
SSN:	DOB:
NATIONALITY:	M/F:
PASSPORT:	ISSUED/EXP:
NATIONALITY:	BLOOD TYPE:
INJURIES:	
STATUS:	
PROGNOSIS:	
HOME OF RECORD:	NEXT OF KIN:

VICTIM INFORMATION	
NAME (LAST, FIRST MI):	
SSN:	DOB:
NATIONALITY:	M/F:
PASSPORT:	ISSUED/EXP:
NATIONALITY:	BLOOD TYPE:
INJURIES:	
STATUS:	
PROGNOSIS:	
HOME OF RECORD:	NEXT OF KIN:

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

~~DRP~~ 67E, F



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



TITLE COM PSD (Kirkuk) Fires on Aggressive Vehicle		DS CASE NUMBER / REPORT NUMBER 7/6/2007 - Kirkuk	
TRUE NAME N/A		CASE TYPE Use of Force	
POST Kirkuk	DATE REPORTED 07-06-2007	DATES INVESTIGATED 07/07/2007 - 07/07/2007	REPORTING AGENT RSO Hislop

SYNOPSIS


Summary: On July 7, 2007, at approximately 1826 hrs, a Kirkuk [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade, [] enroute from Erbil to Kirkuk REO fired on a vehicle after determining that the vehicle posed an immediate threat to their motorcade. This use of force was appropriate and within the parameters of DS use-of force policy. Injuries to the two occupants in the threat vehicle were not observed. End Summary.

The following chain of events is derived from the statements provided by the team members involved in the shooting:

1. [] was enroute from the Erbil to the Kirkuk REO when they encountered an aggressive black BMW four door sedan with two military age males. [] was stopped at red light in a bubble formation preparing to turn right. The follow vehicle had its hazards lights on, red lettering (warning) on the rear of the vehicle as well as the right and left rear gunners out on the running boards using hand and verbal signals for all approaching vehicles to stop or push far to the right or left. All vehicles were complying.
2. At 50 meters out, a black BMW traveling at a high rate of speed and passing all other vehicles approached the motorcade. The rear gunners, with direct eye contact with the driver, continued signaling the driver to stop. The driver failed to slow and the right rear gunner muzzled his weapon attempting to waive off the driver. [] and in fear of his life and those in the motorcade, the right rear gunner fired one round into the grill of the vehicle.
3. The vehicle swerved to the right and stopped. The two occupants looked at the motorcade and no injuries were noted. [] proceeded to the REO Kirkuk with no further incidents. One COM personnel was in the motorcade and no one was injured during the incident. Case Closed.

COPIES REFERRED
REVIEWED BY AGENT SUPERVISOR
_____ (Initials)
_____ (Date)

50249-101
*GPO : 1981 O - 341-526(6549)



OPTIONAL FORM 249
(FORMERLY DS-838)
JULY 1996
DEPT. OF STATE

Exempt From Automatic Decontrol By Statute
CONTENT MUST NOT BE DISCLOSED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS



JOC29

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Sworn Statement

Date 7-7-07	Time 0730
Location J.S. REO Kirkuk	

I, ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to

John Hislop, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the
U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

On 06 July 2007, I was seated in the right rear seat of the last vehicle in the motorcade. The motorcade came to a stop in the left lane due to traffic in the intersection ahead. (Left rear) and I had all traffic to the rear stopped. We then saw a vehicle, a black BMW, weaving in and out of these stopped vehicles approaching the motorcade. had already flashed his flashlight and also threw a water bottle. I heard yell "You're side, Your side"! I opened the door and waved the car to stop. It did not and started to accelerate towards us. I showed my weapon and again waved for the vehicle to stop. It did not. I stepped out of the vehicle and brought my weapon to the low ready, making myself visible, continuing to wave it to stop. It kept coming. I brought my weapon up and pointed at the lower front of the vehicle and waved again for the vehicle to stop. The vehicle kept coming. I sighted in on the vehicle's lower grill and with a very well aimed shot fired once. The vehicle was approximately thirty meters from me. The vehicle then began to stop very quickly. I got back in the vehicle and the motorcade left the area. I felt that I had no other option and that that vehicle was a real threat. It did not stop after multiple warnings and continued to approach the motorcade. Fearing my own personal safety and that of the whole team, I took what I felt the least amount of force necessary to remove the opportunity and capability of that threat. Also, our vehicle was clearly marked in the rear in both Arabic and English to stay back 100 meters.

The shift leader, and the driver, were also present in the rear vehicle. This occurred at 1824 hours at . I feel I completely followed the rules of engagement for the use of force briefed by my shift leader prior to this movement.

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03:15:38:1030

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

DECLASSIFIED

Signed
Printed
Address
U.S. REO Kirkuk

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 7th day of

July, 20 07.

Signed	
Printed	
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE	

Witness Signature
Printed
Address
U.S. REO KIRKUK



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0000000000

Sworn Statement

Date
07 July 2007Time
0730

Location

U.S. REO Kirkuk

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I, _____, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to

John Hislop, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

On 06 July, 2007, at 1821 P.M., I was the driver of the _____ Fighting Follow vehicle from Erbil returning to REO Kirkuk. As we drove east approaching _____, we encountered a red traffic light. The TC instructed all vehicles to position to the left side of the road with the _____ against the median. I positioned my vehicle off the right rear _____ and provide security. I was looking across the median behind the Limo and alternating between my mirrors as I scanned for threats. As we waited for the traffic signal to turn green, _____ (Medic left rear), announced that a vehicle was coming around the many stopped vehicles behind us. He verbally confirmed that the Right Rear PSS _____ saw the dark vehicle approaching the right rear of our vehicle. Both rear PSS's had their doors open and were providing hand and verbal signals, as well as had used flashlights and water bottles to hold back the traffic a safe distance at the intersection. As I was checking my sector to the rear of the Limo it was announced that the vehicle was not complying to _____ escalation of force signals. I then heard a single shot fired from the right rear of the vehicle. The Shift Leader announced on the team frequency that a shot had been fired and for the TC to guide us away from the incident. The motorcade immediately used an opening in stopped traffic to turn right (South) and depart the intersection. The Shift Leader had saved the location _____ on his GPS and started to alert _____ of our situation. As I pulled our follow vehicle into the right turn I observed the dark vehicle stopped with a slight angle to the right in it's lane. The windshield was intact and the occupants showed no apparent injuries. We worked our way through the neighborhood to our original route back to Kirkuk continuing mission. ***END OF STATEMENT***

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Page 1 of 2 Pages

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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

DECLASSIFIED

Signed	[Redacted]
Printed	[Redacted]
Address	U.S. REO Kirkuk

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 06 day of July, 20 07.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	Johanna H. S. Lopez RSO.

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	M. B. Aiford
Address	U.S. REO KIRKUK

DECLASSIFIED



Sworn Statement

Sworn Statement

Date 7-7-07	Time 0740
Location U.S. REO Kirkuk, Iraq	

I, [redacted] b7C, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to

John Hislop _____, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the
U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

At 1824 on the 6th of July 7, 2007, [REDACTED] herein known as RO was traveling on mission from Erbil to Kirkuk REO in the follow vehicle in the left rear position as PSSMedic in a [REDACTED] vehicle motorcade.

At approximately [redacted] RO and [redacted] who was operating in the right rear position, and shift leader [redacted] and driver [redacted] were at said grid code, slowing at the intersection. RO and [redacted] opened rear doors to prevent vehicles from approaching motorcade and maintained secure distance from threats. In heavy traffic prior to approaching intersection RO used spot-light and verbal stop warning as per ROE's briefed by [redacted] in the morning brief and prior leaving venue 2 (Erbil International Airport).

The traffic stopped at approximately 40 meters once spot light and hand signals were used and were lined up across the road, some vehicles with emergency flashers on and some just giving a flash of headlights indicating by RO's experience and training understanding not to proceed. From the rear of the line of cars about 3 rows back a black 4 door BMW accelerated around the stopped vehicles at RO's left and accelerated past and moved to follow right side I called to "right side right side" since the vehicle moved past my line of sight to the right I heard one round from the right side of and the black BMW moved to the right side of the road and stopped. No injuries were noted by RO to the occupants (one driver and one front passenger) of the BMW. The motorcade proceeded on [redacted] route.



No further incidents. Once clearing the escalation of force area [redacted] notified [redacted] and [redacted]

Motorcade arrived to base and end of mission.

03:15:07:30


I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~


Signed	
Printed	
Address	Kirkus RCO

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 7th day of
July, 20 07.

Signed	
Printed	John H. Hurst - Pso

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	M. B. Alford
Address	U.S. RCO Kirkus

~~DECLASSIFIED~~



Sworn Statement

(P)

b6
b7C

b7E, F

00032

Date 7-7-07	Time 0730
Location U.S. REO Kirkuk	

I, ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to
John Hislop, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the
U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

On 06 July, 2007, at 1824 P.M., I was riding as Shift Leader in a motorcade from Erbil to Kirkuk, Iraq. As the motorcade came upon we attempted to hold a security "bubble" around us. The light at the intersection was red and all the follow rear gunners had stopped all traffic approaching from behind us. The fighting follow vehicle car in the motorcade) has a "warning, stay back 100 meters" sign posted on the rear of the vehicle in English and Arabic, the back hatch was open, and the rear gunners were using flashlights and hand and arm signals to communicate to other drivers on the road to stay back. After we had been stopped for a few seconds and traffic began to bunch up behind us, the left rear gunner, called out that a black 4-door BMW occupied by a driver and front seat passenger was trying to make its way through the stopped traffic and was about to try and swing around to the right side of the road from behind in an attempt to approach our motorcade. He told the right rear gunner, that the car was coming to his side, at which time identified the vehicle and began making several attempts to signal the car to stop. A few seconds later, fired a single shot to the engine block area of the vehicle and it pulled over to the right side of the road. I immediately contacted in Erbil and called in a SIT-REP to in Kirkuk. A few seconds later, our motorcade passed through the intersection and continued on its original route. No injuries observed to either driver or passenger in the suspect vehicle. ****END OF STATEMENT***

b7E, F

b6
b7C

b7E, F

03 JUL 2007 1030

log
log

July, 20 07.

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature

M.B. Aiford

Printed

M.B. Aiford

Address

4. S. RED KIRKUK

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

U0033 (P)
HT0816
67E1F

Date of Report: 08 Jul 07

Location:

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 08 Jul 07

Time of Incident: 0909

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO

Personnel Involved:

67E1F
↓

Incident Synopsis: On 8 July 2007, at 0909, a PSD team in-route to the Ministry of Oil, was in the vicinity of traveling northeast when they were slowed due to heavy traffic in the traffic circle. While the motorcade was maneuvering through traffic a sedan aggressively approached the motorcade from the rear. The driver of the sedan failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop and in an escalation of force the left rear PSD of the follow vehicle fired three (3) rounds from his rifle causing the sedan to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued to their venue without further incident.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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b7E,F

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00197: Escalation of Force - Baghdad 07082007

REGIONAL SECURITY
BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00051

Impact: LOW
Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: Escalation of Force - Baghdad 07082007

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:
■ GENERAL

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-03453

Synopsis

On July 08, 2007 a RSO PSD member fired three rounds from am! at an aggressive vehicle that was approaching the motorcade. The driver of the vehicle did not appear to be injured. b7E,F

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
07/08/2007	On July 08, 2007 at 0909, a...

Optional Case Info

Impact: LOW

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:
■ IRAQ

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
Shift Lead Statement	Adobe PDF	2,105 kB
Team Member Statements	Adobe PDF	5,980 kB

Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

07/10/2007	OPEN
07/30/2007	OPEN
08/16/2007	CLOSED

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: Regional Security Office Baghdad

Name: Swoyer

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Swoyer, Ed RSO BAGHDAD

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2003

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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b7E, FDiplomatic Security Service
Baghdad

DECLASSIFIED

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DS Case Number	Case Title	ROI Type	Report Date
RS-2007-00197	Escalation of Force - Baghdad 07082007	CASE FINAL	08-JUL-07
Case Type	Program	Dates Investigated	
ADMINISTRATIVE	REGIONAL SECURITY	08-JUL-07 -	
Case Impact	Case Status	Open/Close Case Dates	
LOW	CLOSED	30-Jul-2007 - 16-Aug-2007	

On July 08, 2007 at 0909, a [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade en-route to a venue, encountered one aggressive vehicle and used escalation of force (EOF) to disable it. The motorcade was stopped at a traffic circle when the assistant gunner of the follow vehicle observed a 4-door black sedan with one military aged male occupant aggressively moving past the stopped traffic and towards the rear of the motorcade. The follow vehicle's assistant gunner gave verbal and visual signals in attempt to stop or slow the sedan's approach. At approximately [] meters, the assistant gunner fired a pen flare that landed to the right of the approaching sedan. The sedan continued its aggressive approach and at approximately [] meters the follow vehicle's left rear gunner fired three well aimed [] rounds into the grill of the sedan. The sedan came to a controlled stop and the driver did not appear to be injured. There were no injuries to COM personnel and five COM principals were in the motorcade.

b7E, F
↓

Reporting Official:

Swoyer, Ed

RSO

Jul-08-07 00:00

Distribution:


Approving Official(s):

Swoyer, Ed- APPROVED

RSO

Aug-16-07 06:41

UNCLASSIFIED (P)

Blackwater USA		Statement Form				Date/Time of Statement 7-08-07 1430 hrs	
Name SL		Team		Incident Type Shooting Disable			
Location Of Incident (Grid or Terrain Feature)		Incident Time 0909		Incident Date 08 July 2007			

00036

Incident Report BW 07-08-07 (1) Weapons Discharge Baghdad

On 07 July 2007, [redacted] was tasked with a mission to move five Principals to the Ministry of Oil, [redacted]. Mission planning was completed on 07 July 2007 and a full Mission Brief was conducted by [redacted] Shift Leader [redacted] to all PSS Personnel at 1700 hours on 07 July 2007. During the Mission Brief it was explained that [redacted] would be operating in conjunction with [redacted] and would be conducting a [redacted] vehicle motorcade move [redacted].


The departure time (0900 hours) was briefed as well as the return to base time (1230 hours). The brief also included Vehicle Load Plan, support assets (Air & TST), Command, AIC Brief, Routes and Intelligence brief by [redacted] Detail's imbedded intelligence analyst. The intelligence analyst briefed that there was an increased threat of Vehicle Bourne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), Improvised Explosive Devices, and insurgent activity along the planned routes. Specific intelligence noted that our [redacted] Route included passage through [redacted], where a VBIED had detonated just three weeks earlier and where Coalition Forces had defeated an ambush five weeks prior. The Communication Plan, Motorcade S.O.P., Chief of Missions Use of Force, and Rules of Engagement Policy were also covered in the mission briefing.

At approximately 0855 hours, Air reconnoitered [redacted] Route as planned and advised it was clear. At that point the Shift Leader [redacted] notified the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) that [redacted] would be departing for [redacted] via their [redacted] Route. [redacted] motorcade consisted of [redacted] Chevrolet Suburbans. The Lead and Follow vehicles were operating with emergency lights and sirens activated in an attempt to alert traffic of the motorcades presence. The Follow vehicle has "WARNING STAY BACK 100 METERS" stenciled on the rear door, in both English and Arabic.

[redacted] was on their [redacted] Route moving East at [redacted] when the motorcade slowed for heavy traffic while traveling through the traffic circle. The motorcade then came to a halt on the southern end of the traffic circle. This traffic circle has five avenues of approach. At this time the secondary well position [redacted] notified the other occupants of the follow vehicle, that the primary well position (PSS) [redacted] did not have a line of sight on approaching vehicles coming from the rear. At the same time the Left Rear, PSS [redacted] noticed a black sedan with one male military age occupant enter the traffic circle from the North and begin to approach the motorcade. PSS [redacted] cracked his door in order to gain a line of sight on the suspect vehicle. With the suspect vehicle approximately [redacted] meters from the motorcade, PSS [redacted] maneuvered his hand outside the window and fired one pen flare across the windshield of the suspect vehicle. The flare was in clear eyesight of the suspect driver. At the same time PSS [redacted] gave the hand signal for stop, while verbally shouting "stop, stop, stop."

The driver of the suspect vehicle disregarded PSS [redacted] visual and verbal commands to stop, despite the fact that [redacted] had made direct eye contact with the driver. The driver also disregarded the pen flare fired across his windshield by PSS [redacted]. The vehicle continued towards the motorcade. PSS [redacted] believed the vehicle was a VBIED and was in fear for the life of his principals, the lives of his teammates, and himself. In full compliance with DOS Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force Policy, PSS [redacted] fired three well aimed shots with his Department of State issued [redacted] rifle into the grill of the suspect vehicle in an attempt to disable it. The suspect driver came to an immediate stop without hitting any obstructions and [redacted].

Person giving statement

Blackwater USA		Statement Form				Date/Time of Statement 7-08-07 1430 hrs	
Name [Redacted] SL		Team [Redacted]		Incident Type Shoot to Disable			
Location Of Incident (Grid or Terrain Feature) [Redacted]		Incident Time 0909		Incident Date 08 July 2007			

put his hands up. It should be noted that all other traffic approaching the traffic circle had stopped approximately 50 Meters from the motorcade and were complying with visual warnings and visual commands to stay back from the motorcade.

PSS [Redacted] and PSS' [Redacted] observed the three shots hit the grill area of the suspect vehicle. PSS [Redacted] noticed fluid draining from the engine compartment of the suspect vehicle. The driver of the suspect vehicle did not appear to be injured.

[Redacted] Shift Leader notified the TOC of the incident. [Redacted] continued to venue without further incident. Upon arriving on venue, the Shift Leader notified the appropriate Chain of Command. ///End///

03 JUL 2007 1030

Person giving statement



Sworn Statement

Date 08 July, 2007	Time 1430 Hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, [redacted] b7C , hereby make the following statement at the request of

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience

031155971030

DECLASSIFIED

In [redacted] I was hired by Blackwater USA as a Protective Security Specialist [redacted] b6, b7c
[redacted] I have successfully completed the WPPS training program according to DOS standards. This training included several specific topics related to PSD operations in a High Threat environment. I have successfully completed all qualification courses required by the U.S. Department of State b7E

[redacted] (After training I was deployed to Iraq and currently work on [redacted] Baghdad from [redacted] to the present. I have also received training on the use of force policy, rules of engagement, shooting from a mobile platform, and shoot/ no shoot targets.

INCIDENT

On 07 July 2007, at 1700 hours, I received a mission brief for the movement of five principals to the Ministry of Oil on 08 July 2007. The mission brief covered our mission for the following day, the routes we would be utilizing, the use of force per the mission policy, and the rules of engagement. Our imbedded intelligence analyst briefed our team on possible threats in the area we would be operating. Intelligence stated there was an increase in Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDS), Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), and an increase in insurgent activity. We were advised on 19 June 2007, insurgents had used a large VBIED to blow up a Shia Mosque located at [redacted] We were also advised that on the 23 May 2007, there was a complex attack on Coalition Forces at the same location. b7E, F

On 08 July 2007 we departed Checkpoint [redacted] in route to the Ministry of Oil. Our [redacted] car motorcade was traveling with our emergency lights and sirens activated on the lead and follow vehicles in an attempt to warn traffic of the motorcade's presence. Additionally the follow vehicle, which I was traveling in has "Warning Stay Back 100 Meters" stenciled on the rear door. The stenciled warning is in both English and Arabic. As we traveled East through [redacted] (a traffic circle), our motorcade stopped in the traffic circle due to heavy vehicle traffic in front of our motorcade. I was located in the follow vehicle on the left second row seat behind the driver (the Left Rear position). The well observer yelled out that he had no line of sight on approaching traffic from the left, my side of the vehicle. At that point, I cracked my door because I noticed a black four door sedan with one military age male occupant coming towards the rear of our vehicle. He was traveling on the inside of the traffic circle and was already within fifty meters of my vehicle. As the sedan came within [redacted] meters, the well observer, PSS [redacted] fired a pen flare at him. The pen flare shot across the front windshield of the threat vehicle. At that same time, I gave the suspect driver the visual command to stop and shouted stop three times. My rifle was pointed at him and he made eye contact with me. He continued to drive toward my vehicle. b6 b7c



By this time he was about [redacted] meters away. I believed the vehicle to be a VBIED and was in fear for the life of the principals, the lives of my teammates and myself. I then fired three well aimed shots into the engine block in an attempt to disable the vehicle. The sedan came to an immediate stop and the male occupant put his hands in the air. I also noticed fluid leaking from the engine compartment. At that time our motorcade began to move. As we pulled away, I noticed the male begin to exit his vehicle. The driver did not appear to be injured. Shift Leader [redacted] b6 b7c

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immediately reported the incident to the RSO TOC. Our motorcade continued on to our venue with no further incident. There was no damage or injuries to our motorcade or its occupants. ///END///


I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 9 day of 7 2007.

Signed	
Printed	David A. Motley
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE	

Witness Signature	
Printed	David S. Farrington
Address	RSO Baghdad

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DECLASSIFIED

received training in the use of force policy, rules of engagement, shooting from a mobile platform, and shoot/ no shoot targets. After training I was deployed to Iraq and I am currently assigned to [] in direct support of the US Department of State Mission in Iraq.

b7E, F

INCIDENT

At approximately 1700 hours, on 7 July 2007, I attended the pre-mission brief for [] movement of principals on 8 July 2007. The pre-mission brief covered our mission for the following day, the routes we would be utilizing, the use of force per the mission policy, and the rules of engagement. Also our imbedded intelligence analyst briefed our team on possible threats in the area we would be operating. Specific intelligence noted that our [] Route included passage through [] where a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) had detonated just three weeks ago and where Coalition Forces had defeated an ambush five weeks prior. The Communication Plan, Motorcade Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Chief of Missions Use of Force, and Rules of Engagement Policy were also covered in the mission briefing.

On 8 July 2007 at approximately 0900 hours, our motorcade departed Checkpoint [] in route to our venue. We were traveling in a [] vehicle motorcade escorting five principals to the Ministry of Oil. Our motorcade was traveling with our emergency lights and sirens activated in an attempt to warn traffic of the motorcade's presence. Additionally, the vehicle I was traveling in, the follow vehicle, has "Warning Stay Back 100 Meters" stenciled on the rear doors. The warning is stenciled in both English and Arabic. [] and I were serving as the well observers in the follow vehicle.

b6
b7C

My assigned position on this mission was secondary well observer. My duties included utilizing the force continuum to keep vehicles that were following or approaching from behind the motorcade, a safe distance away, thus creating a Safe Zone.

As we headed east into [] the motorcade slowed and stopped for traffic. The follow vehicle was positioned in such a way that neither I nor the primary well position had a view of approaching traffic due to the curve of the traffic circle. I immediately notified the left and right rear positions so they could pick up our rear security. At that same time [] in the left rear position of the follow vehicle, reported an approaching vehicle from the northwest side of the traffic circle. I repositioned myself in the well so that I could attempt to get the vehicle to stop. As I leaned out the back window, I saw a black four door sedan being driven by a single military aged male. The vehicle was at approximately [] meters away when I fired a pen flare in an attempt to get the vehicle to stop. The flare went directly in front of the vehicle's windshield but the driver continued to approach the motorcade. At this point I was in fear for the lives of our principals, my team members and myself.

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I heard [] continue to use verbal commands in an attempt to get the vehicle to stop. At approximately [] meters I heard [] fire three shots and observed the rounds impact the grill of the suspected VBIED. Instantly, the driver's hands came up and the vehicle rolled to a controlled stop. The driver appeared to have no injuries. Shift leader [] notified the Tactical Operations Center and we continued on to our venue without further incident. ///END///

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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 9 day of 7 2007.

Signed	
Printed	David A. Motley

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	David S. Farrington
Address	RSO Baghdad

DECLASSIFIED

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED

U0039



U.S. Embassy Baghdad

July 10, 2007



Spot Report 071007-02

Subject: COM PSD Team Fires on Aggressive Vehicle**Reporting Office:** RSO TOC - Kirkuk

Summary: On 9 July 2007, at approximately 0954, a Kirkuk [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade en-route from the Kirkuk REO to the Erbil USAID compound encountered an aggressive white pickup truck with one military age male operator.

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The motorcade was traveling north on Route 2 in an area between the cities of Kirkuk and Erbil, when a white pickup truck with one occupant was traveling in the same direction at a high rate of speed, passing and weaving in between all the other slow moving vehicles. The well and rear gunners of the follow vehicle signaled the driver to slow down with hand signals, using a flashlight as well as throwing a water bottle in the direction of the pickup. The aggressive vehicle continued to close onto the rear of the motorcade, disregarding the "Stay back 100 meters" sign written in English and Arabic on the rear of the follow car.

The rear and well gunners prior to firing attempted to waive the driver off. At approximately [] yards from the follow vehicle, the well gunner fired one round into the grill of the pickup. The pickup then accelerated in an aggressive manner and the well gunner again fired another round into the engine of the pickup. The pickup then swerved to the right and stopped. The occupant appeared to be uninjured.

The motorcade continued to Erbil USAID compound with no further incidents. Three COM personnel were in the motorcade and no one was injured during the incident.

RSO Action: PSD members will be debriefed and written statements are forthcoming. RSO will complete a ROI and provide documentation to the RSCC upon completion.

Location: Approximately 33 km north of Kirkuk REO, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: John Hislop, RSO Kirkuk, Iraq

APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

031415007030

(P)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ b7E, F

600.40

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



TITLE COM PSD (Kirkuk) Fires on Aggressive Vehicle		DS CASE NUMBER / REPORT NUMBER 7/9/2007 - Kirkuk	
TRUE NAME N/A		CASE TYPE Use of Force	
POST Kirkuk	DATE REPORTED 07/10/2007	DATES INVESTIGATED 07/09/2007 – 07/09/2007	REPORTING AGENT RSO Hislop

SYNOPSIS

Summary: On July 9, 2007, at approximately 0954 hrs, a Kirkuk [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade, [] enroute from the Kirkuk REO to the Irbil Erbil USAID compound fired on a vehicle after determining that the vehicle posed a threat to their motorcade. This use of force was appropriate and within the parameters of DS use-of-force policy. Injuries to the lone occupant in the threat vehicle were not observed. End Summary.

The following chain of events is derived from the statements and interviews of each team member involved in the shooting and were witness to the event: [] was enroute from the Kirkuk REO to the Erbil USAID compound when they encountered an aggressive white four door pick up truck with one lone driver approaching them at a rapid speed from the rear. The area of the motorcade was between the cities of Kirkuk and Erbil and approximately 33 km north of Kirkuk. The white pickup truck with one lone occupant was traveling in the same direction as the motorcade at a high rate of speed, passing all the other slow moving vehicles that were maintaining their distance, 100 meters behind the motorcade. As the vehicle approached, the well and rear gunner of the follow vehicle signaled the driver to slow down with hand signals, using a flashlight as well as throwing 4 water bottles in the direction of the pickup. Both the rear and well gunner (prior to firing) muzzled their weapons in attempt to waive the driver off. At approximately [] yards from the follow vehicle, the well gunner fired one round into the grill of the Pickup. The pickup then swerved to the left of the road while accelerating in an attempt to pass the motorcade and again the well gunner fired another round into the engine of the pickup. The pickup then pulled over to the right with smoke billowing from its engine. The occupant appeared to be uninjured. [] continued to Erbil USAID compound and later returned to the REO with no further incidents. Three COM personnel were in the motorcade and no one was injured during the incident. Written statements were immediately written by all members of the Follow car and all occupants of the follow vehicle were later interviewed by RSO Kirkuk. Case Closed.

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REVIEWED BY AGENT SUPERVISOR

(Initials)

(Date)

WAP 080
00041

(P)
b7E, F
b6
b7C

Report #:23-07	Incident-Casualty Report WPPS		Report Date/Time: 9 July 2007/1700
REPORTING INFORMATION			
Incident Date/Time 9 July 2007/0954	INCIDENT LOCATION: 385 on Rt. 2		
TOTAL # PERSONNEL: 4	KIA: 0	WIA: 0	
INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: Shoot to disable/Escalation of Force			
REPORTED BY:	METHOD: Radio		
POINT OF CONTACT:	TEL#:		
VICTIM INFORMATION			
NAME (LAST, FIRST MI): Unkn			
SSN: None		DOB: UNK	
NATIONALITY: Unknown (local)		M/F: Mx1	
PASSPORT: UNK		ISSUED/EXP: UNK	
NATIONALITY: UNK		BLOOD TYPE: UNK	
INJURIES: None observed			
STATUS:			
PROGNOSIS: No injuries			
HOME OF RECORD: UNK		NEXT OF KIN: UNK	
PROPERTY/EVIDENCE			
CODE:	DESCRIPTION:	VALUE:	CURRENT LOCATION:
D	White Nissan Pick Up Truck	UNK/Unknown. Last Seen at	
NARRATIVE			
At approximately 0954 on 9 July 2007 a Dyn Corp vehicle motorcade was traveling from the REO Kirkuk to Erbil on Route 2. Just South of [redacted] at approximately [redacted] the well gunner in the follow vehicle observed a white Nissan pick up truck coming from the rear at a high rate of speed. He began to signal the vehicle with his flashlight and the right rear opened his door and gave hand signals and threw out water bottles to get the vehicle to slow down and stay back from the motorcade. The vehicle continued to close on the motorcade at a high rate of speed. The well gunner presented his rifle to the vehicle and continued to use his flashlight to signal. When the vehicle was about [redacted] yards away the well gunner fired one round from his [redacted] into the engine block. The vehicle moved into the left lane and continued to accelerate towards the motorcade. The well gunner fired another round into the engine block. After the second shot the vehicle pulled over to the right shoulder of the road and stopped. Smoke was observed coming from the engine of the vehicle. The driver was the only occupant of the vehicle. He did not appear to be injured. The motorcade continued on the mission to the USAID compound in Erbil. The incident was immediate.			
ADDITIONAL VICTIM INFORMATION			
VICTIM INFORMATION			
NAME (LAST, FIRST MI):			
SSN:		DOB:	
NATIONALITY:		M/F:	
PASSPORT:		ISSUED/EXP:	
NATIONALITY:		BLOOD TYPE:	
INJURIES:			
STATUS:			
PROGNOSIS:			
HOME OF RECORD:		NEXT OF KIN:	
VICTIM INFORMATION			
NAME (LAST, FIRST MI):			
SSN:		DOB:	
NATIONALITY:		M/F:	
PASSPORT:		ISSUED/EXP:	
NATIONALITY:		BLOOD TYPE:	
INJURIES:			
STATUS:			
PROGNOSIS:			
HOME OF RECORD:		NEXT OF KIN:	

b7E, F

b6
b7C

b7E, F



U0042

(P)

b6
b7C

67E, F

ARDORE

Sworn Statement

Date	07/9/2007	Time	1045
Location			
ERBIL - IRAQ			

I, _____, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to

John H. Hays, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the
U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

I WAS FILLING THE POSITION OF WELL GUNNER IN THE [] b7E, F
FOLLOW VEHICLE TRAVELLING FROM THE KRAB IN KIRKUK TO THE USAID
COMPOUND IN ERBIL. SHORTLY BEFORE REACHING CHECKPOINT []
A NEWER MODEL WHITE NISSAN PICKUP TRUCK ABRUPTLY PASSED
A TAXI THAT WAS HOLDING 100 M BACK FROM OUR MOTORCADE.
IT APPEARED TO HAVE JUST ONE OCCUPANT, THE DRIVER.
I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN SIGNALING THE TRUCK WITH MY FLASHLIGHT
AS THE TRUCK CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE AND CLOSE IN
ON THE MOTORCADE. WHILE I CONTINUED TO FLASH MY LIGHT
AT THE TRUCK, [] THE TEAM MEDIC SITTING
IN THE RIGHT REAR ~~POSITION~~ POSITION, OPENED HIS
DOOR AND CALLED OUT THAT HE WAS WITH THE
TRUCK HAND SIGNALS, AND THEN THREW SEVERAL WATER
BOTTLES. CONTD. ON PAGE 2

CONTD. ON PAGE 2

Page 1 of 3 Pages

THE TRUCK CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE AND CLOSE WITHIN THE MOTORCADE AND I OPENED THE REAR WELL WINDOW AND PRESENTED MY RIFLE AT THE TRUCK WHILE CONTINUING TO FLASH MY LIGHT WITH MY LEFT HAND.

[REDACTED] THE RIGHT REAR THREW ONE MORE WATER BOTTLE AT THE TRUCK, BUT WITH NO RESPONSE FROM THE DRIVER. I THEN FIRED ONE ROUND FROM MY RIFLE INTO THE TRUCKS ENGINE BLOCK.

b6
b7c

THE TRUCK WAS ABOUT [REDACTED] YDS BACK AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST SHOT FIRED. THE TRUCK SWERVED TO THE LEFT LANE AND CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE.

b7E,F



I THEN FIRED A SECOND SHOT INTO THE ENGINE BLOCK AS THE TRUCK BROKE ABOUT [REDACTED] YDS BACK. SMOKE WAS SEEN COMING FROM THE TRUCK'S ENGINE

AND THE TRUCK FINALLY PULLED OFF TO THE RIGHT SHOULDER OF THE ROAD. I THEN HEARD

THE SHIFT LEADER [REDACTED] CALL INTO THE



b6
b7c

TGC A SPOT REPORT ON THE SHOOT, GIVING A GRID OF [REDACTED] AND A TIME OF 0954. NOTHING FURTHER OCCURED.

b7E,F


I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


DECLASSIFIED

Signed	
Printed	
Address	US ROO K. KUK

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 9TH day of
JULY, 20 07.

Signed	
Printed	HSLOP, JOHN T. RSO.
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE	

Witness Signature	
Printed	AUSTIN F. STOFFEL / M.B.A. Fed Detail Leader
Address	DynCorp WPPS NORTHGATE IRAQ



and graph

Sworn Statement

Date	07-09-07	Time	1045
Location			
ERAIL IMP			

I, _____, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to

John H. Wolf, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the
U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

ON 07-09-07 @ APPROXIMATELY 0954. [REDACTED]
HEREIN AFTER KNOWN AS R/O, WAS TRAVELING IN RIGHT REAR
IN [REDACTED] VEHICLE MOTORCADE ON MISSION TO USAID COMPOUND.

AT APPROXIMATE GRID [REDACTED]
WELL POSITION OPERATOR [REDACTED] ADVISED FOLLOW
PERSONAL. SHIFT LEADER [REDACTED] DRIVER [REDACTED]

THAT A WHITE MISSION WAS APPROACHING AT HIGH RATE OF SPEED FROM THE REAR OF FOLLOW VEHICLE. RO OPENED DOOR AND NOTICED VEHICLE WHITE PICKUP APPROXIMATELY [] METERS. RO TOSSED 4 WATER BOTTLES IN THE PATH OF SAID VEHICLE TO DETURE VEHICLE FROM APPROACHING ANY CLOSER. THE VEHICLE DID NOT COMPLY WITH [] LIGHT. AND RO'S WATER BOTTLES THE VEHICLE APPROACHED TO [] METERS b7C. RO HEARD 2 SHOTS FROM THE WELL POSITION.

THE FIRST SHOT. THE VEHICLE DID NOT SLOW.
THE VEHICLE MOVED TO PASS AND ACCELERATED
AND ANOTHER SHOT WAS FIRED FROM THE WELL POSITION
AND THE VEHICLE BEGAN TO SMOKE AND MOVED TO
THE RIGHT OF THE ROAD AND STOPPED. NO INJURIES
WERE NOTED BY RO AND NO INJURIES TO FOLLOW
PERSONAL. MOTORCADE CONTINUED. SHIPT. []
[] BRIEFED DELTA BASE. MOTORCADE ARRIVED
VENUE TWO

b6
b7c

b6
b7c


I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


DECLASSIFIED

Signed	
Printed	
Address	

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 9th day of July, 20 07.

Signed	
Printed	HIS COP, JOHN RSO
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE	

Witness Signature	
Printed	AUSTIN F. STOFFEL / M.B. ALFORD Detail Leader
Address	DYNCOMP WAPS NORTHERN IRAQ

~~ARDOGE~~

Sworn Statement

Date	7-9-07	Time	1045
Location			
ERBIL, IRAQ			


I, _____, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to:

John H. Elap, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

AT APPROX 0954, WHILE DRIVING IN THE VICINITY OF [REDACTED] I WAS DRIVING THE FOLLOWING VEHICLE IN THE [REDACTED] MOTORCADE AT THIS TIME I HEARD THE REAR AND WELL GUNNERS REPORT THERE WAS A FAST MOV. WHITE 4-DOOR PICKUP TRUCK, WITH ONE OCCUPANT APPROACHING.

THE RIGHT REAR, [REDACTED] REPORTED TO HAVE THROWN A WATER BOTTLE TOWARDS THE VEHICLE TO GAIN THE DRIVER'S ATTENTION. THE WELL GUNNER, [REDACTED] WAS REMINDING THAT HE WAS FLASHING HIS LIGHT AND WAVING DOWN THE VEHICLE. I LOOKED IN MY SIDE MIRRORS AND SAW THE VEHICLE FAST APPROACHING. [REDACTED] ~~REPEATEDLY~~ ^{REPEATEDLY} REPEATEDLY HAVING THROWN ANOTHER (PAIR OF BOTTLES, 4 TOTAL, AND) THE VEHICLE STILL APPROACHED AT A HIGH RATE OF SPEED. [REDACTED] FIRED ONE ROUND TOWARDS THE VEHICLE.



END OF STATEMENT

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

DECLASSIFIED

Signed

Printed

Address

VS REG KIRKUK, IRAQ

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 9th day of

JULY, 20 07

Signed

Printed

HISLOP, J. L. T. RSO.

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature

Printed

Address

AUSTIN F. STOFFEL / M.B. AIFORD Detail Leader

DYNACORP WPPS IN NORTHERN IRAQ



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sworn Statement

(P)
b6
b7C
b7E,F

Date 9 JUL 07	Time 1045
Location ERBIL, IRAQ	

00045

I, [redacted] ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to John Aslop, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

b7E,F

AT 0954 ON 9 JULY, 2007, I WAS RIDING AS SHIFT LEAD FOR A C.O.M. [redacted] MOTORCADE FROM KIRKUK TO ERBIL, IRAQ. WHILE TRAVELING NORTH ON ROUTE 2, I HEARD THE WELL GUNNER [redacted] CALL OUT A VEHICLE THAT WAS APPROACHING THE REAR OF THE MOTORCADE. IT WAS DESCRIBED AS A WHITE 4-DOOR NEWER MODEL PICKUP TRUCK. I COULD SEE THE VEHICLE IN THE RIGHT SIDE MIRROR OF MY VEHICLE (FOLLOW) AND IT WAS GAINING GROUND VERY QUICKLY. OUR VEHICLE WAS TRAVELING @ APPROX. 65 MPH AT THE TIME THE RIGHT REAR GUNNER, [redacted] OPENED HIS DOOR AND BEGAN THROWING WATER BOTTLES AT THE PICKUP. [redacted] WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY FLASHING THE SPOTLIGHT FROM THE WELL POSITION AT THE APPROACHING VEHICLE. AFTER THESE ATTEMPTS FAILED TO SLOW THE TRUCK, [redacted] FIRED A SINGLE SHOT AT THE ENGINE BLOCK. THE TRUCK SPED UP AND THEN TRIED TO PASS TO OUR LEFT. [redacted] THEN FIRED ANOTHER SHOT AT THE ENGINE AREA

b6
b7C

67E, F

- THIS EVENT TOOK PLACE @ [REDACTED] 6/21
- NO INJURIES OBSERVED TO THE DRIVER OF THE PICKUP TRUCK AND HE APPEARED TO BE THE ONLY OCCUPANT
- SIT-RAP WAS REPORTED TO RSO TOL KIRKUK AND RSO ERBIL


I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


DECLASSIFIED

Signed	
Printed	
Address	US REC KIRKUK, IRAQ

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 7th day of July, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	Agent, John T. RSO.
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE	

Witness Signature	
Printed	AUSTIN F. STOFFEL / M.B. Alford Detail Leader
Address	DynCorp WPPS NORTHERN IRAQ

Cole-Pasquale, Danielle N

From: Gayhart James W
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2008 3:42 PM
To: Cole-Pasquale, Danielle N
Subject: RE: b0061 b0062

(P)
b7E
b6
b7C

00046

Danielle

Translation:

Incident Report

Date of Report: Monday July, 9

Location: Basra, REO, Iraq

Day of Incident: Monday July, 9

Time of Incident: 19:40

Guard's Name: [redacted] b6 b7C

Location of Incident: [redacted] b7E

Type of weapon used: [redacted]

Number of shots fired: 4 shots

Direction and distance: 310 Degrees approximately 400 meters

Where did the shots go: To the ground

Situation before firing: None, I saw the threat and began firing immediately. b7E

Incidents: I found my self in service in the [redacted] area. At approximately 1340 hours I saw the exit of an RPG from 310 degree, 400 meters approximately. I made use of my [redacted] rifle firing four shots where I saw the RPG. They were direct shots.

Report of injuries: None

General Report of anything else: After the shots the RPG round landed.

Guard information/Number: [redacted] b6 b7C
(signed)

2nd Report

Incident Report

Date of Report: Monday July, 9

Location: Basra, REO, Iraq

Day of Incident: Monday July, 9

Time of Incident: 19:40

Guard's Name: [redacted] b6 b7C

Location of Incident: [redacted] b7E

Type of weapon used: [redacted]

Number of shots fired: 10

Direction and distance: 310 Degrees at 300 meters

Where did the shots go: At the point the RPG was fired

Situation before firing: I did not use.

DECLASSIFIED

Incidents: I hear and explosion at 220 distance, 250 meters simultaneously saw the firing of two RPG rounds. Grade 310 distance 300 meters to this point of the firing from

b7E

Report of injuries: None

General Report of anything else: After the shots ceased the shots from the RPG

Guard information/Number:
(signed)

b6
b7C

End translation

Regards,

James W. Gayhart
Supervisory Special Agent
DS/ICI/CI
Phone (571) 345-7516
Secure
FAX: (571) 345-7657

b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: Cole-Pasquale, Danielle N
Sent: Monday, January 28, 2008 4:30 PM
To: Gayhart James W
Subject: FW: b0061 b0062

Thank you so much for your translation services. They are really appreciated. I have two more that need to be translated. I think, this will be the last.

Thank you,
Danielle

DECLASSIFIED

REPORTE DE INCIDENTE

Fecha del Reporte: LUNES 09 DE JULIO

Localización: Basrah REO: Iraq

Día del incidente: LUNES 09 DE JULIO

Hora del Incidente: 19:40

Nombre del Guardia: [REDACTED]

Localización del Incidente (Tango, Lima u Otros): [REDACTED]

Tipo de Armamento usado: [REDACTED]

Cantidad de disparos efectuados: 04 DISPAROS

Dirección y distancia: 310° DIST. 400 MTS APROX.

Zona donde se realizó los disparos: HACIA EL FOGONASO

Procedimientos antes del disparo (altos, bengalas)

NO SE USO, SE USARON LA SALIDA DEL PROYECTIL Y SE RESPONDIÓ INMEDIATAMENTE

Incidentes (narrar en breve lo sucedido): ENCONTRANDOME DE SERVICIO EN EL [REDACTED] SIENDO APROX. 19:40 SE USARON LA SALIDA DE 02 RP6. GRADO 310° DIST. 400 MTS. APROXIMAD. HICE EL USO DE MI FUSIL] REALIZANDO 04 DISPAROS AL PUNTO DE SALIDA (02 RP6. FUERON TIROS DIRECTOS HACIA [REDACTED]

Reporte sobre heridos:

NO HUBO

A [REDACTED] PARA EL MONITORIO. A CONTROL

Reporte General Adicional:

POSTERIORMENTE DE LOS DISPAROS DEJARON DE LANZAR RP6.

Datos del Guardia: [REDACTED]

Firma

0311547030

REPORTE DE INCIDENTE

Fecha del Reporte: LUNES 09 DE JULIO

(P)

b7E

Localización: Reserva FEO

b6

b7C

Día del incidente: LUNES 09 DE JULIO

B0062

UOC48

Hora del Incidente: 19:40

Nombre del Guardia:

b6
b7C

Localización del Incidente (Tango, Lima u Otros):

Tipo de Armamento usado:

b7E

Cantidad de disparos efectuados: 10

Dirección y distancia: GRADOS 310 A 300 METROS

Zona donde se recibían los disparos: HACIA EL PUNTO SALIDA DE RP 5

Procedimientos antes del disparo (altos, bengalas)

NO SE USÓ

Incidentes (Narrar en breve lo sucedido):

SE ESCUCHÓ UNA EXPLOSIÓN EN GRADOS 220 DIST. 25 METROS
SIMULTANEAMENTE SE VISUALIZÓ SALIDA DE 02 RP 5. GRADOS
310 DISTANCIA 300 METROS, A ESE PUNTO DEL FOGONAZO
SE EFECTUÓ DISPAROS DESDE

b7E

Reporte sobre heridos:

NO HUBO

A quien reportó el incidente:

A CONTROL

Reporte General Adicional:

DESPUES DE LOS DISPAROS CESARON LOS DISPAROS
DE RP 5.

Datos del Guardia:

Firma

b6
b7C

03115001000

ENGAGEMENT REPORT

(P)

b7E

b6

b7C

Date of Report:

10 July 07

Location:

Basrah REO, Iraq

Original Report Translated by:

Mac

U0050

Date of Incident:

9 July 07

Time of Incident:

19:40

Name of TCN guard Involved:

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Detail Location of Incident/Post:

[REDACTED]

b7E

Weapon Used:

Estimated number of shots fired:

10

Direction/Distance from position:

310 Degrees 300 meters

Target: Zone/Area

RPG Launch Point

Prior Course of Action:

N/A

Incident Synopsis:

I heard an explosion at 280 degrees about 25 meters away. I visualized two launches from an RPG at tower [REDACTED] I immediately fired 4 rounds from my [REDACTED] at the possible launch point.

b7E

Injuries if applicable:

N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident:

Control, CoC

Additional Reports Generated:

N/A

03115507030

00051 (P)

INCIDENT REPORT

~~WV 0050~~ 67E, F

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 11 Jul 07

Location: _____

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 11 Jul 07

Time of Incident: 0843

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO _____

Personnel Involved: _____

67E, F

67E, F



Incident Synopsis: On 11 July 2007, at 0843, _____, an Advance Team in-route to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, was in the vicinity of _____ traveling north when they were stopped due to heavy traffic in the intersection. While the motorcade was stopped a sedan aggressively approached the motorcade from the rear. The driver of the sedan failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop and in an escalation of force the Well PSS of the follow vehicle fired three (3) _____ rounds from his _____ into the hood of the vehicle. The vehicle continued closing on the motorcade and the Right Rear PSS fired five (5) _____ rounds from his _____ rifle. The vehicle continued its forward movement towards the motorcade resulting in the Well PSS firing an additional three (3) _____ rounds from his _____ into the hood causing the sedan to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued to their venue without further incident.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

03 JUL 07 1030

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 11 Jul 07

Location: _____

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: Operations Chief

Date of Incident: 11 Jul 07

Time of Incident: 1004

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO _____

Personnel Involved: _____

Incident Synopsis: On 11 July 2007, at 1004, _____ a Tactical Support Team (TST) on return to the IZ from a staging area was in the vicinity of _____ traveling south when they slowed for traffic in the intersection. While the motorcade was in the intersection a sedan aggressively maneuvered around stopped traffic and approached the motorcade from the side. The driver of the sedan failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop and in an escalation of force the front turret PSS of the follow vehicle fired two (2) _____ rounds from his _____ into the grill of the vehicle. The vehicle continued closing on the motorcade and the front turret PSS fired an additional three (3) _____ rounds from his _____ rifle into the hood of the vehicle causing the vehicle to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued to their venue without further incident.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

03 JUL 2007 1030

Clearing operations Started at [] hrs. [] clearance was completed at [] hrs.

Although we didn't believe impacts occurred on the US compound, we conducted a precautionary search of this area.

b7E, F

The all clear was sounded at [] hrs.

Outline injuries if applicable: No Casualties

03:15:58:10:30

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: None

Personnel Notified of Incident: Regional Security Officer, Triple Canopy Project Manager

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: None

Additional Reports Generated: None

03:15:58:10:30

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DSSPOT reporting.

report may be in addition to DSSPOT reporting.

~~BOBEN~~

00054

Date of Report:

7/11/07

67E

Location:

1

Task Order:

Person Releasing Report:

1

b6
b7C

Title of Person Releasing Report:

Fixed Site Supervisor

Date of Incident:

7/11/07

Time of Incident:

1610

Contractor Involved:

b6
b7c

Detail Location of Incident:

b7E, F

Incident Synopsis: At approximately 1550 I observed a red Bronco-type SUV idling in the road 250 meters out from [redacted]. The windows of the vehicle were blacked out, but I was under the impression they were observing the [redacted] area. I engaged the vehicle with a [redacted] round out of the [redacted]. The vehicle left then scene. About 5 minutes later the base received an IDF attack which impacted near the [redacted]. While we were still under duck and cover [redacted] reported an observer on the left side of the road. I entered [redacted] at this time. They said the man was on a rooftop with a cell phone observing the base. I was unable to see the man with the cell phone because as soon as I went to look at him we received accurate IDF fire at [redacted]. I took cover in the tower and reported the observer and the IDF. I was instructed to engage the observer if he was still observing. Went there was a lull in the IDF TCN, [redacted] used binoculars to observe that the observer was still actively observing the base and talking on his cell phone. I told the TCN to engage the man. He engaged with approximately 15-20 rounds out the [redacted]. He claims to have neutralized the threat.

b6, b7C

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence:
Remain vigilant

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO and entire chain of command.

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: TCN incident/engagement report.

0315597030

ENGAGEMENT REPORT

DECLASSIFIED ~~BOOBA~~

(P)
b7E
b6
b7C

U0055

Date of Report: 11 July 07
Location: Basrah REO, Iraq
Original Report Translated by: Mac

Date of Incident: 11 July 07

Time of Incident: 16:10
Name of TCN guard Involved: _____
Detail Location of Incident/Post: _____
Weapon Used: _____
Estimated number of shots fired: 40
Direction/Distance from position: 340 Degrees, 300 meters
Target: Zone/Area Roof top second story building
Prior Course of Action: Notified CoC of suspicious activity

b6
b7C

b7E

Incident Synopsis: I observed an Iraqi male on the roof top of a second story home talking on a cell phone during and after receiving IDF into the compound. I reported to control and was given permission to engage if suspicious male continued to talk and observe during the IDF attack within the compound.

Injuries if applicable: N/A
Personnel Notified of Incident: FSS _____ control.
Additional Reports Generated: See GSS incident report.

b6
b7C

03115587030

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

U0056 (P)
b7E,F

Date of Report: 11 July 07

Location: Basrah REC, Iraq

Task Order: 007

Person Releasing Report: Jeffrey Huber

Title of Person Releasing Report: Project Manager

Date of Incident: 11 July 2007

Time of Incident: Approx. 2144 hours

Contractor Involved: Triple Canopy, Inc.

Detail Location of Incident: U.S. Embassy Compound

Incident Synopsis: On 11 July 2007, at approximately 2144 hrs, the Basra Embassy began receiving indirect fire. The compound warning system was then activated and Duck and Cover was sounded. Accountability of all personnel was taken. Six launches were detected. Four rounds impacted in [redacted]. Two rounds unknown. 100% accountability was at [redacted] hrs.

At 2145 hrs [redacted] fired approx. 20 rounds of [redacted] at suspected launch site.

Clearing operations Started at [redacted] hrs. Route [redacted] from the DFAC up to the fence on the British side clearance was completed at [redacted] hrs.

The all clear was sounded at [redacted] hrs.

On-site injuries if applicable: No Casualties

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: None

Personnel Notified of Incident: Regional Security Officer, Triple Canopy Project Manager

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: None

Additional Reports Generated: None

03 JUL 2007 1030

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

(P)

57E, F

Date of Report: 13 July 07

Location: Basrah REC, Iraq

Task Order: 007

Person Releasing Report: Jeffrey Huber

Title of Person Releasing Report: Project Manager

00057

Date of Incident: 13 July 2007

Time of Incident: Approx. 0952 hrs

Contractor Involved: Triple Canopy, Inc.

Detail Location of Incident: U.S. Embassy Compound

Incident Synopsis: On 13 July 2007, at approximately 0952, the Basra Embassy began receiving indirect fire. The compound warning system was then activated and Duck and Cover was sounded. Accountability of all personnel was taken. Twelve rounds were detected. Five rounds impacted in [redacted]. Three rounds impacted in the vicinity of Tower [redacted]. One round impacted in [redacted]. Two rounds impacted in [redacted]. One round impacted in the River. 100% accountability was at 1001 hrs.

57E, F



Fires broke out in [redacted] and the 1st row of the [redacted] as a result of impacts.

During the period of this incident individuals, not collocated were observed watching the camp while using a cell phone and one with binoculars. This info was passed to RSO which gave permission to engage individuals if their observations continued with cell phone and binoculars.

At 1020 hrs one shot was fired at the individual with the cell phone from the roof of Bunker 10.

At 1024 one shot was fired at the same target from the roof of EOB.

At 1035 hrs personnel told to secure gear from hooch's in the [redacted] due to the fires from IDF rounds.

Clearing operations in [redacted] and the area in the vicinity of Tower [redacted] started at 1046 hrs. Clearing operations were completed around Tower [redacted] at 1054 hrs. [redacted] was cleared at [redacted] hrs.

The all clear was sounded at [redacted] hrs.

Outline injuries if applicable: No Casualties

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: None

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting

Date of Report: 13 July 07

Location: Basrah REO, Iraq

Task Order:

Person Releasing Report:

Title of Person Releasing Report: PSS/PSD [] Team Shift Leader

Date of Incident: 13 July 07

Time of Incident: Approx: 1010

Contractor Involved: Triple Canopy

Detail Location of Incident: U.S. Embassy Compound, Basra, Iraq

Incident Synopsis: On this date multiple rounds of indirect fire were fired into the compound striking the [] living area and into the alphabet rows. I was immediately advised by Triple Canopy PSS/DDM member [] (employee []) that he was secure and inside bunker ten. He then advised that he had seen an Iraqi male subject on the roof top looking south into the compound towards the impact site and holding what appeared to be a cellular telephone to his ear.

I then moved to this location and also observed the individual who had now sought shelter inside a cinder-block small building on the roof. While monitoring this location I observed the same subject exit the building several times looking back into the compound and towards the impact site. I then observed a second subject exit the building at which time he also began looking at the impact site and pointing. At this time I observed the first subject lift what appeared to be a cellular telephone to his ear.

This information was passed to the RSO via the tactical operations command center and the subject was viewed as an active observer for further IDF and he was deemed a clear threat to the safety of the first responders on the compound and the personnel fighting the fire within the housing area.

I fired one single round from my issued [] rifle at which time I observed the subjects form drop straight down towards the ground. This was confirmed by [] who also advised that it appeared the subject went down and did not run to a position of cover.

While observing the movement on the roof I observed the second subject exit the concrete building and again look towards the compound and our position. The subject then went back into the building. I then moved our position to a slightly elevated position on top of bunker ten where [], set up his issued [] that he was carrying. The second subject then exited the building and [] engaged him with a three round burst. The subject ran back into the building and a moment later he exited again and appeared to be getting to the area of the downed subject. [] again engaged with a second three round burst and the subject either dropped to the ground or was able to crawl back into the building. The subject was never seen again.

During this time, [redacted] Team shift leader [redacted] had established an elevated position on the roof top of the EOB along with PSS detail member, [redacted] (Employee [redacted]) I advised [redacted] that there was a second subject inside the concrete building and it appeared that he was trying to exit the structure and render aid to the subject no longer in view or that he may be able to low-crawl out of the structure. b6 b7c

[redacted] then advised that he had a third subject on the roof of a different building approximately four hundred meters north of the first engaged location and that he was looking back into the compound with a set of binoculars. Bowers fired one round from his issued [redacted] rifle at which time the subject was immediately out of view. b6 b7c

The second subject who had been concealed in the concrete building was never seen exiting and his whereabouts were not confirmed.

The defensive positions were held for approximately thirty minutes to support the K9 clearing teams and once an all clear was given all positions broke down with no further action being taken.

[redacted] b6 b7c
PSD/[redacted] Team Shift Leader
Triple Canopy

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence:

Personnel Notified of Incident: TOC at EOB, Detail Leader and RSO

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: N/A

03115507030

(P)

b7c

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b7c

00059

00059

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting

Date of Report: 13 July 07

Location: Basrah REO, Iraq

Task Order:

Person Releasing Report: [redacted] b6
b7c

Title of Person Releasing Report: PSS Detail Member

Date of Incident: 13 July 07

Time of Incident: Approx: 1430

Contractor Involved: Triple Canopy

Detail Location of Incident: U.S. Embassy Compound, Basra, Iraq

Incident Synopsis:

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On this date I, [redacted] was at my assigned duty station at the River-Watch post. From this location I observed a 20-foot long boat with three adult males enter my immediate field of view. They were coming from the south traveling north upstream and once they traveled east into the [redacted] occupied by the British forces they apparently turned left traveling directly toward our defensive position.

b7c

Once they became visible again the boat was approximately 40 yards from my defensive position and traveling slowly, observing my position. The two males seated in the center and front of the boat were leaning forward, looking at me, with their hands down out of view. There was no fishing paraphernalia visible. I immediately began motioning with my arms and yelling for them to move out of my defensive sector.

Due to the extremely close proximity of the boat and the fact that I would be unable to react in a timely manner to a weapons threat, I immediately assumed a prone firing position behind cover. I pointed my rifle towards their position. This did not deter them. Due to their refusal to comply and leave the area, I fired two warning shots approximately 5 feet in front of their boat. The three males immediately crouched lower in the boat. The driver of the boat proceeded to turn directly away from our position and accelerate rapidly. After the boat was approximately 150 yards out from the River-Watch position, it turned upstream and continued at a rapid rate of travel out of the area.

b7c

I immediately notified the TOC of the incident, then my shift leader.

[redacted] b6
b7c

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence:

Personnel Notified of Incident:

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: N/A

00059

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

~~AWD/ASD~~

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U0060

Date of Report: 13 July 07

Location: Basra RSO, Iraq

Task Order: 007

Person Releasing Report: Jeffrey Huber

Title of Person Releasing Report: Project Manager

Date of Incident: 13 July 2007

Time of Incident: Approx. 1904 hrs

Contractor Involved: Triple Canopy, Inc.

Detail Location of Incident: U.S. Embassy Compound

Incident Synopsis: On 13 July 2007, at approximately 1904 hrs, the Basra Embassy began receiving indirect fire. The compound warning system was then activated and Duck and Cover was sounded. Accountability of all personnel was taken. Six rounds were detected. Six rounds impacted outside in the River. 100% accountability was at hrs.

b7E, F

Launch site was detected by Riverwatch at approximately 110 degrees at 3000 meters. 3 Vehicles were at the site and remained after the launches. RSO was informed along with the British Javelin team. RSO gave permission to engage site with

b7E

A boat with 3 personnel circled the area twice and then moved up River at slow speed with eyes on. Verbal and hand and arm warnings were given. The RSO was advised and gave permission to fire 2 rounds in front of the Bow as additional warning. There was no response from the occupants of the boat. Permission was then given to fire 3 well aimed rounds at the boat avoiding occupants. The boat then moved off out of AO.

No clearing operations.

The all clear was sounded at hrs.

b7E, F

Outline injuries if applicable: No Casualties

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: None

Personnel Notified of Incident: Regional Security Officer, Triple Canopy Project Manager

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: None

Additional Reports Generated: None

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This report may be in addition to DS SPQT reporting

B/D/D/6/9

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b6
b7c

b6
b7c

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03/15/2010 10:30

I immediately notified the TOC of the incident, then my shift leader.

 b6
b7c

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: Personnel Notified c
Incident:

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: N/A

03:15:58 7:30




(P)
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
ENGAGEMENT REPORT

DECLASSIFIED

00062

Date of Report: 15 July 07
Location: Basrah REO, Iraq
Original Report Translated by: Billy Warden

Date of Incident: 15 July 07
Time of Incident: 0008
Name of TCN guard Involved:  b6 b7C
Detail Location of Incident/Post: 
Weapon Used:  b7E
Estimated number of shots fired: 03
Direction/Distance: 340 degrees, 300 meters
Target zone/area: Main Avenue, origin of enemy fire.
Prior Course of Action: None

Incident Synopsis: Approximately 00:08, 2 Local
Nationals with AK 47s fired on  hitting sandbags in front of the position with 20 rounds. b7E

Injuries if applicable: None
Personnel Notified of Incident: Control
Additional Reports Generated: The gunfire originated near the bakery.

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ENGAGEMENT REPORT

DECLASSIFIED

(P)
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b6
b7C
00063

Date of Report: 15 July 07
Location: Basrah REO, Iraq
Original Report Translated by: Warden, Billy

Date of Incident: July 07
Time of Incident: 00:08
Name of TCN guard Involved: ☐ b6
Detail Location of Incident/Post: ☐ b7C
Weapon Used: ☐ b7E
Estimated number of shots fired: 30
Direction/Distance: 340 degrees 300 meters
Target zone/area: Main Avenue in front of ☐ where the
gunfire originated. b7E
Prior Course of Action: None

Incident Synopsis: Approximately 00:08 hours, 15 July 07, ☐ took effective
gunfire with hits on the sandbags in front of ☐ Proceeded to engage threat by
firing at the origin of the gunfire to repel the attack. b7E

Injuries if applicable: None
Personnel Notified of Incident: Control
Additional Reports Generated: The gunfire originated off the left of the
main avenue

03 JUL 08 1030

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED



U.S. Embassy Baghdad

July 15, 2007



Spot Report – 071507-07

Subject: REO Basrah Security Fires on Suspicious Boat.**Reporting Office:** RSO Basrah

Summary: On 07/15/07, at approximately 0750, U.S. REO Security Forces observed one boat occupied by three unknown individuals traveling south on the Shatt-Al-Arab River. REO Security Forces did not observe any of the occupants with cell phones or cameras. However, the boat came within approximately twenty meters of the outer perimeter of the Basrah Palace compound, heading directly towards the REO security posts. In addition, the REO Compound received five rounds of indirect fire (IDF) launched against it approximately one hour prior to this incident. REO Security Force personnel fired two, well-aimed shots from a _____ across the bow of the boat and into the river. Upon doing so, the boat increased its speed, turned away from the Basrah Palace compound and continued traveling south.

RSO Action: RSO investigated the incident, received written reports from those involved and notified British Forces of the incident. RSO's assessment is that this incident could have been a probe of the Basrah Palace shore line perimeter. Normally, all boat traffic in the area maintains a constant speed up and down the river on the far side and away from the REO Compound. It is uncommon and highly suspicious for boats to come this close to the REO Compound.

DRAFTED BY: Josh Godbois, A/RSO Basrah
CLEARED BY: Bryan Bachman, RSO Basrah
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

0316587030

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY



U.S. Embassy – Baghdad

July 15, 2007



Spot Report – 071507-09

Subject: COM PSD Advance Team Fires on an Aggressive Vehicle

Reporting Office: RSO, Baghdad

Summary: On July 15, 2007 at 1000, a [] vehicle COM Advance Team, while at their venue, encountered an aggressive vehicle. The Advance Team convoy was stopped in front of their venue on a 2-lane road with the opposite direction lanes divided by small raised median. The convoy had vehicles stopped and diverted through an opening in the median at approximately [] meters- at least [] meters behind a [] established by vehicle warning signs, a high intensity spotlight aimed at the drivers and hand and arm signals.

The convoy was in a static position with team members dismounted to provide security when the right security standing alongside the follow vehicle observed a blue 4-door taxi with one military aged male (MAM), abruptly go through the stopped traffic at high rate of speed and towards the convoy. The left security of the follow vehicle continuously directed the spotlight at the aggressive driver; the right security fired a pen flare at approximately [] meters. The taxi continued its aggressive approach and at approximately [] meters, the right security fired one well-aimed [] round into the grill of the vehicle. The taxi came to a complete stop and then hastily reversed to the stopped and diverted traffic. The occupant of the vehicle did not appear to be injured. There were no injuries or damage to

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

the COM Advance Team. There were no COM principals in the convoy.
All signals and warnings were used as time and urgency permitted.

RSO Action: PSD members debriefed and written statements forthcoming.
Notified DS/CC.

Location: Red Zone, Baghdad, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: Roque Salas, Watch Officer, Baghdad, Iraq
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 15 Jul 07

Location: _____

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 15 Jul 07

Time of Incident: 1000

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: Arab Palace Hotel

Personnel Involved: _____

Incident Synopsis: On 15 July 2007, at 1000, _____ a Technical Site Survey (TSS) Team was on venue at the Arab Palace Hotel conducting a site survey. Due to venue being on the roadway, the team blocked traffic in an effort to provide proper security. While other traffic was stopped a sedan aggressively maneuvered around the stopped traffic and approached the follow vehicle from the rear. The driver of the sedan failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop and in an escalation of force a dismounted PSS fired one (1) _____ round from his _____ into the grill of the vehicle causing it to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team concluded their TSS without further incident.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION			
TITLE 15JUL2007 Escalation of Force		DS CASE NUMBER / REPORT NUMBER	
TRUE NAME 15JUL2007 Escalation of Force		CASE TYPE Escalation of Force	
POST US Embassy Baghdad	DATE REPORTED 15JUL2007	DATES INVESTIGATED 15JUL2007	REPORTING AGENT Farrington
SYNOPSIS On July 15, 2007, Blackwater Personal Security Detail [redacted] was conducting a Technical Site Survey in the Baghdad Red Zone when a blue taxi approached the stationary motorcade at a high rate of speed. The taxi driver refused to obey commands to stop. Therefore, a [redacted] team member fired one [redacted] round into the grill of the taxi. The taxi driver immediately drove away from the scene. There was no principal with [redacted], and there were no injuries.			
DETAILS This report is based on statements that team members from Blackwater Personal Security Detail [redacted] made to Assistant Regional Security Officer David Farrington in an interview that took place between 1210 and 1235 on the day of the incident described below. All times are approximate. On July 15, 2007, [redacted] was tasked with conducting a Technical Site Survey (TSS) of the Arab Palace Hotel, which is located in the Baghdad Red Zone at [redacted]. The hotel is on the west side of a north-south main road that has two lanes flowing in each direction. A median separates the north and southbound lanes. The [redacted] team members of [redacted] left the US Embassy Baghdad Annex in a [redacted] vehicle motorcade with no principal at 0930 and arrived at venue between 0945 and 0950. There was no room on venue property to stage the motorcade. Therefore, the team established a defensive perimeter immediately upon arrival by blocking all southbound traffic in the two lane road in front of the hotel. The vehicles were canted to give the team visibility of the traffic, and the motorcade vehicles have placards with English and Arabic text that warns drivers to stay 100 meters back. Shift leader [redacted] and an interpreter went in the venue and began the TSS.			
COPIES REFERRED			
REVIEWED BY AGENT SUPERVISOR			
(Initials)		(Date)	

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b7E, F
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50249-101
*GPO : 1981 0 - 341-526(6549)

OPTIONAL FORM 249
(FORMERLY DS-838)
JULY 1996
DEPT. OF STATE

Exempt From Automatic Decontrol By Statute
CONTENT MUST NOT BE DISCLOSED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

UNCLASSIFIED

CASE NUMBER:

03:11:00:00:00

Southbound traffic stayed 100-120 meters away from the motorcade and began to get backed up. Most drivers used a median break to turn around and drive north. Team member [] occasionally used a powerful spotlight to warn off drivers who came within 100 meters of the motorcade. b6 b7c

At 1000, a blue four door taxi with a male driver and no passengers broke through the stopped traffic and approached [] at a high rate of speed. [] used the spotlight to warn off the driver, and team member [] used hand and arm signals for the same purpose. However, the driver did not slow down or change course. [] then fired a pen flare over the vehicle. The driver continued to drive toward the motorcade at a high rate of speed. b6 b7c

Fearing for his life and for his teammates, [] fired one [] round into the grill of the taxi when it was approximately [] meters from the motorcade. The driver brought the taxi to a screeching halt, put the vehicle in reverse, and used the median break to turn around and leave the scene. b7E, F b6 b7c ↓

[] completed the TSS and returned to the Embassy Baghdad Annex. No one was injured in this incident.

03:11:00:00:00 UNCLASSIFIED

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Blackwater USA		Statement Form		Date/Time of Statement July, 15 2007 1300 Hrs	
Name	b6 b7C	Team	Incident Type Shoot to Disable		
Location Of Incident (Grid or Terrain Feature) Arab Palace Hotel		Incident Time Approx. 2000	Incident Date July 15, 2007		

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U0068

Incident Report BW 071507 (1) Weapon Discharge Baghdad

On 15 July 2007, at approximately 0900 hours, [redacted] conducted a pre-mission brief in the WPPS Camp. The mission brief began with the morning intelligence which stressed the continued threat of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) in our area of operation. The Chief of Mission rules of engagement and escalation of force procedures, per the Department of State policy, was briefed by the [redacted] Shift Leader [redacted]. The mission for the day was to conduct a Technical Site Survey (TSS) of the Arab Palace Hotel [redacted].

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At approximately 0930 hours, [redacted] departed the International Zone for the Arab Palace Hotel [redacted] located at grid [redacted]. The motorcade consisted of [redacted] vehicles. The vehicle configuration for the mission was [redacted]. All vehicles in the motorcade have "Warning, stay back 100 meters" stencilled on the back in both English and Arabic. In addition, the Follow vehicle is equipped with rear emergency strobe-flashers, which were activated at the time of the incident. At approximately 0940 hours, [redacted] arrived on venue. The venue is located on a main thoroughfare and has no standoff from the street. Additionally, there are no significant perimeter security features (e.g., T-walls, Hesco barriers) that provides protection from personnel or vehicles on the street. The street is divided by a concrete median with two north bound lanes and two south bound lanes. After arrival the team set up exterior security/defensive positions in order to best provide security to the team during the TSS process. The southbound traffic was diverted at [redacted] away from the venue and the northbound traffic was stopped and diverted away from the motorcade towards [redacted]. After establishing exterior security, [redacted] met with the venue's POC and began the TSS process. [redacted] established a standoff distance of approximately [redacted] meters to the south along with approximately [redacted] meters standoff to the north [redacted] between the venue and local national vehicular traffic. The exterior security team manned static positions in front of the venue and monitored the roadway where traffic was stopped and diverted away from the venue. The Lead and Follow vehicles were positioned in the roadway in order to block vehicular traffic from passing in front of the venue. The follow vehicle was canted in the roadway to allow the Well PSS to control traffic from the south.

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At approximately 1000 hours, a blue four door taxi with a single male driver aggressively proceeded around stopped traffic to the south. The vehicle breached the standoff distance that had been set by the exterior security team. PSS [redacted] was assigned to the Well position of the Follow vehicle. In addition, PSS [redacted] was dismounted providing exterior security adjacent to the Follow vehicle. Upon observing the vehicle, PSS [redacted] flashed the issued spot light at the driver in an attempt to warn the approaching vehicle to stop. Additionally, PSS [redacted] attempted to signal the driver through the use of verbal commands and hand and arm signals. The vehicle did not stop or slow down. At this time PSS [redacted] deployed one pen flare from the Well position which flew directly over the hood and roof of the approaching vehicle. The driver of the vehicle disregarded the pen flare warning signal, the sign on the rear of the vehicle, the rear strobe flashers, spotlight, as well as the verbal warnings and hand and arm signals. The vehicle continued to approach the team's position. At that time, based on his training, experience, and the

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[redacted] b6
b7C
Person giving statement

Blackwater USA		Statement Form				Date/Time of Statement July, 15 2007 1300 Hrs	
Name _____		Team _____		Incident Type Shoot to Disable			
Location Of Incident (Grid or Terrain Feature) Arab Palace Hotel -				Incident Time Approx. 10:00		Incident Date July 15, 2007	

actions of the driver in the approaching vehicle, PSS [redacted] believed that the vehicle was a VBIED and an imminent deadly threat to him and his team. Fearing for his life and the safety of his teammates, PSS [redacted] fired one disabling round from his Department of State issued [redacted] into the front grill of the approaching vehicle. The vehicle came to a controlled stop, immediately reversed out and left in the direction it came from. The driver of the vehicle did not appear to have sustained any bodily injuries. No personnel from [redacted] were injured and no [redacted] vehicles were damaged during the incident. The mission was concluded without further incident. ///END///

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Person giving statement



DECLASSIFIED

Sworn Statement

U006.9

Date 15 July 2007	Time Approx. 1400 hours
Location WPPS Camp, Baghdad Iraq	

I, David Farrington, hereby make the following statement at the request of

David Farrington who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Experience Military/Civilian:

--

In I was employed by Blackwater USA, and completed the WPPS High Threat Protection course. While attending training at Blackwater USA, I were given instruction on motorcade operations, attacks on principal, principal recovery and extraction, evasive / defensive driving, threat identification, use of force, escalation of force, force continuum, defensive tactics and shooting from moving vehicles. While at the Blackwater training center, I completed WPPS II training.

Incident:

On 15 July 2007, at approximately 0900 hours, I conducted a pre-mission brief inside the WPPS Camp. The mission brief began with the morning intelligence which stressed the continued threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) on our routes and in our area of operation. The Rules of Engagement and



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Sworn Statement

escalation of force, per the Department of State policy was briefed by the _____ Shift Leader Castaneda. The mission for the day was to conduct a Technical Site Survey at the Arab Palace Hotel.

At approximately 0930 hours, _____ departed the International Zone (IZ) for the Arab Palace Hotel _____ located at grid _____. The motorcade configuration for the day was _____ All _____ vehicles have "Warning, stay back 100 meters" stenciled on the rear doors. The warning is in both English and Arabic and the Fighting Follow also has rear emergency strobe-flashers. At approximately 0940 hours, Team _____ arrived at the Arab Palace Hotel. There was insufficient on venue parking so the team deployed and used the suburbans to block traffic on both ends of the street. I took up rear security on the right rear quarter panel of the Follow vehicle watching toward the south and the alleys to the east. Traffic had built up south of the venue and was holding or diverting to the west acknowledging our team's presence and direction.

At approximately 1000 hours, a blue four door taxi broke from stopped traffic and began heading north directly towards our position. The vehicle sped around several other stopped vehicles that were holding approximately 120 meters south of the Follow vehicle's position. The suspect vehicle was occupied by a single male driver. I shouted "kiff" and used hand and arm signals in an attempt to signal the vehicle to halt. The vehicle did not stop or slow down. At that point I heard the deployment of a pen flare and I observed the flare fly over the approaching vehicle's hood and roof. The vehicle continued to travel forward despite the signage on the rear of the Follow vehicle, its activated rear flashers, and the deployment of the pen flare. I continued to shout verbal commands as I pointed my U.S. Department of State (DoS) issued _____ rifle at the approaching vehicle. The driver of the vehicle failed to respond to all attempts to de-escalate the situation. At that time the vehicle was approximately _____ meters away and closing. I feared that the vehicle was a VBIED and an imminent threat to my life and the lives of my teammates. I fired one round to the grill of the vehicle in an attempt to stop the threat by disabling the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle responded by immediately coming to a controlled stop. The driver then reversed his vehicle before turning around and departing the scene. The driver of the vehicle did not appear to be injured.

I continued to hold security until _____ completed the mission and returned to the US Embassy, without further incident. No personnel from _____ were injured and no _____ vehicles were damaged during the incident. Weapon discharge notifications were made. ///END///

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Sworn Statement

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16th day of July, 2007.

Signed	<i>David S. Farrington</i>
Printed	David S. Farrington
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE	

Witness Signature	<i>[Signature]</i>
Printed	David M. [illegible]
Address	

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

Sworn Statement

Date 15 July 2007	Time Approx. 1400 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

(P)
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00070

I, David Farrington, hereby make the following statement at the request of

David Farrington, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting therefrom may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience:

--

b6
b7C

In I successfully completed the WPPS training with Blackwater USA. While attending training at Blackwater USA, I were given instruction on motorcade operations, attacks on principal, principal recovery and extraction, evasive / defensive driving, threat identification, use of force, escalation of force, force continuum, defensive tactics and shooting from vehicles. While at the Blackwater training center

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Sworn Statement

Incident:

On 15 July 2007 at approximately 0900 hours, [] pre mission brief was conducted by the Shift Leader [] and the Tactical Commander []. The mission brief included the routes, updated intelligence regarding an increased risk of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) and small arms fire along the route. The rules of engagement per the mission firearms policy and escalation of force were reiterated.

On July 15, 2007 at approximately 0930 hours, [] departed the International Zone from Checkpoint [] traveling to [] the Arab Palace Hotel. The motorcade configuration was a [] The motorcade was

traveling with the vehicle emergency lights and sirens activated in an attempt to warn traffic of the motorcade's presence. The motorcade was traveling with the flow of traffic using [] All [] vehicles have "Warning, stay back 100 meters" stenciled on the rear doors. The warning is in both English and Arabic and the fighting follow also had its rear emergency strobe-flashers activated.

Upon arrival the motorcade stopped in front of the venue because there was no space for parking inside the venue's compound. Due to the venue's layout, the Shift Leader deployed extra personnel for exterior security. While setting up the exterior security positions the driver of the Follow vehicle positioned the vehicle at an angle in order to control approaching traffic from the south and so approaching traffic could to see the warning lights and warning stencils. Traffic to the south was holding approximately 120 meters away from the Follow vehicle. I then observed a blue four door sedan, which appeared to be a taxi, drive through the stopped traffic and approach my position at a high rate speed. The vehicle was to our south and drove right through the stopped traffic 120 meters to the rear of the Follow vehicle's position. I observed a single male driver, who looked to be approximately 25-30 years old, operating the vehicle. Once the suspect vehicle approached to within 100 meters I attempted to signal the driver with a 2 million candlepower spot light. I directed the light beam at the front windshield vehicle. The suspect vehicle continued toward the Follow vehicle with no deviation from its path or speed. Seeing that the vehicle was not stopping, I deployed one pen flare in an attempt to gain the driver's attention. The pen flare went directly over the front windshield and the vehicle's roof. Despite the deployment of the pen flare the driver continued on a path toward the follow vehicle without slowing. It appeared that the driver was focused on our vehicle. His clear disregard of the warnings given led me to believe that the vehicle was a VBIED.

At this point I was in fear for my life and the lives of my teammates. I immediately began to transition to my [] to fire disabling shots but PSS [] who was posted on the right rear quarter panel acted first, firing 1 round from his [] into the grill of the blue sedan. I observed the round impacting the grill and reassessed the threat, the vehicle came to a immediate halt approximately [] meters from the motorcade and the driver put the car in reverse and left the venue area. The driver appeared to be uninjured. The TC [] notified my Shift Leader that one disabling shot had been fired. We continued with our mission at the Arab Palace Hotel without further incident. ///END///

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

Sworn Statement

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16th day of July, 2007.

Signed	David S. Farrington
Printed	David S. Farrington

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	David M. Hays
Address	

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY 00071

DECLASSIFIED



U.S. Embassy-Baghdad

July 16, 2007



Spot Report 071607-07

Subject: COM PSD Team Fires on Aggressive Vehicle**Reporting Office:** RSO TOC - Kirkuk

Summary: On 16 July 2007, at approximately 0851, a REO Kirkuk vehicle motorcade (RSO), while en-route from Kirkuk to Erbil/Camp Zaytun encountered an aggressive red colored SUV with one military age male occupant. b7E,F

The fighting-follow vehicle was running with hazard lights on and the well gunner had his window open to alert vehicles approaching with hand signals and a flashlight to stay back. The well gunner noticed a red SUV traveling at a high rate of speed, closing in on the motorcade and passing the slower moving traffic located approximately 100 meters behind the motorcade. The well gunner informed everyone in the vehicle of an aggressive SUV approaching the motorcade. The right and left rear gunners opened their doors and signaled the suspect-vehicle of the motorcades presence. The red SUV continued traveling towards the motorcade ignoring the signals given from the PSD members as well as the "Stay back 100 meters" (In Arabic) written on the rear of the follow vehicle.

The rear gunners then muzzled their weapons at the driver attempting to slow the vehicle down. At approximately 100 meters from the follow vehicle, the well gunner and right rear fired one round into the grill of the SUV. The SUV then accelerated towards the left side of the motorcade and the left b7E,F

gunner fired 2 more rounds into the grill of the vehicle. The sedan swerved to the right and the well gunner fired one more round into the grill when the vehicle stopped and pulled to the side of the road. The lone occupant appeared to be uninjured after he got out and inspected his vehicle. The motorcade continued on with its mission.

At 0920, the COM PSD Team reported they were being detained at a check point (local name- Mahkmour Checkpoint) southwest of Erbil by Peshmerga Forces. RSO Erbil contacted the Director of Asaish (Erbil Province) relative to the detention of the motorcade and after further discussion, an agreement was made to release the motorcade and allow them to continue on with their mission.

Three COM personnel were in the motorcade; no COM were injured during these incidents.

RSO Action: PSD members are pending debriefing and written statements are forthcoming. RSO will complete a ROI and provide documentation to the RSCC upon completion.

Location: Kirkuk, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: John Hislop, RSO Kirkuk, Iraq
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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Report #: 24-07	Incident-Casualty Report WPPS	Report Date/Time: 16 Jul 07/2012
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REPORTING INFORMATION

17 Jul 07/0851	INCIDENT LOCATION: Ate 2 500 meters North of
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TOTAL # PERSONNEL:	KIA: 0	WIA: 0
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INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: Escalation of Force

REPORTED BY:	METHOD:
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POINT OF CONTACT:	TEL#:
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VICTIM INFORMATION

NAME (LAST, FIRST MI):	
SSN:	DOB:
NATIONALITY:	M/F:
PASSPORT:	ISSUED/EXP:
NATIONALITY:	BLOOD TYPE:
INJURIES:	
STATUS:	

PROGNOSIS:

HOME OF RECORD:	NEXT OF KIN:
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PROPERTY/EVIDENCE

CODE:	DESCRIPTION:	VALUE:	CURRENT LOCATION:

NARRATIVE

At 0851 on July 17th 2007, I _____ reported an escalation of force 500 meters north of _____ on route 2 heading towards Irbil. A total of fives shot were fired at an aggressive driving vehicle. The left rear, right rear, and well position in the last vehicle fired at red SUV. The driver pulled over, stepped out of his car, and inspected the damage. He did not appear to be injured. There were no injuries to COM personel. At the following checkpoint, _____ was detained by local authorities for approximately seventy minutes. The RSO for Irbil arranged for their release and the continued on mission.

ADDITIONAL VICTIM INFORMATION

VICTIM INFORMATION

NAME (LAST, FIRST MI):	
SSN:	DOB:
NATIONALITY:	M/F:
PASSPORT:	ISSUED/EXP:
NATIONALITY:	BLOOD TYPE:
INJURIES:	
STATUS:	

PROGNOSIS:

HOME OF RECORD:	NEXT OF KIN:
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VICTIM INFORMATION

NAME (LAST, FIRST MI):	
SSN:	DOB:
NATIONALITY:	M/F:
PASSPORT:	ISSUED/EXP:
NATIONALITY:	BLOOD TYPE:
INJURIES:	
STATUS:	

PROGNOSIS:

HOME OF RECORD:	NEXT OF KIN:
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This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00299: 20070716 EOF, Irbil PRT

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REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00090

00000000

Impact:

Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070716 EOF, Irbil PRT

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: CRIMINAL

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ CRIME / INCIDENT

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04992

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Hammond

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Hammond, Kory H ARSO BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On July 16th, 2007, members of an RSO Irbil PSD were involved in an Escalation of Force Incident.

Primary Subjects**Case Reports**

Date	Snippet
09/03/2007	Attached are documents prov...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
20070716 [] EOF statem...	Adobe PDF	2,655 kB
20070716 [] EOF writte...	Adobe PDF	1,604 kB
20070716 EOF in Erbil - Upd...	HTML	3 kB
20070716 Email on EOF and f...	Adobe PDF	1,231 kB

Related Cases**Outstanding Warrants****Status History**

09/03/2007	OPEN
09/03/2007	OPEN
09/03/2007	CLOSED

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

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Sworn Statement

Date July 16, 2007	Time 2030
Location Kirkuk REO, Iraq	

I, [redacted], hereby make the following statement voluntarily to [redacted], who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.


On the 16th of July at approximately 0900 hours I witnessed the below actions.

I was in a [redacted] car motorcade traveling from th REO, Kirkuk to Camp Zaytun, Irbil. I was in the position of the Shift Leader in the [redacted] vehicle. When my vehicle commander of the [redacted] vehicle [redacted] which was our CAT vehicle informed me that shots had been fired. I asked [redacted] vehicle commander of the CAT vehicle for a immediate situation report. I was then told that they had engaged a red SUV that was failing to yield to their EOF/warnings. I was given a location of 500 meters North of [redacted] heading Northbound, I then later received a rough grid location of [redacted]. Additionally I was informed that a total of five (5) rounds had been fired and that the vehicle had pulled over and that the driver had exited the vehicle and moved around to the front of the vehicle. After being given this informatin my vehicle contacted [redacted] Base and informed them of the situation, adding that we had no casualties and were continuing on with the mission, [redacted] Base Erbil Operations was notified as well.

Prior to our departure from Kirkuk all members of the team were briefed on the Rules of Engagment and the Escalation of Force. The use of water bottles, opening of doors, hand and arms signals, verbal communications as well as visual warnings with lights and pen flares was addressed.


03:15:58:10:30

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	REC/KIRKULK

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b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16th day of July, 20 07.

Signed	
Printed	John H. Lof RSO

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Edward R. Rose Detail Leader
Address	





Sworn Statement

Date July 16, 2007	Time 2030
Location Kirkuk/REO	

I, [redacted] ^{b6}_{b7c}, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to John Hislop, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

Approximately at 0900 heading north on route 2 500 meters north of [redacted] in the [redacted] and [redacted] vehicle in the motorcade the well position [redacted] I identified a fast moving red suv approximately 150 meters behind our convoy. Two red trucks/suv 's were on our bolo list. At that time [redacted] began using his flashlight to get the attention of the driver. As it came closer (100M) I could see it was a single occupant vehicle. The vehicle had already past 2 other vehicles we were holding back. When it had reached approximately 100M to our convoy myself (Left Rear) and [redacted] (Right Rear) opened our doors and I began using hand and arm signals to get the driver to stop while yelling " stop " in the process. The driver continued at a very fast pace towards our convoy. When the vehicle was approximately [redacted] meters away and closing fast I continued to use hand and arm signals and yelling to get the driver ' s attention and tried to get him to stop with no success. I immediately raised my rifle. That's when [redacted] and [redacted] fired one round into the grill to disable the vehicle. The red suv continued at a fast pace to our convoy and moved left to get to the center of the road. I then fired 2 rounds into the grill to disable. The vehicle continued towards our convoy. [redacted] then fired the 5th and final round. The vehide then pulled to the side of the road. I saw the driver get out of the vehicle and appeared to be o.k. while assesing the damage of his vehicle. I believed this vehicle to be an immediate threat and I was concerned for the safety of the detail members and principals in our convoy. This is the reason for my escalation of force.

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
I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

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
Signed	
Printed	
Address	
REO/Kirkuk FOB Warrior apo ae 09338	

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16th day of
July, 20 07.

Signed	
Printed	Jenna Hruska PSC

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Edward A. Ruiz Detach Leader
Address	

Page 2 of 2 Pages

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Sworn Statement

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Date July 16, 2007	Time 2030
Location Kirkuk REO, Iraq	

I, [redacted] ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to

John Hirsler, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

During [redacted] mission to Camp Zaytun I was in the well position in the last vehicle of the motorcade. The EOF took place approximately 500 meters north of [redacted] going Northbound on Route 2.

I identified a vehicle that matched the description of a bolo VBIED, the vehicle was a red SUV with a single occupant. The Red SUV approached our motorcade at a very high rate of speed, actually having to pass two other vehicles that we gave visual, hand and arm signals to stay back.

I called out to my other team members which was

[redacted] and [redacted] that a fast moving suspicious vehicle was approaching the motorcade.

I then used a flash light and hands to visually warn the red SUV to stay back. The red SUV failed to yield to all of my visual, verbal, hand and arm signals. The red SUV got to about 100 meters from my vehicle when I heard the rears/ [redacted] and [redacted] open their doors and began their visual, verbal, hand and arm signals as part of the EOF.

Once the red SUV continued to advance on our motorcade to a distance of roughly [redacted] meters I felt that the red SUV's intent was to cause serious harm, destruction or kill myself or someone in my motorcade.

I then fired one round into the red SUV's grille to disable the vehicle,


[redacted] then fired one round as well into the vehicles grille. The vehicle continued to speed up to our motorcade and began driving in the center of the road and appeared to speed up even more. As the red SUV continued to advance on our position [redacted] then fired two rounds into the grille, I fired one more round into the red SUV where it finally pulled off the road. I then witnessed the driver which was the only person in the red SUV get out of the vehicle and begin to assess the damage done to his vehicle.

During all of this I was calling out what the vehicle was doing so that my other team members would know what was happening.

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
DECLASSIFIED

I hereby swear or affirm that the statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge. Page 2 of 3 Pages

Signed	
Printed	
Address	
Kirkuk REO <u> </u>	

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16 day of July, 2007.

Signed	
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Notary Public, State of Iraq

Printed

John H. ...
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature

[Signature]

Printed

Edward J. ... Detail Leader

Address

Page 3 of 3 Pages

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Sworn Statement

b7E, F

Date 16 July 2007	Time 2030
Location U.S. REO Kirkuk, Kirkuk Iraq	

I, [redacted] b6 b7c, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to

John Hissler, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

I was the driver of the [redacted] and [redacted] vehicle in the motorcade driving north on Route 2 from Kirkuk to Erbil. At approximately 0900 16 July 2007 in the vicinity of [redacted] who was in the rear of the vehicle, called out "fast mover from the rear". I recall looking in the rearview mirror and seeing a red SUV / truck moving at a high rate of speed approaching our vehicle approximately [redacted] away while passing two vehicles. At the same time, [redacted] began signaling the red vehicle using hand & arm signals and his high intensity flashlight. Due to the fact our vehicle was approximately [redacted] meters from the next vehicle in our motorcade, I increased the speed in an attempt to give the red vehicle more time to see [redacted] signaling him, hoping that he would slow down and distance himself from our vehicle.

As [redacted] continued to visually warn the red vehicle (flashlight and hand & arm signals), both [redacted] and [redacted] opened their doors [redacted] on the left, [redacted] on the right) and began yelling out at the vehicle to stop. Due to the fact both rear doors were open, I could not see to the rear by using the side mirrors but looked over my right shoulder and witnessed [redacted] using hand & arm signals in an attempt to back the vehicle off. At this point I could hear all three team members yelling out for the vehicle to stop. I once again looked back at the rearview mirror and noticed the red vehicle had gained considerable distance to our vehicle, the vehicle was now within [redacted] meters and increasing speed. Approximately two seconds later, one shot was fired. I once again looked in the rearview mirror and noticed the red vehicle had not backed off and was maintaining the same speed if not increasing it's speed.

Page 1 of 3 Pages


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At this point I was extremely concerned for the safety of our vehicle. I then heard another shot as _____ called out "he is not backing off". I believe the second shot came from _____ rifle. I looked back at the rearview mirror and once again noticed the vehicle was maintaining the same distance but had shifted from right to left. At this point I heard another shot followed by two more shots. I believe the third shot was from _____ rifle and the forth and fifth shots from _____ rifle. After the last shot, almost simutanuisly, I heard from all three team members that the vehicle was pulling over. No more than twenty seconds later I heard _____ call out that the driver had exited the vehicle.

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As the driver, I had the hazard lights on and honked the horn several times in an attempt to do anything and everything I could to warn the driver of the red vehicle. The vehicle I was driving has STAY BACK 100 METERS in both English and Arabic stenciled on the back.

Prior to the mission, during our intelligence brief, we had been briefed that two red SUV/ trucks had been added to the BOLO list and that these vehicles had been moved to the Kirkuk area to be used as VBIEDs.




Number of books read	Number of students
0	2
1	3
2	4
3	2
4	3
5	1
6	2
7	1
8	2
9	1
10	1

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July

Priority -

John H. Bishop R.S.

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Sworn Statement

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Date	16 July 2007	Time 20:30
Location	Kirkuk REO	

I, ^{b6}_{b7c}, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to


John Hilder, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

I was seated in the right rear of the last vehicle in the motorcade. Enroute to Erbil, approximately 500 meters north of check point _____, _____ called out; "fast mover". I looked back and saw a red/maroon SUV (Isuzu make) quickly approaching at approximately 150 meters. Once the red SUV approached within _____ meters, I cracked my door, leaned out of the vehicle and made arm and hand signals indicating that the driver needed to stop and stay back from the motorcade. The vehicle continued closing range at a fast pace, _____ said; "he is not responding to my light". At this point I leaned further out of the vehicle and showed my weapon. At approximately _____ meters, the vehicle was center line in the road, demonstrating its intention to pass, _____ called out; "fast mover trying to pass on our left". By the time the red SUV was within _____ meters, I sensed that we were in a high threat situation, that this SUV could be one of the red trucks from the bolo list. At this time _____ fired a shot at the grill of the red SUV and I also fired a well aimed shot at the grill of the red SUV, intending to disable the vehicle and eliminate the threat. Even after 2 disabling shots were fired at the vehicle, the red SUV did not slow down, continued to move further into the left lane attempting to pass. At this point the red SUV was moving out of my view and into a blind spot, so I pulled back into our vehicle. _____ fired 2 shots at the grill of the red SUV and _____ fired one more disabling shot into the grill. After the 5th and final shot was fired, the red SUV finally slowed down and quickly pulled over to the right hand shoulder of the road and stopped. The driver quickly exited his vehicle and proceeded to walk towards the front of the red SUV and checked for damage. At this time the details of the incident were reported up to higher.


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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


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Address	1500 ...


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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16th day of July, 20 08.

Signed	
Printed	JOHN H. HISE

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Robert R. Pina Detail Leader
Address	



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Sworn Statement

Date	16 JUL 07	Time	830
Location	Approximately 3000		
Route 2 / area of [redacted] operators building used [redacted] Erbil			

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I, _____, hereby make the following statement voluntarily to _____, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

See second page
STATEMENT STARTS
ON
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Page 1 of 3 Pages

03 JUL 2007

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Today, 16 JUL 07, during [redacted] movement from Kirkuk to Erbil, the fighting follow engaged a vehicle in the area approximately 500-1000 meters North of grey code [redacted] Northbound for Erbil. The following are the events I witnessed from my perspective.

I was the [redacted] of the fighting follow which was the [redacted] and [redacted] vehicle in the motorcade. Shortly after the lead TC called for [redacted] the well of the vehicle [redacted] began calling out of a fast mover from behind. As the well was calling out fast mover, both the rear positions opened their doors, and quickly all three were yelling 'stop'. Hearing the word from the open doors and the yelling, I immediately began focussing for any oncoming traffic that might pose an obstacle for the lead's open door. As all three were still yelling, I heard four quick shots. It seemed as though two rifles went off at the same time in the vehical followed by some more verbal commands and three more shots. From the first to last shot was approximately 3-5 seconds. As I heard the shots, I tried to get a visual of the target in the passenger side mirror but [redacted] door was still open, so I then continued on to reach for the GPS and to call for the shift lead for a SITREP. I then yelled to the back for any injuries, and was told that the vehical personnel were ok, and that the target had pulled to the side of the road and got out to check for vehicle damage as we continued to roll on for Erbil. I did not see who fired which shots nor did I ever get a visual of the target, and when asked by the shift lead how many shots were fired for the SITREP I asked the rear and well to which they replied 5. I radioed the last transmissions to the shift leader, and as we continued on, the well [redacted] said the single occupant was outside his SUV inspecting vehicle damage.

These are the events as described to the best of my knowledge.

Page 2 of 3 Pages

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DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Redacted]
Printed	[Redacted]
Address	860 Kirkuk / DMHBP / APO AE09338

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16 day of July, 2007

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Signed	
Printed	

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	AUSTIN STOFFEL
Address	DynComp WPPS Northern Iraq


EO 16 JUL 07

Page 3 of 3 Pages

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



TITLE COM PSD (Kirkuk) Fires on Aggressive Vehicle		DS CASE NUMBER / REPORT NUMBER 7/16/2007 - Kirkuk	
TRUE NAME N/A		CASE TYPE Use of Force	
POST Kirkuk	DATE REPORTED 07/17/2007	DATES INVESTIGATED 07/16/2007 - 07/17/2007	REPORTING AGENT RSO Hislop

SYNOPSIS

Summary: On July 16, 2007, at approximately 0851 hrs, a Kirkuk RSO [] vehicle PSD motorcade, [] enroute from the Kirkuk REO to Erbil/Camp Zaytun compound fired on a vehicle after determining that the vehicle posed a threat to their motorcade. This use of force was appropriate and within the parameters of DS use-of-force policy. Injuries to the lone occupant in the threat vehicle were not observed but later determined to be of a minor nature. End Summary.

The following chain of events is derived from the statements and interviews of team member involved in the shooting who were witness to the event: [] was enroute from the Kirkuk REO to Camp Zaytun located in Erbil when they encountered an aggressive red four door SUV (possibly Isuzu model) with one lone driver approaching them at a rapid speed from the rear. The area of the motorcade was between the cities of Kirkuk and Erbil and approximately 52 km north of Kirkuk and 40 km south of Erbil. The red SUV with one lone occupant was traveling in the same direction as the motorcade at a high rate of speed, passing all the other vehicles that were maintaining their distance, 100 meters behind the motorcade.

As the SUV approached the last vehicle in the motorcade (CAT), the well gunner of the CAT vehicle signaled the driver to slow down by flashing his flashlight on and off and giving hand and arm signals to stay back through his drop down window. As the vehicle wasn't adhering to his commands and continued approaching the motorcade, both the left and right rear of the CAT vehicle opened their doors in an attempt to warn off the driver by using hand and arm signals. Statements made by all three rear gunners stated the vehicle approached in such a rapid manner only hand and arms signals prior to muzzling their weapons in the direction of the vehicle in attempt to waive the driver off.

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REVIEWED BY AGENT SUPERVISOR

(Initials)

(Date)

50249-101
GPO 1981 O-341-526(6549)

OPTIONAL FORM 249
(FORMERLY DS-838)
JULY 1996
DEPT OF STATE

Exempt From Automatic Declassification By Statute
CONTENT MUST NOT BE DISCLOSED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

At approximately [redacted] from the rear of the CAT vehicle, the well gunner fired one round into the grill of the SUV. Almost immediately at the same time the well gunner fired, the right rear of the CAT vehicle fired one round into the grill of the SUV. The aggressive SUV then swerved to the left of the road and continued accelerating in an attempt to pass the motorcade. At this time the left rear gunner fired two rounds into the grill of the SUV and shortly followed by one more round by the well gunner. The SUV pulled over to the right shoulder and came to a complete stop. The occupant appeared to be uninjured as he exited the vehicle seconds after pulling over and started to inspect his vehicle. The motorcade continued on with its mission. The Shift leader of the RSO Motorcade immediately notified Erbil TOC of the EOF, which notified the RSO and RSO Baghdad. b7E,F

At approximately 0920 [redacted] (the same COM PSD Team) reported they were being detained at the Mahkmour checkpoint which is southwest of Erbil by the Peshmerga Forces. Initially the Peshmerga stated to the Shift Leader (through our translator) the team was being detained for a shooting that occurred at a nearby village (Qush Tappa) 2 kilometers west of where the before mentioned EOF occurred, injuring and killing multiple individuals. Statements by the Shift Leader made thru the interpreter to the Peshmerga acknowledged the PSD had recently shot a vehicle between Kirkuk and Erbil but not where the officials were claiming. The Shift Leader relayed this information through the TOC's on what was occurring at the checkpoint. RSO Erbil contacted the Director of the Kurdish Asaish (Erbil Province) relative to the detention of the motorcade. After further discussion with the Director, an agreement was made to release the motorcade and allow them to continue on with their mission. b7E,F

A Tactical Support Team (TST) was launched from Erbil to support the team, however after a determination was made that the team was not in harms way, this team was ordered to return to base and placed on standby.

During the detention of the COM motorcade, the senior guard at the checkpoint asked the shift leader if he could take his picture which was denied. The same guard also stated that our motorcade could continue on but one vehicle would have to accompany them to the Asaish headquarters which was also promptly denied. Due to the amount of time the motorcade was at the check point, the motorcade was asked to move to the side which they obliged and cooperated with. At one time the Shift Leader requested to depart the checkpoint but was denied by the guard.

At approximately 1030, a Ashish official arrived at the scene and after a few minutes informed the translator the motorcade could depart. The team departed the checkpoint and continued on to Camp Zaytun with out further incident.

Three COM personnel were in the motorcade and no one was injured during the incident. Written statements were immediately written by all members of the CAT vehicle and the Shift Leader which were later interviewed by RSO Kirkuk.

On July 17th Erbil RSO met with the Kurdish Director of the Asaish in Erbil to discuss the events that occurred on the 16th. During the meeting, RSO Zittle determined and was convinced that on the 16th of July, [redacted] b7E,F

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while supporting three COM employees shot and injured _____ is a
civilian affairs judge for the Kalar court. After being shot, _____ was transported to a emergency
room with a minor bullet wound to the leg and later released from the hospital. RRT staff members will be
visiting _____ on 18 July.

b6
b7c

Case Pending

DECLASSIFIED



Sworn Statement

Date 17-07-07	Time 13:11
Location REO/KIRKUK	

I, [redacted], hereby make the following statement voluntarily to John Heslop, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service.

On July 16th, 2007 at approx. 0930 hrs. during our mission to Zaytun Camp, Irbil the following incident occurred. While traveling to Irbil we were moving in a [redacted] car motorcade and entering the MAKMUR checkpoint [redacted] I was in the Shift Leaders position which is in the [redacted] vehicle when our motorcade was stopped. My Tactical Commander, [redacted] in the first vehicle made initial contact with the checkpoint guards. [redacted] informed me that we had a problem, at this time I exited my vehicle after calling for the interpreter to accompany me. Initially my interpreter and self, addressed the problem with three gentlemen of which two (2) were in uniform. Through my interpreter, I learned that we were being detained because of a shooting. I asked where the shooting had occurred and was told initially that the report had come from the village of Qush Tappa that was 2 Kilometers west of our route. Additionally one of our Kurdish counterparts informed me that there were multiple injuries and possibly dead. I secured a map from my tactical commander who had identified the village and presented that to our Kurdish checkpoint guards, they were unable or did not want to identify the village.


I explained to them that we had a escalation of force earlier that morning while coming from Kirkuk, but that is was not in that area. During the above incident I was informed by what appeared to be the senior Kurdish officer that we were being detained until the problem could be resolved. Earlier I had informed the Kurdish contingent that we were carrying Department of State personnel. I was informed that they had someone from the Kurdish asaish on the way out and that we could not move. At this time I had my driver notify [redacted] Base, Irbil and give them a situation report. He reported that [redacted] base was sending another team to our location which was eventually turned around. During this time two small pick-ups with Peshmerga arrived and deployed. Prior to this my team had already assumed 360 degree security around the motorcade. For the better part of a hour, two of the checkpoint guards that we were dealing with were on the phone with various sources. They informed me that the Asaish Officials were on their way out to our location. I was then contacted by [redacted] Base Operations in Erbil and told that a PSD team was on their way out to link up with us. At this time the senior Checkpoint guard asked if he could take my picture and I stated that I was sorry but that was against policy. About this time the senior

guard informed me that our motorcade could continue but one vehicle would have to accompany them to the Asaish Headquarters in Erbil. I told him that we could not do that and that we still had another American contingent on its way to our location. About this time I was informed that the PSD team from [] Base had turned around and was heading back to [] Base. The senior guard then asked me if I could move my motorcade to another lane so that traffic could resume through the checkpoint. We cooperated with the guards and moved the motorcade over to the far right lane. At this time I asked if they knew when the Asaish would be arriving at the checkpoint and then was told that they were still on their way to our location. I asked the guard if we could back out of the checkpoint and return to the Kirkuk REO and let our senior US Officials, help to resolve this issue. He informed me that we were not to leave the checkpoint, after about one hour and ten minutes the Asaish Official arrived. He was there for about two minutes and he did not speak to me at all. My Translator informed me that we could now leave, and at that time we loaded the other members of my team back into their vehicles and continued on to Camp Zaytun with no further incidents. I also want to point out that during this incident our DOS principals were kept aware of the situation as it was developing.

b7E1F


03115587030

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	
Printed	
Address	
REO/KIRKUK	

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 17th day of July, 2008.

Signed	
Printed	John T. Haslop JSO

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	
Address	

00082 (P)

~~MRD008257~~ b7E, F**From:** Hislop, John T (Kirkuk)**Sent:** Tuesday, July 17, 2007 10:17 PM**To:** Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad); Zittle, Zachariah (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO)(APO)**Cc:** Miller, Earl R (Baghdad); Rowe, James AJ (Kirkuk); Swoyer, Edward J (Baghdad); Backstrom, Paul M (Baghdad); Hammond, Kory M (Baghdad)**Subject:** EOF in Erbil - Update 7/17

b7E, F

Attachments: ROI 071707PSD EOF KIRKUK.pdf; SL check point statement 071707.pdf; Email on EOF and findings 71707.pdf; [] EOF written statements 16 July 07.pdf; [] EOF typed statements 16 July 07.pdf

Gentlemen,

Attached are all the current documents available from REO Kirkuk's EOF on 7/16/07. please save as needed. The ROI and case is still pending based on the meeting Zach will be having with the Judge tomorrow morning and any information he may learn during the meeting. Thanks again Zach for all your help and support on this one.

John

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b7c

Hislop, John T (Kirkuk)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00083

From: Zittle, Zachariah (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO) [zzittle@usaid.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2007 3:26 PM

To: Hislop, John T (Kirkuk); Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad); Miller, Earl R (Baghdad); Rowe, James AJ (Kirkuk)

Subject: RE: EOF in Erbil - UPDATE

Well gentlemen – I met with the Director this morning; as such, I am convinced that we shot the red-colored SUV driven by _____ a civilian affairs judge in kalar court, who was transported to the emergency room with a minor bullet wound to the leg.

b6
b7c

I certainly am not questioning the judgment of the PSD members involved in this incident; in fact, the contrary. Based on my review of the reports, like John, the PSD members did exactly what they should have done and we should hope they react similarly if presented with the same scenario in the future.

There's certainly no way for us to differentiate between bad guys and friendly government officials who simply drive in a reckless fashion without regard for their personal safety; as such, we do what we must to stay safe by taking the appropriate action.

With that said, we find ourselves in a negatively unique situation regarding future relationships when we shoot at government officials without taking some type of follow-on action – this is the second one in the past few months. It's very important for me/us to maintain the relationships we've worked hard to develop if we want to find continued success in this region – we have many VIP visits and travel routinely around the region with much support from all levels of the regional government from the MOI himself to the local police chief.

Without apologizing, I will meet with the Judge tomorrow morning to express our sympathy regarding the incident. The Erbil Director of Asaish recommended we offer restitution for the medical expenses and vehicular damage – in the past, this bureaucratic process has taken as long as four months – is there a mechanism in place to gain immediate access to funds so we can make peace with the locals? According to the Director of Asaish, we can probably make this incident go away without further review if we show up tomorrow with \$1000 when we meet the judge. We have funds on hand at the RRT I could probably dip into immediately to cover the restitution; we could then have someone carry up cash to replenish the fund the next time a visitor arrives.

Moving forward – I set off with two major goals this morning; one, to find out if we were responsible for this incident; secondly, I wanted to discuss the way ahead. The director and I reached what I believe to be a fair compromise. I will create placards for each vehicle that will read in both English and Kurdish: "This vehicle and its occupants are currently involved in a United States diplomatic mission. By order of the Director of Asaish, the occupants of this vehicle should never be detained, even if a law has been broken; moreover, you should assist the occupants of this vehicle in every way possible. The Security Attaché for the U.S. Mission to Erbil/Kirkuk will discuss the details of all incidents with KRG Officials at the earliest opportunity." as a last resort only: Director _____, (any feedback would be appreciated – this is the rough language I worked out with the director).

b6

In short – The director stated that if we carry placards as described herein that he will ensure we are not detained in the future. He justified his reaction yesterday by stating that he usually lets us proceed without delay, but that, considering the victims official status, he would have upset a lot of people in his cabinet and on his staff if he didn't take some action. He agreed that he should have handled the situation differently and that he will ensure it doesn't happen again in the future if we simply provide the placard as described. The director furthered by stating that there are several private security firms operating in the region and he needs to ensure we have more than words to identify ourselves, that the placard will resolve future problems – Director _____ will brief his staff of the new initiative.

b6

John and I will, with your concurrence, brief our respective teams on the new policy and ensure it is followed – I don't feel PSDs should be required to give personal names (if asked, they can provide my name so as not to belabor the brief encounter with local security); If asked any questions about particulars, I'm comfortable with the men giving a quick description of the subject vehicle, the reckless action and the subsequent PSD reaction. If

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7/17/2007

stopped for more than five minutes, call RSO Kirkuk or Erbil and/or the numbers listed on the placard for further guidance – shouldn't be an issue.

Note: we carry diplomatic placards in the vehicles now, but apparently they're not official – the new ones will be blessed and stamped by Asaish.

I feel today's meeting has strengthened our relationship with the KRG. When time permits, please advise on restitution matter – I'm meeting the judge at 1000.

Please contact me for clarification on any ambiguous information.

Thanks for your patience,

Zach

From: Hislop, John T. (Kirkuk)(Kirkuk)
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2007 8:55 AM
To: Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad)(Baghdad); Zittle, Zachariah (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO)
Subject: RE: EOF in Erbil - UPDATE

Rick,

All statements and interviews were completed at approximately 2230 last night. All of the three shooters involved in the EOF (five shots fired in total) used the minimal force to stop this potential threat. Three of the occupants stated they had never seen such an aggressive driver and were in fear for their life and that of the COM motorcade. Two of the shooters have been with DynCorp for almost three years without a previous EOF. Statements from the PSD members stated the individual pulled over and he immediately exited the vehicle with NO apparent injury to his person.

As Zach stated, we may have been in the wrong place, time and told the truth at the Peshmerga checkpoint...that we just had a escalation of force between Erbil and Kirkuk. The Peshmerga in turn took this information as we were the "shooters" they were looking for. (S/I. on the scene) handled the situation flawlessly at the checkpoint until Zach's contact with Asaish was able to release the motorcade. We will be standing by for Zach's portion later today.

John

From: Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad)
Sent: Monday, July 16, 2007 7:54 PM
To: Zittle, Zachariah (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO)(APO)
Cc: Miller, Earl R (Baghdad); Hislop, John T (Kirkuk)
Subject: RE: EOF in Erbil - UPDATE

Thanks Zach

Rick Colon,
 Deputy RSO Baghdad
 GSM: 914-360-4549 / DSN: 239-5907
 Email: ColonR@state.gov / ClassNet: ColonR@state.sgov.gov

From: Zittle, Zachariah (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO) [mailto:zzittle@usaid.gov]
Sent: Monday, July 16, 2007 7:15 PM
To: Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad); Miller, Earl R (Baghdad)
Cc: Hislop, John T (Kirkuk); Backstrom, Paul M (Baghdad)
Subject: RE: EOF in Erbil - UPDATE

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7/17/2007

Gentlemen – all necessary contacts have been made with KRG security officials regarding this event.

Allegedly, there was a U.S. Military EOF incident that occurred at about the same location and time as ours – I will don formal attire in the morning and meet with security director prior to APD event in an effort to ascertain whether we fired the wounding shots and to discuss the elimination of future Peshmerga detentions regarding US COM personnel. I will explain that our EOF policies are designed to provide a gradual and disciplined approach to addressing vehicles that our teams perceive to be a threat to our motorcades.

I have read PSD reports of today's incident – there is a possibility that we did not injure the individual Peshmerga claims we did – I will work hard to find the truth.

If I can partake in the APD affair, I will; if not, I have made all necessary arrangement to ensure it's properly covered.

Thanks,

Zach

From: Colon, Ricardo (Baghdad)(Baghdad)

Sent: Monday, July 16, 2007 12:17 PM

To: Miller, Earl R (Baghdad)(Baghdad)

Cc: Hislop, John T (Kirkuk)(Kirkuk); Zittle, Zachariah (IRAQ/ERBIL/RSO); Backstrom, Paul M (Baghdad)(Baghdad)

Subject: EOF in Erbil - UPDATE

Earl, compilation of reporting from John and Zach:

At approximately 0951, an RSO PSD team traveling from Kirkuk to Camp Zaytun in Irbil with three COM personnel had an EOF incident approximately half way between Kirkuk and Irbil (still waiting on actual grid from the team). According to reports, five shots were fired on a Red SUV with a lone male occupant reportedly resulting in minor injuries to the vehicle driver.

However upon entering into Irbil, the team was detained at Macmore checkpoint by the Peshmerga for this EOF and demanded to give over the shooters to the Asaish for further investigation. Zach Zittle was able to contact Chief of Asaish for the Peshmerga to have the team released from the checkpoint, and after some back and forth they acquiesced. Zach intends to have a follow up meeting with his contacts tomorrow in an effort to avoid this type of reaction by the Peshmerga in the future.

Statements and investigation will follow by our agents on the ground.

Steve Valdez took upon himself to notify the front office while we were still collecting and assessing reporting from the team on the ground. I received a call from Damon Wilson from the DCM staff on an unrelated issue and I gave him a quick brief on the incident.

Rick Colon
Deputy Regional Security Officer
U.S. Embassy Baghdad - Iraq
GSM: (914) 360-4549 / DSN: 239-5907
Email: ColonR@state.gov
ClassNet: ColonR@state.sgov.gov

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7/17/2007

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b6

03:15:58:10:30

Kurdistan Region Judges Union

July 18, 2007

Statement

The day before yesterday a coalition troop fired
who is a judge in Kalar, on Kirkuk-Erbil road near Qushtapa
when he was going to Erbil to do his private job. b6
It is worth mentioning that he was wounded and his car got hit, we as
Kurdistan Judges union protest this awful accident and we consider
this accident as an aggressive act against people life and their possession
and it is violence against human rights in general and against innocent
citizens in particular.
We would like to inform the coalition and the American troops that we
deal with such accidents very carefully and with special attention.
Moreover we would like to express our very deep concern and we
emphasis that no one should be fired for no reason and the life,
possession and security of our people in the region should be preserved
and not exposed to dangerous while the situation in Kurdistan is secure
and very safe.
Finally we request for compensation for this judge please.

Very best regards


Rizgar Muhamad Amin

Chief of Kurdistan Judges Union

03:15:58:10:30

470837

(P)

b6

00085

Dear Sir/Madam

DECLASSIFIED


We would like to inform you that yesterday July 16, 2007
before noon an American troop fired [redacted]
who is a judge in **KALAR**.

b6

His car got hit by some bullets but fortunately he was not
wounded badly.

We would like to protest this illegal accident and we
request for clarification and for an official apology for this
accident, moreover we request for compensation for the
wounded judge.

We expect your reply please.


Yours truly

Faruoq jamil
Minister of Justice

FYI.... For filing

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United States Embassy Baghdad
REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE
Investigations Section

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V0086

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MEMORANDUM

Date: July 19, 2007
To: Members, Iraq Claims & Condolences Committee
From: Edward Swoyer, ARSO
Re: Claim filed by _____) b6
b7c

On July 16, 2007, a Chief of Mission (COM) Personnel Security Detail (PSD) team providing security services for the US Regional Embassy Office (REO) Kirkuk was involved in an Escalation of Force incident. The PSD team was traveling from the Kirkuk REO to Erbil when a vehicle approached the motorcade from the rear at a high rate of speed. The members of the PSD believed that the vehicle was a threat to the motorcade and tried to signal the driver to maintain a safe distance. The PSD:

- Flashed a high powered spotlight in the driver's eyes
- Gave hand and arm signals to tell the driver to slow down while yelling at him to stop
- Opened their doors and pointed their rifles at him

When these efforts failed, the PSD fired several rounds into the engine of the oncoming vehicle in an attempt to disable it. The vehicle then pulled to the side of the road, where the driver got out and looked at the damage to the vehicle.

Kirkuk RSO conducted an investigation and determined that the PSD's actions listed were within the established Department of State policy for Escalation of Force.

The claimant is requesting a total claim of \$1550 for damage to his vehicle.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLAIMS FORM

وزارة الخارجية الامريكية
استمارة طلب التعويض

TO: Department of State

Today's Date: _____

July 18th 2007 تاريخ اليوم:

الى: وزارة الخارجية الامريكية

FROM: Name: _____

من: الاسم:

b6
b7c

Circle one: Claimant Attorney Authorized representative Parent Brother/Sister Son/Daughter.

→ [Anyone other than claimant MUST attach proof of authorization or proof of familial relationship.]

ارسم دائرة حول واحد منها: المذعي المحامي/الممثل المفوض احد الوالدين الاخ/الاخت الابن/الابنة
(يتوجب على اي شخص غير المذعي ان يرفق إثبات التفويض او إثبات العلاقة العائلية)

Other: _____ اخر:

ADDRESS of person filing claim:

عنوان مقدم الطلب:

(English): Sinlaimania - Kalar - Court Nb.
behind the court building. (باللغة العربية):

(a) I, the above named claimant/attorney/representative, certify that I (or the person on whose behalf I am making this claim) am a resident of _____

أنا ، المذعي / المحامي / الممثل المفوض المذكور اسمه اعلاه ، أقر بأنني (أو الشخص الذي لثمت هذا الطلب بالنيابة عنه) من سكان منطقة Katar

(b) I hereby make a claim against the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT for damages, injuries or death caused by the Department of State or its contractors.

ب. ارفع بموجب هذا طلباً للتعويض ضد حكومة الولايات المتحدة عن اضرار ا ، او إصابات ، او وفاة كانت وزارة الخارجية او المتعاقدون سبباً فيها.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE CLAIMS FORM

وزارة الخارجية الامريكية
استمارة طلب التعويض

(c) The property damaged is owned by: ج. ان الملكية التي تضررت تعود الى:

C. Judge / His car (ISUZU 4x4) 2001 b6 b7c

(d) The name of the person injured or killed is: د. اسم الشخص الذي اصيب او قتل:

injured person / b6 b7c

(e) The incident happened on July 15th 2007, Erbil - Qashtapa highway
(Date) (City/town/neighborhood/highway name & number)

@ 0900 am في ٠٩٠٠ في وقت الحادث يوم (التاريخ)
(المدينة/البلدة/المحلة/اسم ورقم الطريق السريع)

(f) The facts of the incident are as follows:

و. ان وقائع الحادث هي كالآتي

The Judge been driving on the highway towards Erbil
Then he by passed bunch of cars so he was surprised
with the PSD convoy, then he got shot and got
injured on left leg then been transferred to hospital
Thank god he is alive, and he is OK. as been declared
The shooting reason was (suspected Vbid)

[Use back of sheet if needed. Be sure to include any photographs, statements from witnesses, documents proving ownership of damaged or destroyed property, death certificates, medical bills and repair estimates.]

(استخدم الجانب الخلفي من هذه الورقة عند الحاجة. تأكد من ارفاق اي صور ، وإفادات شهود ، ووثائق تثبت الملكية المتضررة او المدمرة ، وشهادات وفاة ، وفواتير طبية وتقدير لكلفة التصليح.)

Same description of the Judge's car
been reported as a (Vbid) .

0311557030



CLAIMS FORM

وزارة الخارجية الامريكية
استمارة طلب التعويض

(g) The names and addresses or other contact information of any witnesses: _____

ز. اسماء وعناوين الشهود او معلومات اخرى للاتصال باي منهم
witness / Dr. Kurdistan Secretary of women Union.

(h) If the claim is for death, please provide a detailed description of decedent's employment, family information, degree of support provided to family by decedent, itemized medical bills and burial expenses and any other information that would have a bearing on the damages claimed

ح. إذا كان طلب التعويض عن وفاة، يرجى تقديم وصفا مفصلا عن عمل المتوفي، ومعلومات عن عائلته، ودرجة الإعالة التي يوفرها المتوفي الى العائلة، وفواتير طبية مفصلة وتكاليف الدفن وأي معلومات أخرى قد يكون لها صلة بالاضرار المطلوبة تعويضها.

_____ TOTAL للمجموع

(i) If the claim is for personal injury, please provide a detailed description of the nature of the injury, as well as any doctor's reports, medical bills, prognosis for future treatment, evidence of lost income, or any other evidence or information that would have a bearing on the damages claimed.

د. إذا كان طلب التعويض عن إصابة شخصية، يرجى تقديم وصفا مفصلا عن طبيعة الإصابة، وكذلك أي تقارير طبية، وفواتير طبية، وتشخيص للعلاج المستقبلي، ودليل عن الدخل المفقود، أو أي دليل أو معلومات قد يكون لها صلة بالاضرار المطلوبة تعويضها.

Medical Reports are available @ the
(Asayesh) office cuz they been at the
Emergency hospital when the Judge brought
in and they have the whole Details.



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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLAIMS FORM

وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية
استمارة طلب التعويض

_____ TOTAL المجموع

(j) If the claim is for damage to property, please provide a detailed list of what was damaged or destroyed and the estimates for repair, if damaged, or replacement, if destroyed:

ي. إذا كان طلب التعويض عن اضرار الملكية، يرجى تقديم قائمة مفصلة بالملكات التي تضررت أو دُمرت وتبديل لكلفة التصليح، إذا كانت قد تضررت أو الاستبدال إذا كلفت قد دُمرت:


PRICE (المبلغ)	Car Damages	ITEM (المادة)
_____	Plastic Dumper (Front)	250 \$
_____	Engine Cover	200 \$
_____	Radiator	100 \$
_____	Front wind shield	150 \$
_____	Back wind shield	150 \$
_____	Remote Control Device	100 \$
_____	wipers and stop lights	100 \$
_____	AC System Maintaine	200 \$
_____	TOTAL (المجموع)	
_____	Engine Belts & Brakes checking	100 \$
_____	Mirrors	50 \$
_____	Fixing holes on the inside Frame	150 \$
_____	Total Amount	1550 \$

(k) I had insurance for the following persons/property: / كان لدي تأمين على الأشخاص / الممتلكات التالية

(l) My insurer paid me the following amount for the injuries/damage:

ل. دفعت شركة التأمين لي المبلغ التالي عن الإصابات / الأضرار:

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLAIMS FORM

وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية
استمارة طلب التعويض

To the best of my knowledge, another claim (has/ has not) been filed relating to the incident described above.

بحسب علمي، (لقد لم يتقدم) طلب آخر بالتعويض متعلق بالحدث المذكور أعلاه.

NOTE: BY SIGNING BELOW, YOU ARE SWEARING THAT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS CLAIM IS ACCURATE AND TRUTHFUL. ANYONE WHO ATTEMPTS TO FILE, OR CONSPIRES TO FILE, A DUPLICATE OR FRAUDULENT CLAIM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL FACE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

ملاحظة: عند التوقيع أدناه تعتبر قد ادبت التمس بأن المعلومات المقدمة في طلب التعويض هذا هي دقيقة وحقيقية. وسيواجه محاكمة جنائية كل من يحاول تقديم أو يتآمر من أجل تقديم طلب مزدوج أو احتيالي ضد حكومة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.

asiacell
sanatell
medo com

(توقيع المذيع)
(Signature of Claimant)

b6
b7c

The claimant was assisted in completing this claim form by:

استعان بمساعدتي في ملئ استمارة طلب

(الاسم) (Name)

(Contact information: e-mail, address, phone, etc.) (البريد الإلكتروني، عنوان، هاتف، إلخ)



(P)

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U0088

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UNCLASSIFIED



United States Regional Reconstruction Team- Erbil
Regional Security Office

MEMORANDUM

Date: July 30, 2007
To: Members, Iraq Claims & Condolences Committee
From: Zach Zittle, RSO-Erbil *Zach Zittle*
Re: Claim filed by *b6
b7c*

On July 30, 2007, members of the Erbil, Iraq Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) met with *b6
b7c* for lunch. We discussed the incident, but also issues concerning the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. At the conclusion of lunch, RRT Leader Jess Baily presented \$2,500.00 to the Judge.

The Judge was extremely appreciative of the manner in which the incident was resolved; in fact, the Judge said that the way we had handled the matter made compensation unnecessary and stated the friendships made were worth more than anything. In the end, the Judge accepted the currency; pictures were taken, receipts were signed then later forwarded to Natalie Cropper.

RRT Erbil considers this case closed.

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED

U0089



U.S. Embassy – Baghdad

July 17, 2007



Spot Report – 071707-02

Subject: COM PSD Counter Assault Team (CAT) Fires on an Aggressive Vehicle

Reporting Office: RSO, Baghdad

Summary: On July 17, 2007 at 0945, [] vehicle COM CAT, while conducting area support for COM PSD teams, encountered an aggressive vehicle. The CAT was traveling north on a 2-lane road towards a major intersection, with a feeder road on the east, that merged towards the same intersection. b7E, F

The convoy had sirens blaring and lights flashing as it slowly approached stopped traffic at the intersection. The middle vehicle turret gunner observed two military aged male occupants in a red 4-door sedan weaving in and out of the feeder road traffic rapidly moving towards the convoy. At approximately [] meters, the gunner established eye contact, raised and directed his [] rifle at the driver and raised his left hand to warn him to stop or slow down. The driver did not heed the signals but rather continued its aggressive approach; at approximately [] meters the middle turret gunner fired a pen flare but it misfired. The red sedan continued its approach and at approximately [] meters, the middle turret gunner fired two well aimed [] rounds into the grill of the aggressive vehicle. The vehicle came to a complete stop. The two occupants were observed looking over the front end of their sedan and did not appear to be injured. There were no injuries or damage in the COM CAT. There were no COM principals in the motorcade. b7E, F

RSO Action: PSD members debriefed and written statements forthcoming.
Notified DS/CC,

Location: Red Zone, Baghdad, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: Roque Salas, Watch Officer, Baghdad, Iraq
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

03115507030

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 17 Jul 07

Location: [redacted]

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Scott Bruggeman

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 17 Jul 07

Time of Incident: 0945

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: 50 meters south of [redacted]

Personnel Involved: Fast CAT

Incident Synopsis: On 17 July 2007, at 0945, [redacted] a Counter Assault Team was conducting area support for COM PSD teams. While approaching the intersection at [redacted], a red sedan aggressively approached the motorcade from the right side. The driver of the red sedan failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop. In an escalation of force, a PSS fired two (2) [redacted] rounds from his [redacted] into the grill of the vehicle causing it to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued with their Counter Assault mission in support of COM PSD teams.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

03 JUL 2007 1030

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00393: 20070717, UODFI, BAGHDAD, [REDACTED]

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00134

DECLASSIFIED

Impact:

Status: OPEN

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070717, UODFI, BAGHDAD, [REDACTED]

Status: OPEN

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ CRIME / INCIDENT

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-03659

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

■ IRAQ
■ UNITED STATES

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: ARSO David Farrington

Phone: (914) 360-1980

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore	ASAC	BAGHDAD
Farrington, David S	SA	BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On July 17, 2007, Blackwater Personal Security Detail [REDACTED] was operating in the Baghdad Red Zone on a major route near [REDACTED]. Team members in the lead vehicle ordered merging traffic to stop, and most drivers complied. However, the driver of a red four-door Opel brought his vehicle around the stopped traffic and drove toward the motorcade. The turret gunner from the middle [REDACTED] vehicle made eye contact with the Opel driver and motioned repeatedly for the driver to stop. The driver refused to stop. Fearing for his life and for his teammates, the turret gunner aimed for, shot at, and hit the grill of the Opel. The vehicle came to a stop, the driver and passenger got out to inspect the damage, and [REDACTED] continued the mission. There was no principal with [REDACTED], and there were no injuries.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
07/17/2007	This report summarizes stat...
10/24/2007	This report summarizes stat...
10/25/2007	This report summarizes stat...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
AAR - 17JUL2007 Escalation ...	Adobe PDF	1,463 kB
[REDACTED] Statement - 17JUL2...	Adobe PDF	2,920 kB
[REDACTED] Statement - 17JUL2...	Adobe PDF	2,798 kB
Spot Report: Escalation of ...	MS Word	269 kB

Related Cases

RS-2007-00425: RSO USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS

Comment:

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

07/17/2007	OPEN
	OPEN - PENDING PQ APPROVAL
10/24/2007	OPEN

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.



Diplomatic Security Service
Baghdad

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

U0092

DS Case Number	Case Title	BOI Type	Report Date
RS-2007-00393	20070717, UODF, BAGHDAD	CASE INTERIM	17-JUL-07
Case Type	Program	Dates Investigated	
ADMINISTRATIVE	REGIONAL SECURITY	17-JUL-07	
Case Impact	Case Status	Open/Close Case Dates	
	OPEN	24-OCT-07	

This report summarizes statements that team members of Blackwater Personal Security Detail [redacted] made to Assistant Regional Security Officer David Farrington in an interview that took place between 1255 and 1320 on the day of the incident described below. All times, speeds and distances are approximate. b7E, F

At 0930 on July 17, 2007, [redacted] left US Embassy Baghdad and followed another Blackwater PSD at a distance in support of the other team's mission. At 0945, [redacted] was northbound on a major route just south of a major intersection with a feeder road. The intersection is at [redacted]. The motorcade had sirens blaring and lights flashing, and it approached the intersection at five miles per hour. ↓

Team members in the lead vehicle motioned for feeder traffic to stop before merging on the main road, and most drivers stopped their vehicles. However, the male driver of a red four door Opel with one male passenger weaved through and drove around the stopped traffic toward [redacted].

The Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) was the second vehicle in the [redacted] motorcade, and [redacted] was the ERV turret gunner. [redacted] made eye contact with the Opel driver when they were 60 meters apart and motioned for him to stop. However, the Opel driver refused to slow down or change course. When they were [redacted] meters apart, [redacted] tried to fire a pen flare over the Opel, but the flare misfired. Fearing for his life and for his teammates, [redacted] aimed his rifle at the grill of the Opel and fired two rounds. The rounds hit the grill of the Opel when it was [redacted] meters from the motorcade, and the Opel came to a stop. b6 b7C b7E, F

[redacted] scanned the area for Iraqi Police and for threats, and then he returned his attention to the Opel. [redacted] saw the driver and passenger get out and assess the damage, and they appeared to be unharmed. There was coolant leaking from the radiator. b6 b7C

The Shift Leader ordered the motorcade to maintain course and increase speed, and [redacted] completed the mission. b7E, F

Reporting Official:

Farrington, David S

SA

Approving Official(s):

Carpenter, Theodore- APPROVED

ASAC

Distribution:

(P)

b6
b7C
b7E, F
00093

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)		Date/Time of Statement 17 July 2007 / 1400 hrs	
Name _____ b6 b7C		Team _____		Situation Shoot to disable	
Location/Venue 50 meters south of _____ b7E, F		Time Occurred 0945 hrs		Date Occurred 17 July 2007	

Incident Report BW 07-17-07 (F) Weapons Discharge Baghdad

On 17 July 2007 at approximately 0845 hours, _____ conducted a pre-mission brief at the _____ staging area. The brief started with an intelligence report from the embedded Intelligence Analyst for _____ Detail. The brief further included a detailed list of the teams _____ would be directly supporting, the venues they would be visiting, and any direct threats to their routes and venues. The Department of State mission firearms policy and escalation of force was also covered by the _____ (Shift Leader) _____.

At approximately 0930 hours, _____ departed the International Zone in direct support of _____ move to _____. The vehicle configuration for the day was _____. The _____ Counter Assault Team vehicles in the motorcade have clearly stenciled warnings on the rear of the vehicles that state "Warning, stay back 100 meters" in both English and Arabic. _____ was traveling north from _____ towards _____. _____'s motorcade was utilizing lights and sirens during the entire movement.

_____ was traveling approximately 50 meters to the south of _____. The roadway has 2 lanes for north bound traffic and 2 lanes for south bound traffic divided by a median. As _____ approached _____, traffic came to a near standstill. As _____ slowed for the heavy traffic, the motorcade passed a one lane feeder road on the right side. Several Local National (LN) vehicles were traveling on the feeder road and moving towards _____. The lead HMMWV's turret PSS motioned for the vehicles to stop at which time they complied and yielded to our motorcade. Once the lead HMMWV had passed the feeder road, the Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) was approaching this same roadway when the turret PSS of the ERV noticed a red four door opal at approximately 60 meters weaving through traffic attempting to reach the motorcade. The ERV's turret PSS _____ began to yell Kiff (meaning stop in Arabic) several times at the driver of the suspect vehicle and made eye contact with him. _____ also used hand and arm signals for the suspect driver to stop but these warnings were also ignored. The suspect vehicle continued to weave through traffic on a collision course with _____ motorcade. The driver of the suspect vehicle looked directly at _____ and disregarded all warnings to stop. At approximately _____ meters, _____ attempted to fire a pen flare to give one last warning to the suspect vehicle to stop. The pen flare misfired and the suspect vehicle continued to approach the motorcade despite more verbal and visual attempts by _____ to warn the fast approaching vehicle to stop. _____ was in fear for his life and that of his teammates and was certain that the suspect vehicle was a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device. With all other means of warning the suspect vehicle to stop exhausted, _____ made the decision to fire two well aimed shots into the suspect vehicle's engine block in an attempt to disable the threat. The suspect vehicle came to an immediate stop, at which point the _____ ordered the lead HMMWV to push through traffic and move out of the threat area. Immediately following the shoot to disable, the LN traffic directly to the front of _____ began to clear. As _____ continued forward, the rear HMMWV passed by the suspect vehicle and the _____ saw that the driver and the passenger of the suspect vehicle were unharmed and had exited the vehicle to inspect the damage. As _____ drove out of the immediate area, the _____ notified the RSO Tactical Operations Center of the shoot to disable and continued on with the mission without further incident. No members of _____ were injured nor were any _____ vehicles damaged during the incident.///END///



U0094

(P)
b7E, F
b6
b7C~~SECRET~~

Sworn Statement

Date 17 July 2007	Time Approximately 1330 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, [redacted] ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement at the request of

David Farrington, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience:

I was hired by Blackwater USA in [redacted] I attended the WPPS vetting course where I received training in operating as a member of a protective detail, shooting from a mobile platform, the [redacted] shoot/no shoot scenarios, the use of force, and the rules of engagement. I deployed to Baghdad, Iraq in direct support of the U.S. Department of State Mission in Iraq. I am currently assigned to the Counter Assault Team,

0315071030

b7E, F

Incident:

DECLASSIFIED

On 17 July 2007 at approximately 0845 hours, _____ conducted a pre-mission brief at _____ staging area. The brief began with intelligence and routes being passed on from the team Shift Leader _____. The brief also included further details of _____ mission to the Ministry of Electricity. The rules of engagement per the mission firearms policy and escalation of force were also reiterated by our Shift Leader.

b7E, F

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At approximately 0930 hours, we departed the International Zone (IZ) in direct support of Team _____ move to the Ministry of Electricity. The motorcade configuration for the day was _____ All _____ vehicles are stenciled or have large signs on the rear with "Warning-Stay back 100 meters", in both English and Arabic. Additionally, all vehicles had emergency lights and sirens activated to alert traffic of the motorcades movement. I was riding in the _____ vehicle as the turret PSS.

b7E, F



At roughly 0945 hours, approximately 50 meters south of the intersection commonly known as _____ I observed a red four-door sedan going around stopped traffic and weaving in between the stopped vehicles on a feeder road to my right. All other Local National (LN) traffic had stopped on the side street when the lead turret PSS had given directions for the LN traffic to hold. The vehicle was a red four door Opal occupied by one male driver and one male passenger. Both occupants appeared to be Arabic males of military age. The suspect vehicle was driving directly toward our motorcade. The vehicle was approximately 60 meters away as it weaved through stopped traffic and accelerating toward us. The line of stopped traffic was about 5 to 6 cars deep. In accordance with our use-of-force policy, I used hand signals for the driver of the suspect vehicle to stop and began yelling, "Kiff, Kiff" (meaning stop in Arabic) repeatedly. The male driver of the suspect vehicle looked directly at me, but made no attempt to stop. The suspect vehicle continued toward our motorcade. The suspect vehicle began to accelerate through traffic and was headed straight for our motorcade. At this point, I attempted to fire a pen flare but the pen flare misfired.

The suspect vehicle was quickly approaching our motorcade and was now approximately _____ meters away. The vehicle continued to approach with the driver still looking directly at me. I was in fear for my life and the lives of my teammates and I firmly believed that the suspect vehicle was a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device. I fired two rounds from my State Department issued _____ into the front grill of the suspect vehicle in an attempt to disable the threat. The vehicle came to an immediate stop. As we continued down the street, I observed both male occupants exit the vehicle and begin inspecting it for damage. There were no signs of injury to either individual.

b7E, F



I advised my Vehicle Commander of the shoot to disable, and he notified our Shift Leader of the incident. I heard my Shift Leader contacting the RSO Tactical Operations Center over the _____ radio. We continued in direct support of _____ mission to the Ministry of Electricity. We completed our mission and returned to the IZ without further incident. No personnel from _____ were injured and none of our team vehicles were damaged.///END///

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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Redacted Signature]
Printed	[Redacted Name]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 18th day of July, 2007.

Signed	<i>David S. Farrington</i>
Printed	David S. Farrington

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE. DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	<i>[Signature]</i>
Printed	DEVIN L. R. [Signature]
Address	RSC-12SCC

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED Sworn Statement

(P)
b7E, F
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b7C
U0095

Date 17 July 2007	Time Approximately 1330 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, David Furrington ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement at the request of

David Furrington, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience:

[Empty box for General Military/Civilian Experience]

In I attended the WPPS vetting at Blackwater USA. I received training in operating as a member of a protective detail, shooting from a moving platform; shoot/no shoot scenarios, the use of force, and the rules of engagement. I then deployed to Baghdad, Iraq, in direct support of the U.S. Department of State Mission in Iraq. I am currently assigned to the Counter Assault Team,

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b7E, F

Incident:

DECLASSIFIED

On 17 July 2007 at approximately 0845 hours, [redacted] Shift Leader [redacted] conducted a pre-mission brief at [redacted] staging area. The brief began with updated intelligence on the routes we would be traveling. The brief detailed that we were to support [redacted] mission to the Ministry of Electricity, by shadowing their chosen route. [redacted] chose their [redacted] route due to an intelligence report of a possible Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) threat on their [redacted] route. Shift Leader [redacted] also reiterated the rules of engagement and use of force policy per the mission firearms policy.

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b7E,F
↓

At approximately 0930 hours, we departed the International Zone (IZ) through CP [redacted] in direct support of [redacted] movement. Our vehicle configuration for the day was [redacted]. All [redacted] vehicles have "Warning-Stay back 100 meters" stenciled on the back, in both English and Arabic. Additionally, all vehicles had emergency lights and sirens activated to alert traffic of our motorcades movement.

b7E,F
↓

At approximately 0945 hours, we were passing through [redacted] traveling north. We were almost stopped due to heavy traffic ahead. The turret PSS in the lead Humvee had stopped all the Local National (LN) traffic that was attempting to merge from our right. My vehicle, the Bearcat, was the vehicle in the motorcade. We were moving very slowly through the intersection and I was using the horn, sirens and lights to alert traffic that we were in the intersection. From my position in the right front seat, I observed that the traffic on the feeder road to our right had stopped. I observed a red four door sedan passing the stopped traffic at a high rate of speed while weaving through the stopped vehicles. I heard my vehicle's turret PSS, [redacted] repeatedly shouting "Kiff" (Arabic for stop). I observed the male driver of the red suspect vehicle looking directly at our vehicle, and he continued towards us without slowing down. I then heard PSS [redacted] fire his Department of State issued [redacted] twice and witnessed the rounds impact the grill area of the red sedan. At this time, the suspect vehicle stopped approximately [redacted] meters to the right of our vehicle. I also observed radiator fluid draining out onto the ground in front of the suspect vehicle. I observed the driver of the suspect vehicle as he got out of the car and looked at the front of his vehicle. He did not appear to be injured.

b6
b7c

b7E,F

I then asked PSS [redacted] if he was okay, to which he replied, "yes". I advised our Shift Leader [redacted] that PSS [redacted] had fired his [redacted] in order to disable a suspected VBIED threat. I provided a description of the vehicle, location, and advised that there were no injuries. Our Shift Leader advised the RSO Tactical Operation Center of the vehicles description and disposition. We continued in direct support of [redacted] and arrived at the Ministry of Electricity without further incident. No personnel from [redacted] were injured and none of our team vehicles were damaged.///END///

b7E,F
b6
b7c

b7E,F

DECLASSIFIED

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	[Redacted]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 18th day of July, 2007.

Signed	[Signature: David S. Farrington]
Printed	David S. Farrington

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature: Devin L. Rice]
Printed	DEVIN L. RICE
Address	PSC PSC

03 JUL 2007 1030

(P)
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b7E
U0096

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting

UNCLASSIFIED

Date of Report: July 18 2007

Location: [redacted] b7E

Task Order: fixed site security Basra

Person Releasing Report: [redacted] b6
b7C

Title of Person Releasing Report: [redacted]

Date of Incident: July 18 2007

Time of Incident: 0705

Contractor Involved: [redacted] b6
b7C

Detail Location of Incident: 250m in front to the right side of the road, behind the tin shack with lean to roof.

Incident Synopsis: IDF was hitting [redacted] at approx 0700, [redacted] opened fire at approx 0704, followed by [redacted] and [redacted] When observing impacts of TCN's fire at tin building 1 individual was spotted ducking in and out of building appeared to be spotting incoming IDF, I opened fire in support of TCN's on the corner of the tin building when spotter was seen ducking behind the corner. b7E

Outline injuries if applicable: NA

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence:

Personnel Notified of Incident: Fixed site office

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident:

Additional Reports Generated:

UNCLASSIFIED

~~(S)~~

(P)

b7E

b6
b7C

ENGAGEMENT REPORT

03115087030

U0097

Date of Report: July 18 2007
Location: Basrah REO, Iraq

Date of Incident: July 18 2007

Time of Incident: 0705

Name of contractor Involved: [redacted] b6 b7C

Detail Location of Incident/Post: [redacted] approx 250m on the right hand side of road, at the tin building with lean to roof. b7E

Weapon Used: [redacted]

Estimated number of shots fired: 30rds

Direction/Distance: 360 degrees, 250 meters

Target zone/area past [redacted] approx 125m

Prior Course of Action: was taking IDF at the time, TCN's opened the engagement.

Incident Synopsis: IDF was hitting [redacted] at approx 0700, [redacted] opened fire at approx 0704, followed by [redacted] and [redacted]. When observing impacts of TCN's fire at tin building 1 individual was spotted ducking in and out of building appeared to be spotting incoming IDF, I opened fire in support of TCN's on the corner of the tin building when spotter was seen ducking behind the corner.

Injuries if applicable: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: Fixed Site Office

Additional Reports Generated: FSS incident report

03115087030

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

00098

b7E,F



U.S. Embassy-Baghdad

July 23, 2007



Spot Report – 072307-08

SUBJECT: Indirect Fire against the Basrah Palace**REPORTING OFFICE:** RSO Basrah, Iraq

SUMMARY: On 07/23/07 at 2325, two mortar rounds were launched against the Basrah Palace Compound. Both rounds impacted near the front gate of the REO. RSO security force guards were able to see the Mortar launch point and fired 6-8 well aimed [redacted] rounds on the launch point. There were no casualties or damage.

b7E

RSO ACTION: [redacted] prior to the first IDF impact. The "Duck and Cover" was announced; all personnel donned Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and were restricted to hardcover bunkers/buildings. The RSO TOC sounded the "All Clear" at [redacted]. The RSO continues to coordinate with coalition forces regarding the numerous daily attacks. All personnel are required to wear PPE while outdoors and stay under hard cover whenever possible.

b7E,F

LOCATION: Basrah, Iraq**DRAFTED BY:** Murjan Ali, RSO TOC Watch Officer**APPROVED BY:** Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

0313507030

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

W0914 (P)
UC099 b7E, F
b6
b7C

Date of Report: 25 Jul 07

Location: IVO

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Scott Bruggemann

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 25 Jul 07

Time of Incident: 1050

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO

Personnel Involved: (TST)

Incident Synopsis: On 25 July 2007 at 1050, [redacted] a Tactical Support Team (TST) was conducting area support for COM PSD teams. While approaching the intersection at [redacted], a red sedan aggressively approached the motorcade. The driver of the red sedan failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop. In an escalation of force, a PSS fired two (2) rounds from his [redacted] into the grill of the vehicle causing it to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued with their mission in support of COM PSD teams.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

00100



U.S. Embassy – Baghdad

25 July, 2007



Spot Report – 072507-03

Subject: COM Tactical Support Team (TST) Fires on an Aggressive Vehicles

Reporting Office: RSO TOC – Baghdad

Summary: On July 25, 2007 at 1050, a [] vehicle COM TST motorcade, while returning to the International Zone from a venue, encountered aggressive vehicles and used an escalation of force (EOF) to stop them. The motorcade was stopped in the outer lane of a traffic circle while Iraqi Police (IP) were clearing traffic ahead and holding traffic behind the motorcade. A burgundy Volkswagen followed by a white sedan bypassed traffic that had been stopped by IP's and were quickly approaching the rear of the TST convoy. The Volkswagen had a lone, male driver and the white sedan had multiple passengers. The turret gunner in the follow vehicle monitored the aggressive approach and used all attention generating methods in attempt to slow or halt the approaching vehicles which had closed to [] meters; the IP's also were attempting to stop the vehicles. The Volkswagen ignored the lights, sirens, and hand signals of the motorcade, and approached within [] meters. The turret gunner fired a pen flare at the rapidly approaching vehicles but the vehicles failed to yield to the pen flare signal. At [] meters, the turret gunner fired 2 well aimed [] rounds into the grill. The Volkswagen came to an immediate halt; the white sedan also came to a halt, since it had no room to maneuver toward the motorcade. The driver of the Volkswagen did not appear to be injured and was pulled from the vehicle by IP's. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no COM principals

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were in the motorcade. The COM motorcade continued movement toward the International Zone. All signals and warnings were used as time and urgency permitted.

RSO Action: PSD members debriefed and written statements forthcoming. Notified DS/CC.

Location: Red Zone, Baghdad, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: Marty Lyman, Watch Officer, Baghdad, Iraq
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

(P)
WORKS 67E, F

Date of Report: 1 Aug 07

Location: IVO

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Scott Bruggemann

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

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00101

Date of Incident: 01 Aug 07

Time of Incident: 1310

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO

Personnel Involved: (TST)

67E, F

Incident Synopsis: On 01 Aug 07 at 1310, a Tactical Support Team (TST) was conducting area support for COM PSD teams. While approaching the intersection at _____, a white and orange taxi aggressively approached the motorcade. The driver of the white and orange taxi failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop. In an escalation of force, a PSS fired two (2) rounds from his _____ into the grill of the vehicle causing it to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued with their mission in support of COM PSD teams.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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RS-2007-00213: 20070801, UODFI, BAGHDAD

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00053

Impact: NOT SPECIFIED

Status: OPEN

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070801, UODFI, BAGHDAD

Status: OPEN

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ GENERAL

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04402

Optional Case Info

Impact: NOT SPECIFIED

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date: 08/01/2007

Countries Impacted:

■ IRAQ

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: SA Sadler

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore DUTY AGENT BAGHDAD

SCOLLAN, MICHAEL T ARSO BAGHDAD

Synopsis

See attached statements and incident report regarding Escalation of force by BW team on 01 August 2007.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
08/16/2007	See attached IR and Stateme...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
IR and Statements	Adobe PDF	8,119 kB
IR and Statements	Adobe PDF	8,119 kB

Related Cases

RS-2007-00425: RSO USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS

Comment:

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

08/16/2007	OPEN
08/16/2007	OPEN

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

03:15:07:30

U0103 ~~CLASSIFIED~~

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)		Date/Time of Statement 01 August 2007/1700 hrs	
Name [redacted] b6 b7C	Team [redacted]	Situation Shoot of imminent threat/suspect [redacted] VBIED			
Location/Venue [redacted] b7E, F		Time Occurred 1310		Date Occurred 01 August 2007	

Incident Report BW 08-01-07 (1) Weapons Discharge Baghdad


On 01 August 2007, at approximately 1245 hours, [redacted] conducted a pre-mission brief at [redacted] staging area. The brief began with intelligence passed on from the embedded intelligence analyst for [redacted] Detail. The rules of engagement and escalation of force, per the Department of State mission firearms policy, was briefed by the [redacted] Shift Leader (SL). Pertinent intelligence included reports of Vehicle Bourne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) and Explosive Formed Projectiles (EFP) recently detonated along the area where operations would be conducted on this day.

At approximately 1300 hours, [redacted] departed The Ministry of Electricity (MOE [redacted]), in support of COM PSD elements, specifically [redacted]. The vehicle configuration for the day was [redacted]. The motorcade vehicles were traveling with their emergency lights and sirens activated to warn traffic of the motorcades approach. All [redacted] vehicles in the motorcade have "Warning stay back 100 meters" stenciled on the back of each vehicle. The warning is written in both English and Arabic. At approximately 1310 hrs, [redacted] was traveling south bound on Route [redacted] at [redacted]. Route [redacted] at [redacted] is a large traffic circle with a tunnel running through it from north-south traffic. The tunnel ascends and merges with traffic from the access road above, and to the right.

[redacted] motorcade was traveling south bound at [redacted]. The lead vehicle rear turret PSS, [redacted] deployed a red smoke over the railing and onto the tunnel road after several attempts to stop forward merging traffic failed. As the lead vehicle was merging onto the roadway, a white and orange vehicle (suspect vehicle), with one occupant, drove through the red smoke, past other local national traffic, and drove at a high rate of speed toward the lead vehicle in our motorcade. The lead vehicle front turret PSS, [redacted], gave loud verbal commands to stop and also gave hand signals in an attempt to get the suspect vehicle to stop. The suspect vehicle continued toward the motorcade. At this time the suspect vehicle and Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) were parallel to each other, with the ERV still at a slightly elevated position. The lead vehicle rear turret PSS, [redacted], fired a pen flare at the vehicle, striking the front of the vehicle in the hood. The ERV, [redacted] vehicle in motorcade, rear turret PSS [redacted] also fired a pen flare at the suspect vehicle. The pen flare entered the vehicle's passenger side window and struck the dashboard. The suspect vehicle accelerated past the ERV and was headed toward the motorcade's lead vehicle. It was now approximately [redacted] meters from the lead vehicle and was attempting to merge into [redacted] motorcade.

The suspect driver's actions and disregard of all the warnings given were similar to tactics used by insurgents to attack motorcades. Fearing for his life and the life of his teammates, ERV rear turret PSS [redacted] fired two rounds into the rear window of the suspect vehicle in an attempt to stop the threat. The suspect vehicle came to a stop in the middle of the roadway. [redacted] observed the suspect drive put his hands up in the air after he brought his vehicle to a stop. The driver appeared uninjured. Once the suspect vehicle stopped its forward movement it was no longer considered an imminent threat. The motorcade drove past the suspect vehicle moving to the far right in order to put as much distance as possible between it and the motorcade. The motorcade continued on with its mission in direct support of [redacted] and entered Check Point [redacted] without further incident. [redacted]

Person giving statement

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)				Date/Time of Statement	
						01 August 2007/1700 hrs	
Name _____		Team _____		Situation			
				Shoot of imminent threat/suspect			
				VBIED			
Location/Venue _____				Time Occurred		Date Occurred	
				1310		01 August 2007	

Shift Leader. _____ notified the RSO TOC of the shoot to stop the threat and advised the location and disposition of the suspect vehicle. No _____ personnel injured and no _____ vehicles were damaged in the incident.

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 08/03/07

03:45:07:34

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 Person giving statement



DECLASSIFIED

Sworn Statement

fire a weapon from a moving vehicle. We also received training on shoot/ no shoot scenarios, the use of force, [] the rules of engagement and PSD operations. I deployed to the Baghdad, Iraq in direct support of the US Department of State Mission in Iraq. I am currently assigned to [] Tactical Support Team as a turret PSS.

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Incident:

On Aug 1, 2007 at approximately 0800 hours, [] conducted a pre-mission brief. The brief included any changes to previously briefed information, escalation of force, and the rules of engagement per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy. Routes and relevant venues were briefed by the Tactical Commander. The intelligence report was briefed and the threat of small arms fire, Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED's), and Explosive Formed Projectiles (EFP's), were considered high for the area we would be moving through.

Our mission was to support the Chief of Mission PSD teams operating in vicinity of the Ministry of Interior [] and Ministry of Electricity []. I was assigned to the rear PSS turret on the [] vehicle (white armored Mamba). Our motorcade configuration was []

[] Our motorcade was traveling with lights and sirens activated in an order to warn local traffic of our presence. Also each vehicle in the motorcade has "Warning-Stay Back 100 Meters" stenciled on the back. The warning is in both English and Arabic.

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At approximately 1310 hours our motorcade was traveling south from [] []. As our motorcade approached a merge where traffic exits from a tunnel, I observed traffic to be unusually heavy. I made several attempts to stop traffic utilizing visual and verbal signals. All attempts to stop traffic failed, I then deployed a red smoke grenade over the railing into the path of the oncoming traffic, and continued to use hand signals in an attempt to stop traffic. I also yelled loud verbal warnings, shouting "Kiff, Kiff", Arabic for stop. All traffic appeared to stop. As our motorcade proceeded to merge, a four door sedan, white in color with orange trim emerged from the tunnel. The vehicle was occupied by single male subject. The suspect driver ignored all motorcade signals to stop.

As our lead vehicle merged onto the main roadway, the suspect vehicle drove through the smoke cloud and continued toward our motorcade. The vehicle drove around stopped vehicles that had already complied with our signals to stop. At this time I fired a pen flare in an attempt to get the driver of the vehicle to stop. The flare struck the front of the vehicle and I gave another hand signal to stop. The ERV ([] vehicle in the motorcade) was parallel to the suspect vehicle, and the front turret PSS [] also fired a pen flare at the suspect vehicle.

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The suspect driver ignored the pen flares and accelerated rapidly toward the rear of the Lead vehicle. At this time I was in fear for my life and the lives of my teammates as I recognized the suspect driver's actions as tactics used by suicide bombers to drive VBIEDs into motorcades. I was transitioning from the pen flare back to my [] and was about to shoot to stop the threat, when PSS [] fired two rounds from his [] rifle through the rear window of the suspect vehicle in an attempt to stop the imminent threat to the motorcade. I saw the suspect vehicle immediately come to a stop on the left side of our motorcade. I continued to monitor the vehicle as the rest of our motorcade drove past the suspect vehicle. I did not observe any injuries to the suspect driver.

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Sworn Statement

Our Shift Leader [redacted] notified the RSO Tactical Operations Center of the incident. We continued with our mission back to the International Zone without further incident. No personnel were injured and none of [redacted] vehicles were damaged. ///END///

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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[redacted]
Printed	[redacted]
Address	WWPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 3rd day of August, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	DEVIN L. RICKEL

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	David S. Farrington
Address	Baghdad

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DECLASSIFIED

Sworn Statement

Date 1 August 2007	Time Approx. 1800 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, [redacted] ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement at the request of [redacted] who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience:

In [redacted] I attended vetting and qualification at Blackwater USA in Moyock NC. I received training in weapons handling, marksmanship, shoot no / shoot scenarios, shooting from a mobile platform, use of force, and the rules of engagement. I also received training on Principal Recovery and Extraction, and operating as a member of a Protective Security Detail. Upon graduation, I deployed to Baghdad, Iraq in direct support of the US Department of State Mission. I am currently assigned to [redacted] Tactical Support Team (TST) as a turret PSS.

Incident:

03:15:587030



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Sworn Statement

On Aug 1, 2007 at approximately 0800 hours, [] conducted a pre-mission brief. The brief included any changes to previously briefed information, escalation of force, and the rules of engagement per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy. Routes and relevant venues were briefed by the Tactical Commander. The intelligence report was briefed and the threat of small arms fire (SAF), Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device's (VBIED's), and Explosively Formed Projectiles' (EFP's), was considered high for the area we were to be moving through. Earlier in the day and prior to our 1300 movement, it was reported via radio broadcast that an EFP had detonated a few hundred meters south of []

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On Aug 1, 2007 [] was tasked with supporting [] on its return from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to the International Zone (IZ). The following is a summary of a shoot to stop the threat incident that occurred on the south side of the intersection known as [] is a traffic circle with a tunnel intersecting it from north to south. Traffic traveling south above the tunnel merges with southbound traffic from inside the tunnel into one lane on the south side of the intersection. The merge lane gradually descends from an elevated position above, while the traffic lane from inside the tunnel gradually ascends, both eventually merging into one lane at street level. I was in the lead turret of the [] vehicle also known as the emergency response vehicle (ERV).

While traveling south through [] all of our vehicles were employing their emergency lights and sirens. Additionally, the rear of [] vehicles are stenciled with "Warning, Stay Back 100 Meters," in bold red lettering. The warning is in both English and Arabic. The motorcade began descending toward the merge and the lead vehicle's rear turret PSS, [] deployed a red smoke grenade down into the tunnel to warn traffic of our motorcades approach after several other attempts to stop traffic had failed. As we continued to descend I noticed all of the vehicles exiting the tunnel were obeying our hand/arm, visual and verbal signals to stop. I then observed an orange and white four door sedan with one occupant drive past the stopped vehicles and exit the tunnel at a high rate of speed driving directly toward the rear of the Lead vehicle. I used hand and verbal signals to alert the vehicle's driver to our merging motorcade and to attempt to get the vehicle to stop. By this time the Lead vehicle was already entering the main roadway and the ERV was parallel to the vehicle but still slightly elevated on the merge lane. The vehicle continued driving toward the rear of the Lead vehicle, disobeying all signals to stop. I then deployed one pen flare at the side of the vehicle, which entered the vehicle's window and struck the dashboard. Simultaneously, the lead vehicle's rear turret PSS, [] fired a pen flare which struck the vehicle from the front. The vehicle continued to accelerate rapidly, still driving directly toward the rear end of the lead vehicle. The suspect vehicle continued to accelerate past my vehicle, the ERV [] vehicle in motorcade). Believing this vehicle to be a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) and in fear for the lives of my teammates, I fired two rounds from my U.S. Department of State Issued [] rifle through the rear window at the driver in an attempt to stop the threat. The vehicle came to an immediate stop in the middle of the road. I continued to watch the threat as our motorcade departed the area southbound until it left my sector of fire. From my vantage point I could not determine if there were any injuries to the vehicle occupant. [] continued its mission to the IZ without further incident. Notification of the shoot to stop the threat

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Sworn Statement

was made to SL [] ///END///

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	[Signature]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 3rd day of August, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	DL REKEY

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	David S. Farrington
Address	Baghdad

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY



U.S. Embassy Baghdad

August 07, 2007




Spot Report – 080707-01

Subject: COM PSD Team uses EOF on Aggressive Vehicle

Reporting Office: RSO TOC - Kirkuk

Summary: On 6 August 2007, at approximately 1338, a Kirkuk [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade () en-route from the Erbil USAID compound to the Kirkuk Regional Embassy Office (REO) encountered an aggressive white Toyota Land Cruiser.

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The motorcade was traveling south on Route 2 in an area between the cities of Kirkuk and Erbil, when they approached checkpoint [] an Iraqi Army checkpoint. This checkpoint is 4kms from the Kirkuk REO. While stopped and in a bubble formation, all vehicles to the rear of the motorcade had come to a complete stop, approximately 100 meters out. At this time, a white Toyota Land Cruiser with tinted windows passed all stopped vehicles and was heading straight towards the rear of the motorcade.

The left rear gunner who had moved to the gunner's hatch through the roof of the vehicle began giving hand and arms signals to the driver to stop. The right rear gunner, who had his door open, attempted to stop the driver by using the spotlight. The vehicle did not stop and the right rear gunner then pointed his [] at the approaching vehicle while using left hand signals, attempted to stop the vehicle. The aggressive vehicle continued to close in on the rear of the motorcade, disregarding as well the "Stay back 100 meters" sign written in English and Arabic on the rear of the follow car.

At approximately [] meters out from the follow vehicle, the left rear gunner fired one pen flare round at the approaching vehicle. At the [] meter mark, the vehicle came to a complete stop and then pulled to the shoulder of the road. Both gunners noted the vehicle had all tinted windows and could not determine who was in the vehicle.

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The motorcade continued to the Kirkuk REO compound with no further incidents.

RSO note: On August 1, 2007 PSD personnel had been briefed to be on the look out for a white Toyota Land Cruiser VBIED. In addition, on May 11, 2007 [] reported that men working on a billboard at checkpoint [] had noted that one male took photos of the passing motorcade.

RSO Action: PSD members will be debriefed and written statements have been received. RSO will complete a ROI and provide documentation to the RSCC upon completion.

Location: Approximately 4 km north of the Kirkuk REO

DRAFTED BY: James "Chance" Rowe, RSO Kirkuk, Iraq
APPROVED BY: Earl Miller, SRSO Baghdad

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



TITLE COM PSD (Kirkuk) Fires Pen Flair on Aggressive Vehicle		DS CASE NUMBER / REPORT NUMBER 8/6/2007 - Kirkuk	
TRUE NAME N/A		CASE TYPE Escalation of Force	
POST Kirkuk	DATE REPORTED 08-06-2007	DATES INVESTIGATED 08/06/2007 - 08/07/2007	REPORTING AGENT RSO Rowe

SYNOPSIS

Summary: On August 6, 2007, at approximately 1338 hrs, a Kirkuk [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade, [] enroute from the Erbil USAID compound to the Kirkuk REO fired a pen flair on a vehicle after determining that the vehicle posed an immediate threat to their motorcade. This escalation of force was appropriate and within the parameters of DS use-of-force policy. No injuries to the occupant(s) were observed. End Summary.

The following chain of events is derived from the statements provided by the team members involved in the shooting:

1. [] was enroute from the Erbil USAID Compound to the Kirkuk REO when they encountered an aggressive white Toyota Land Cruiser. [] was traveling south on Route 2 in an area between the cities of Erbil and Kirkuk. [] came to a stop at checkpoint [] an Iraqi military checkpoint. The checkpoint is 4kms from the Kirkuk REO. [] was stopped at the checkpoint in a bubble formation and holding. The follow vehicle had red lettering (warning) on the rear of the vehicle as well as the right rear gunner having his door propped open and the left rear gunner positioned up in the roof hatch.
2. All vehicles to the rear of the motorcade had come to a complete stop; approximately 100 meters out. At this time, a White Land Cruiser with tinted windows passed all stopped vehicles and headed straight towards the motorcade. The gunner in the hatch began giving hand and arm signals for the vehicle to stop. The right rear gunner used his spotlight, attempting to stop the vehicle. The vehicle continued, the right rear gunner pointed his [], while using left hand signals, attempted to stop the vehicle. At [] meters, the hatch gunner fired a pen flair. At [] meters, the vehicle came to a stop and pulled to the shoulder of the road. Both gunners noted the vehicles windows were all tinted and could not determine who was in the vehicle.

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(Initials)

(Date)

50249-101
*GPO : 1981 O - 341-526(6549)

OPTIONAL FORM 249
(FORMERLY DS-838)
JULY 1996
DEPT. OF STATE

Exempt From Automatic Decontrol By Statute
CONTENT MUST NOT BE DISCLOSED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

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DECLASSIFIED

3. The motorcade continued on to the Kirkuk REO compound with no further incidents. RSO note: On August 1, 2007 PSD personnel had been briefed to be on the look out for a white Toyota Land Cruiser VBIED. In addition, on May 11, 2007 [] reported that men working on a billboard next to checkpoint [] noted one male taking photos of the passing motorcade. Case closed.

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- 2 -

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



TITLE COM PSD (Erbil) Fires Pen Flair on Aggressive Vehicle		DS CASE NUMBER / REPORT NUMBER 08/09/2007 - Erbil	
TRUE NAME N/A		CASE TYPE Escalation of Force	
POST Erbil	DATE REPORTED 08-09-2007	DATES INVESTIGATED 08/09/2007	REPORTING AGENT RSO Erbil

SYNOPSIS

On August 9, 2007, at approximately 1400, [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade traveling from the Ankawa RRT compound to the Sheraton Hotel encountered a white-colored Toyota Hilux driven by an aggressive motorist. A pen flair was fired in front of the vehicle after it was determined that the vehicle posed an immediate threat to their motorcade. This escalation of force was appropriate and within the parameters of the DS use-of-force policy. Neither injuries to the occupant nor damages were observed. End Summary.

The following chain of events is derived from statements provided by team members involved in the shooting:

1. A [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade traveling from the Ankawa RRT compound to the Sheraton Hotel encountered a white-colored Toyota Hilux driven by an aggressive motorist. The motorcade was traveling eastbound on 100 Meter road in the Southwest quadrant of Erbil when a white Hilux approached the motorcade at a high-rate of speed. The turret gunner in the fighting follow attempted to gain the driver's attention by using hand and arms signals; the vehicle did not stop. The turret gunner then pointed his [] at the approaching vehicle. The driver of the Hilux made eye-contact with the turret gunner and subsequently created distance between his vehicle and the motorcade. Approximately two minutes later, the driver approached the motorcade again at a high rate of speed; the turret gunner went through the EOF measures once more until the Hilux backed off.
2. After another few minutes, the driver of the Hilux rushed the motorcade a third time, but ignored all warnings to stay back. When the Hilux was approximately [] meters away from the follow vehicle, the turret gunner fired one pen flare about two car lengths in front of the subject vehicle. The vehicle came to a complete stop. The pen flare caused no damage or injuries and was last observed resting on the road.

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(Initials)

(Date)

50249-101
*GPO : 1981 0 - 341-526(6549)

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OPTIONAL FORM 249
(FORMERLY DS-838)
JULY 1995
DEPT. OF STATE

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3. The motorcade continued to the Sheraton hotel then back to the Ankawa compound with no further incidents. The emergency hazard lights on all three PSD vehicles were activated; the "Stay back 100 meters" sign written in English and Arabic was affixed to the rear of the follow car; a vehicle matching the description of the subject vehicle was recently added to the BOLO list. This case is closed.

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W/10831 (P)
UO109 b7E,F
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Report #: 28 07	Incident-Casualty Report WPPS	Report Date/Time: August 9, 2007 1500	
REPORTING INFORMATION			
INCIDENT DATE/TIME: August 9, 2007 1500	Erbil, Iraq		
TOTAL # PERSONNEL: 1	KIA: N/A	WIA: N/A	
INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: Pen Flare discharge			
REPORTED BY: Detail Leader	METHOD: Telephone		
POINT OF CONTACT: Deputy Project Manager	TEL#		
VICTIM INFORMATION			
NAME (LAST, FIRST MI): None			
SSN: None	DOB: None		
NATIONALITY: None	M/F: None		
PASSPORT: None	ISSUED/EXP: None		
NATIONALITY: None	BLOOD TYPE: None		
INJURIES: None			
STATUS: EOF cleared as within policy by RSO Zach Zittle			
PROGNOSIS: None			
HOME OF RECORD: None	NEXT OF KIN: None		
PROPERTY/EVIDENCE			
CODE:	DESCRIPTION:	VALUE:	CURRENT LOCATION:
NARRATIVE			
On August 9, 2007, at approximately 1400, a vehicle COM PSD motorcade traveling from the Ankawa RRT compound to the Sheraton Hotel encountered a white-colored Toyota Hilux driven by an aggressive motorist. A pen flare was fired in front of the vehicle after it was determined that the vehicle posed an immediate threat to their motorcade. This escalation of force was appropriate and within the parameters of the DS use-of-force policy. Neither injuries to the occupant nor damages were observed. End Summary.			
The following chain of events is derived from statements provided by team members involved in the shooting:			
1. A vehicle COM PSD motorcade traveling from the Ankawa RRT compound to the Sheraton Hotel encountered a white-colored Toyota Hilux driven by an aggressive motorist. The motorcade was traveling eastbound on 100 Meter road in the Southwest quadrant of Erbil when a white Hilux approached the motorcade at a high-rate of speed. The turret gunner in the fighting follow attempted to gain the driver's attention by using hand and arms signals; the vehicle did not stop. The turret gunner then pointed his at the approaching vehicle. The driver of the Hilux made eye-contact with the turret gunner and subsequently created			
2. After another few minutes, the driver of the Hilux rushed the motorcade a third time, but ignored all warnings to stay back. When the Hilux was approximately meters away from the follow vehicle, the turret gun			
3. The motorcade continued to the Sheraton hotel then back to the Ankawa compound with no further incidents. The emergency hazard lights on all three PSD vehicles were activated; the "Stay back 100 meters" sig			
ADDITIONAL VICTIM INFORMATION			
VICTIM INFORMATION			
NAME (LAST, FIRST MI): None			
SSN: None	DOB: None		
NATIONALITY: None	M/F: None		
PASSPORT: None	ISSUED/EXP: None		
NATIONALITY: None	BLOOD TYPE: None		
INJURIES: None			
STATUS: None			
PROGNOSIS: None			
HOME OF RECORD: None	NEXT OF KIN: None		
VICTIM INFORMATION			
NAME (LAST, FIRST MI): None			
SSN: None	DOB: None		
NATIONALITY: None	M/F: None		
PASSPORT: None	ISSUED/EXP: None		
NATIONALITY: None	BLOOD TYPE: None		
INJURIES: None			
STATUS: None			
PROGNOSIS: None			
HOME OF RECORD: None	NEXT OF KIN: None		

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

UD110
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Date of Report: 11 Aug 07

Location: [REDACTED]

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Scott Bruggemann

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

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b7E, F

Date of Incident: 11 Aug 07

Time of Incident: 1607

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO burned out red building on Route [REDACTED]

Personnel Involved: [REDACTED]

Incident Synopsis: On 11 Aug 07 at 1607 hours, [REDACTED] a Tactical Support Team (TST) was enroute to the IZ from BIAP when multiple rounds of Small Arms Fire (SAF) were directed at the motorcade. [REDACTED] was traveling east and in the vicinity of [REDACTED] when multiple shooters engaged the lead vehicle of the motorcade with SAF from a burned out red building on the south-side of the road. [REDACTED] returned fire and continued to the IZ without further incident. There were no injuries to CoM personnel. There was minor damage to several of the vehicles in the motorcade.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

03115507030

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

~~1170984~~ (P)

b7E, F

Date of Report: 15 Aug 07

Location:

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Scott Bruggemann

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

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Date of Incident: 15 Aug 07

Time of Incident: 1008

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO [] intersection

Personnel Involved: []

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Incident Synopsis: On 15 Aug 07 at 1008, [] a Tactical Site Survey Team (TSS) was returning to the International Zone after completion of their site survey of the Izdihar Compound. While approaching the intersection at [], a white 4-door sedan aggressively approached the motorcade. The driver of the white 4-door sedan failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop. In an escalation of force, one PSS fired three (3) rounds from his [] and another PSS fired two (2) rounds from his [] into the grill of the vehicle. The vehicle came to an immediate stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel, and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued to the International Zone without further incident.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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RS-2007-00237: 20070815 EOF: RSO Baghdad

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00059

Impact:

Status: CLOSED

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070815 EOF, RSO Baghdad

Status: CLOSED

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04667

Synopsis

On August 15th, 2007, members of an RSO Baghdad PSD were involved in an escalation of force incident.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date

Snippet

08/15/2007

On Wednesday August 15th, 2...

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
20070815 Stmt	Adobe PDF	2,698 kB
20070815 Stmt	Adobe PDF	3,015 kB
20070815 Stmt	Adobe PDF	2,264 kB
20070815 Stmt	Adobe PDF	2,999 kB

Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad

Name: Hammond

Phone:

Source Comments:

Status History

08/27/2007	OPEN
08/27/2007	CLOSED
09/01/2007	OPEN
09/01/2007	OPEN
09/01/2007	CLOSED

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore	ASAC	BAGHDAD
Hammond, Kory H	ARSO	BAGHDAD
Motley, David	DUTY AGENT	BAGHDAD

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.



Diplomatic Security Service
Baghdad

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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DS Case Number	Case Title	ROI Type	Report Date
RS-2007-00237	20070815 EOF, RSO Baghdad	CASE FINAL	15-AUG-07
Case Type	Program	Dates Investigated	
ADMINISTRATIVE	REGIONAL SECURITY	15-AUG-07 -	
Case Impact	Case Status	Open/Close Case Dates	
	CLOSED	01-Sep-2007 - 01-Sep-2007	

On Wednesday August 15th, 2007, I was advised by personnel in the RSO TOC that one of the Chief of Mission (COM) Personal Security Details (PSD) had fired several rounds at a vehicle during an escalation of force incident.

When the team finished its duties that day the individuals involved in the shooting responded to the RSO TOC where I interviewed them. Present during the interview were:



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_____ and _____ who were in the Right Rear and Well Gunner positions respectively, were the only ones to fire their weapons and told me the following: While enroute to perform a Tactical Site Survey (TSS) of a venue, the motorcade was traveling on a 2 lane divided roadway, with a raised median separating the 4 lanes of traffic.

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While enroute to their destination the motorcade had been using lights and sirens to indicate to traffic the need to yield to the motorcade. Additionally, the vehicle is marked in English and Arabic to "stay back" and the PSD members use audible and visual signals to indicate to traffic the need to stay away from the motorcade.

While on the road approaching their destination the motorcade was forced to come to a halt in traffic due to an Iraqi Police checkpoint. All local national vehicles following the PSD recognized the motorcade and came to a stop approximately 150 yards behind the follow car. It was at this time that the PSD members in the follow car noticed a white, 4-door sedan break from the stopped traffic and begin to accelerate toward the motorcade.

_____ who was in the Well Gunner position, began to yell "KIF!" and shine a 2-million candlepower flashlight at the driver of the approaching vehicle. The vehicle continued toward the follow car, and when it reached approximately _____ yards both _____ and _____ (Right Rear) fired pen flares at the vehicle. One pen flare streaked out to the left and the other hit the ground about 20 yards in front of the suspect vehicle, bursting as it struck the asphalt.

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At this time both _____ and _____ realized the vehicle was not going to yield to the motorcade. _____ fired one 3-round burst from his _____ into the grille of the approaching vehicle. At the same time _____ fired two rounds from his _____ into the grille. This had the effect of making the suspect vehicle slam on the brakes and come to a sudden stop in the roadway.

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The driver of the vehicle, an Arabic looking male approximately 20 years of age and apparently the sole occupant of the car, held his hands in the air and sat motionless until the motorcade departed.

There were no further incidents and no indications that the driver of the suspect vehicle was injured.

Reporting Official:

Hammond, Kory H

ARSO

Aug-15-07 00:00

Distribution:

Approving Official(s):

Hammond, Kory H- APPROVED

ARSO

Aug-27-07 07:04

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

DS #: RS-2007-00237

CASE FINAL : 15-AUG-07

The shooting was reported immediately to the RSO TOC. See team member statements for further details. This use of force incident is within the DS Embassy Baghdad Use of Force policy.

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On 15 August, 2007, members of a Chief of Mission Personal Security Detail fired several rounds at an aggressive vehicle. There were no injuries to COM personnel no apparent injuries to the driver of the suspect vehicle. This incident was within U.S. Embassy Baghdad's Use of Force policy.

On Wednesday August 15th, 2007, I was advised by personnel in the RSO TOC that one of the Chief of Mission (COM) Personal Security Details (PSD) had fired several rounds at a vehicle during an escalation of force incident.

When the team finished it's duties that day the individuals involved in the shooting responded to the RSO TOC where I interviewed them. Present during the interview were:



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_____ the Shift Leader, explained to me that his team was enroute to conduct a Tactical Site Survey (TSS) at a venue near the International Zone. At the time of the shooting the team was traveling along a 4-lane roadway divided by a raised median through a business district with heavy traffic. The motorcade had just passed through an Iraqi Police (IP) check point when they became stopped in traffic. The IP had stopped traffic approximately 150 meters behind the motorcade and all vehicles were obeying the indications to stop.

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The motorcade had been using air horns and sirens to indicate that traffic needed to yield the right of way. Additionally, the back of the vehicles are marked "Stay Back" in English and Arabic, and the Well Gunners were utilizing high-powered spot lights to indicate the need to stay away from the motorcade.

While stopped, a white, 4-door sedan suddenly pulled out of traffic around the IP check point and began to approach the rear of the motorcade. This was in spite of Iraqi police officers who were present stopping traffic. As the vehicle broke free from traffic, _____ flashed his spot light at the car to further indicate that it needed to yield. The vehicle continued to accelerate. At this time both _____ and _____ began to yell "KIF!" and both of them fired pen flares at the suspect vehicle. One pen flare veered to the left, and the second skipped off the roadway and burst about 20 meters in front of the vehicle. The vehicle continued to accelerate, and by this time _____ and _____ could see that the driver (and only occupant) was an Arabic male about 25 years of age.

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When the vehicle was approximately _____ from the rear of the motorcade, both _____ and _____ fired into the engine block in an attempt to stop the vehicle. _____ fired three rounds from his government issued _____, and _____ fired two rounds from his government issued _____. All five rounds struck the grille of the vehicle.

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When the vehicle was struck, the driver immediately slammed on the brakes and came screeching to a halt. He then held his hands up in the air inside the vehicle and remained there until the motorcade continued on and lost sight of him. There is no reason to believe that the driver was injured.

The shooting was reported immediately to the RSO TOC. See team member statements for further details. This use of force incident is within the DS Embassy Baghdad Use of Force policy.

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U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience

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On [redacted] I was hired by Blackwater USA. I completed WPPS training [redacted] as well as WPPS 2 in [redacted]. I was trained and assessed on several PSD operating techniques, to include; marksmanship, tactical driving, Principal Recovery and Extractions (PRE) and firing from moving a vehicle.

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Incident

On August 15, 2007, at 0900 hours, [] staged and conducted an operational brief for the day's mission. Our mission was to conduct a Technical Site Survey (TSS) on the Izdihar compound. The mission brief was in accordance with [] standard operating procedures and covered Department of States rules of engagement. The intelligence portion was briefed by our team intelligence analysis []. The brief highlighted venue and route specific threats of direct and indirect fire, as well as possible and multiple Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED). This mission required us to leave the safety of the U.S. Military-controlled International Zone and travel through a part of Baghdad where para-military / insurgent forces hostile to the U.S. presence in Iraq routinely conduct terrorist and guerrilla operations. Attacks on Coalition forces are common in this area.

At Approximately 1000, [] completed the Technical Site Survey and departed using the [] route due to RSO Air's route recommendation. I was assigned to the left rear PSS position of the follow vehicle in a [] motorcade. Our motorcade consisted of [].
[] Our motorcade was traveled Eastbound towards [].


Upon entering the traffic circle of [] the motorcade was stopped due to a change in direction made by Tactical Commander (TC) []. While scanning for any possible threats from the 9 o'clock area of the motorcade, I heard the well PSS and the right rear PSS position in the vehicle, giving loud and repeated verbal commands for the suspect vehicle to stop. The follow vehicle has "WARNING Stay back 100 meters" stenciled on the rear doors. The warning is written in both Arabic and English. Also the follow vehicle is equipped with bright red and white reflective tape on the left, right doors and rear window. The follow vehicle is also equipped with rear facing warning strobes which were activated at this time. Despite of the warnings given, the suspect driver continued to advance on the motorcade. His actions were consistent with tactics used by insurgents to attack coalition motorcades. A few seconds later I heard (2) pen flares being fired, a pause, then a short burst of fire. At this time I glanced to the rear of the motorcade and saw a single Arabic male driving a White Sedan slam on his brakes and fluid leaking from the front radiator. The driver immediately stopped his vehicle and put his hands up in the air to signify compliance, and appeared to be uninjured.

The motorcade continued on towards the Green Zone. Shift Leader [] contacted the RSO Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and informed them of the incident. No personnel from [] were injured during the incident and no [] vehicles were damaged during the incident.
///END///

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
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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16th day of August, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	16M Hammond

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	David Motley
Address	

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Sworn Statement

Date 15 August 2007	Time Approximately 1008 Hours
Location WPPS Baghdad Iraq Camp	

I, _____, hereby make the following statement at the request of

_____, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting therefrom may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience

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In _____ I successfully completed the WPPS training with Blackwater USA. While attending training at Blackwater USA, I was given instruction on motorcade operations, attacks on principal, principal recovery and extraction, evasive / defensive driving, threat identification, use of force, escalation of force, force continuum, defensive tactics and shooting from moving vehicles.

Since _____ I have been working in Baghdad, Iraq under the WPPS Program, conducting Venue Advances and Technical Site Surveys.

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Incident

On Wednesday August 15, 2007, at 0830 hours, [] staged and conducted an operational briefing for the day's mission of conducting a Technical Site Survey on the Izdihar Compound. The brief was conducted in accordance with [] standard operating procedures and included the overall situation in Baghdad, mission brief and rules of engagement. The intelligence portion of the brief highlighted venue and route specific threats of direct and indirect fire, as well as possible and multiple VBIED's (vehicle borne improvised explosive device). The Izdihar Compound is located in a part of Baghdad where militia / Insurgent forces hostile to the U.S. presence in Iraq routinely conduct terrorist and guerrilla operations. Attacks on coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians are prevalent in this area.

I was in the Well PSS position of the follow vehicle of a [] vehicle motorcade. The follow vehicle has "Warning Stay back 100 meters" stenciled on the rear door. The warning is written in both Arabic and English. The follow vehicle is also equipped with rear emergency strobe-flashers, which were activated at the time of the incident. Additionally, the follow vehicle has red and white reflective tape on the interior of the rear doors, which is visible when the doors are opened for signaling. The reflective tape is also displayed above the rear well position and is visible to traffic approaching from the rear.

At approximately 1008 hours, [] was en-route back to the International Zone after departing venue. As [] approached [] the motorcade encountered heavy traffic and eventually came to a halt. Up to this point I was utilizing a two million candlepower spotlight to signal traffic to stay back. Local traffic acknowledged our motorcade and was maintaining a security standoff of approximately 150 meters. The motorcade was preparing to change its direction of travel when a white four door sedan with one male occupant, broke away from the stopped traffic and started coming directly toward the motorcade at a very high rate of speed. As the vehicle approached to approximately [] meters, I again shined the two million candlepower spotlight at the driver and began yelling for him to stop in Arabic and English. The vehicle made no attempt to slow. As the vehicle approached [] meters, I fired one pen flare at the vehicle, which struck the ground approximately 20 meters in front of the vehicle. At that same time, I noticed another pen flare being fired from the right side of the follow vehicle. The driver of the white sedan ignored the pen flares and continued without slowing. The vehicle continued to close on the motorcade with no signs of slowing despite multiple visual warnings and two pen flare deployments. The driver's actions were consistent with methods used by insurgents utilizing Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED).

Based on my training, experience and recent intelligence reports, I perceived the driver's actions to be a threat to myself as well as my teammates. Fearing for my life and the lives of my teammates I then fired three rounds with my [] into the front grill of the sedan in an attempt to disable and stop the vehicle. I observed the rounds impacting into the grill of the sedan. The driver of the vehicle quickly applied the breaks, put his hands in the air, and stopped the vehicle approximately [] meters behind the Follow vehicle. The male driver was the only occupant of the vehicle. I did not observe any injuries to the driver. [] Shift Leader, [] immediately reported the incident to the PSD Tactical Operations Center (TOC) as we proceeded

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to exit the area. The Shift Leader then ordered continuation of the mission and [] proceeded to the International Zone without further incident or injury. -END-

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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	[Signature]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16th day of August, 2007.


Signed	[Signature]
Printed	16M Hammond

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	David Motley
Address	

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~~PARADOX~~ (P)

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)				Date/Time of Statement 15 August 2007/ 1330 hrs	
Name		Team		Situation		Shot to Disable b6 b7C	
Location/Venue Approximately 100 meters west of		Time Occurred 1008 hrs		Date Occurred 15 August 2007			

Incident Report BW 08-15-07 (1) Weapons Discharge Baghdad


On August 15, 2007 at 0830 hours [redacted] conducted a pre-mission brief covering its assigned mission for the day; conducting a Technical Site Survey of the Izdihar Compound located at [redacted]. The pre-mission brief included an intelligence brief by [redacted] intel representative. [redacted] The day's brief (and past intelligence reports) indicated that insurgents were targeting areas in and around major bridges, checkpoints, and large open markets. On August 14, 2007 there was an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) attack on Coalition Forces approximately 100 meters north of the team's assigned venue. [redacted] pre-mission brief covered the Department of State's Use of Force Policy and Rules of Engagement. The Use of Force portion of the brief covered: use of force options, escalating levels of force, and the Chief of Mission Rules of engagement per the Mission Firearms Policy.

The team made the movement to the venue without incident. At approximately 1000 hours, Team [redacted] departed Izdihar Compound, en-route to the International Zone (IZ), in a [redacted] vehicle motorcade. The motorcade configuration was as follows; [redacted] On the rear of the Follow vehicle, stenciled in large red letters, it states, "WARNING - Stay back 100 meters." The warning is in both Arabic and English. The Follow vehicle is also equipped with rear emergency strobe-flashers, which were activated at the time of the incident. Additionally, the follow vehicle has red and white reflective tape applied to the interior of the rear doors of the vehicle, which is highly visible when PSSs open the doors to signal traffic. The follow also has the reflective tape above the rear interior window of the vehicle.

[redacted] was traveling with the vehicle's emergency lights and sirens activated in order to warn traffic of the motorcade's presence. [redacted] covered [redacted] movement as the team departed from the venue. [redacted] routes immediately prior to departure and recommended that [redacted] utilize its [redacted] route.

[redacted] traveled east from the venue towards [redacted] upon reaching [redacted] motorcade came to a halt in order to change its direction of travel. [redacted] Tactical Commander, [redacted] informed the team that there was heavy congestion at [redacted] and to keep some "stand-off" between the motorcade and the traffic to the rear.

Protective Security Specialist (PSS) [redacted], in [redacted] Follow, Well position, advised that a white four door sedan, with a single male occupant, had accelerated from the stopped traffic and was approaching from the rear at a high rate of speed. PSS [redacted] utilized the team's issued two million candlepower spotlight to visually signal the driver of the sedan to stop. The driver failed to stop and at approximately [redacted] meters PSS [redacted] fired a pen flare that struck the roadway directly in front of the approaching vehicle. At the same time the right rear PSS of the Follow vehicle, [redacted] opened his door and gave visual and verbal commands for the driver of the sedan to stop. At approximately [redacted] meters PSS [redacted] fired one pen flare which also struck the ground in front of the vehicle. The driver ignored the pen flares and all verbal and

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)				Date/Time of Statement 15 August 2007/ 1330 hrs	
Name _____ (Shift Leader)		Team _____		Situation Shoot to Disable			
Location/Venue Approximately 100 meters west of _____				Time Occurred 1008 hrs		Date Occurred 15 August 2007	

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visual signals from the Follow vehicle and continued its high speed movement toward the motorcade.

Based on previous intelligence reports [] and [] both knew of previous attacks on coalition forces, where vehicles have been packed with explosives and detonated after driving into motorcades. [] and [] believed, based on the driver's actions, that the vehicle was a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [] and [] fired their weapons at the grill of the vehicle in an attempt to disable the vehicle. [] fired two rounds from his [] rifle. [] fired three rounds from his []. Immediately after the shots were fired the vehicle came to a complete stop and the male occupant put his hands in the air. [] continued to observe the vehicle as the motorcade drove away.

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SL [] notified the RSO TOC of the incident. [] continued on its [] route and returned to the International Zone, via Checkpoint [] without further incident. The [] Detail Leader, [] was present in the motorcade at the time of the incident. No known injuries were sustained as a result of this incident. -END-

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Sworn Statement

Date August 15, 2007	Time 1300
Location WPPS Camp, Baghdad	

I, [redacted] ^{b6}_{b7c}, hereby make the following statement at the request of [redacted], who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience:

[Large empty box for General Military/Civilian Experience]

I attended WPPS training, in [redacted] at Blackwater's training facility and received extensive training in High Threat PSD operations, including; threat identification, motorcade operations and shooting from a moving platform. I have been with the WPPS Program since [redacted] Since that time I have been on PSD and Advance Teams. I successfully completed

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[Signature]
11/11/2007



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Sworn Statement

Incident:

On Wednesday, August 15, 2007, [] staged and conducted an operational briefing for the day's mission that included a Technical Site Survey (TSS) of the Izdihar Compound []. The brief was conducted in accordance with [] Standard Operating Procedures and included the overall situation in Baghdad, relevant threat intelligence and rules of engagement per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy.

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I was assigned to the Right Rear PSS position in the follow vehicle of a [] motorcade. This vehicle is equipped with sliding windows, which allows the Well PSS Position to interact with traffic to the rear. The follow vehicle has "WARNING stay back 100 meters" stenciled on the rear doors. The warning is in both English and Arabic. The follow vehicle is also equipped with emergency strobe lights that are activated through the vehicle's rear lights. In addition, there is highly reflective red and white tape that has been placed on the inside of the doors to help make the vehicle more visible to the advancing traffic incase a situation arises where the doors must be opened to signal approaching traffic or threats.

At approximately 1000 hrs, [] departed from the Izdihar Compound en-route to the International Zone using [] route. As [] was approaching, [] the motorcade made a short halt due to a change in the direction of travel. Adhering to the commands of the well PSS and door PSS positions all of the traffic to the rear was slowing down and coming to a stop at a distance of approximately 150 meters. At this time a white four door sedan, with a single Arabic male occupant ignored our signals, broke away from the stopped traffic and accelerated toward the rear of our motorcade. I opened my door and began to give the appropriate hand signals for the vehicle to stop, as well as verbal commands. The well PSS, [] also began to give hand signals, verbal commands and utilized the 2 million candlepower spotlight to signal the driver of the suspect vehicle to stop. The driver showed no signs of compliance to our hand and arm signals or the spot light and continued to proceed towards the rear of our Motorcade.

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Simultaneously, PSS [] and I fired pen flares at the suspect vehicle as it closed to within approximately [] meters of our motorcade. Both pen flares struck the ground approximately 20 meters directly in front of the vehicle. After the pen flares were deployed the driver of the suspect vehicle continued to ignore our signals and advanced towards our motorcade at a high rate of speed. The driver's actions were consistent with methods used by insurgents operating Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED). Based on my experience, training and recent intelligence reports, I felt the driver's actions were a threat to the motorcade. Fearing for my life and the lives of my teammates I fired two well aimed rounds into the grill of the vehicle attempting to disable it. Simultaneously, well PSS [] also fired three rounds into the grill of the vehicle in an attempt to disable it. The vehicle then came to a complete stop and the driver immediately put his hands up in the air so that we could see them. The driver appeared to be uninjured.

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Shift Leader [] contacted the RSO Tactical Operation Center (TOC) and informed them of the incident. We proceeded back to the International Zone without further incident. No personnel from [] were injured during the incident and no vehicles were damaged. //END///

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DECLASSIFIED

Sworn Statement

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Redacted Signature]
Printed	[Redacted Name]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16th day of August, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	KM Hammens

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	David Motley
Address	

DECLASSIFIED

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

b7E,F

U0119



DECLASSIFIED

U.S. Embassy – Baghdad

29 August 2007



Spot Report – 082907-01

Subject: Escalation of Force (EOF) by COM tactical support team**Reporting Office:** RSO TOC – Baghdad

Summary: On August 29, 2007 at 1120 hours, a [] vehicle COM tactical support team (TST) was on a mission north of the International Zone in support of other PSD teams in the area. While stopped in heavy traffic, a four-door gray sedan with two occupants drove towards them. The TST turret gunners directed visual signals at the driver of the suspect auto as a warning to cease approaching the team. After initially stopping, the vehicle again drove towards the motorcade and ignored repeated visual warnings to stop. When the sedan came within [] meters of the TST, it was deemed a threat and a turret gunner fired two shots from his [] into the front grill region of the suspect vehicle. The vehicle immediately decelerated and the occupants appeared uninjured. The TST continued their mission without further incident.

b7E,F



RSO Action: PSD members debriefed and written statements forthcoming. Notified DS/CC.

Location: Red Zone, Baghdad, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: Darren Hanner, Watch Officer, Baghdad
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

DECLASSIFIED

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

~~170405~~ (P)
b7E, F

Date of Report: 29 Aug 07

Location: IVO

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

DECLASSIFIED

U0120

Date of Incident: 29 Aug 07

Time of Incident: 1121

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO

Personnel Involved: (TST)

b7E, F

Incident Synopsis: On 29 Aug 07 at 1121 a Tactical Support Team (TST) was conducting area support for COM PSD teams. While approaching the intersection at _____, a sedan aggressively approached the motorcade. The driver of the sedan failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop. In an escalation of force, the lead turret PSS of the second vehicle fired two (2) rounds from his _____ into the grill of the vehicle causing it to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued with their mission in support of COM PSD teams.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

DECLASSIFIED

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00397: 20070829, UODFI, BAGHDAD, [REDACTED]

b7E, F

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00136

DECLASSIFIED

Impact: MEDIUM

Status: OPEN

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070829, UODFI, BAGHDAD, [REDACTED]

Status: OPEN

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ CRIME / INCIDENT

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-04864

Optional Case Info

Impact: MEDIUM

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

■ IRAQ
■ UNITED STATES

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO Baghdad, [REDACTED]

Name: Blackwater PSD Team Member [REDACTED]

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore ASAC BAGHDAD

Farrington, David S SA BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On August 29, 2007, Blackwater Personal Security Detail [REDACTED] was operating in the Baghdad Red Zone near the Central Rail Station. All vehicles in the motorcade were stopped because traffic was heavy. Team members tried to clear traffic and keep other vehicles at a safe distance from the motorcade, but one driver brought his vehicle around stopped traffic and refused to obey written and visual commands to keep his car at a safe distance. Fearing for his life and for his teammates, a turret gunner from the second vehicle in the motorcade aimed for, shot at, and hit the grill of the non-compliant driver's car. The car came to a stop, and reversed out of the traffic and continued the mission.

[REDACTED] had no principal because it was operating in support of [REDACTED] which was going to Tobchi Juvenile Prison. No Chief of Mission personnel were injured, and the non-compliant driver and his passenger did not appear to be injured.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
08/30/2007	This report summarizes stat...
10/24/2007	This report summarizes stat...
10/24/2007	This report summarizes stat...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
AAR 20070829EOF Baghdad Rav...	Adobe PDF	1,313 kB
Statement 20070829 EO... [REDACTED]	Adobe PDF	2,706 kB
Statement 20070829 E... [REDACTED]	Adobe PDF	2,812 kB

Related Cases

RS-2007-00425: RSO USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS
Comment:

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

08/30/2007	OPEN
10/24/2007	OPEN - PENDING PQ APPROVAL

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.



Diplomatic Security Service
Baghdad

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

U0122
AR000396

(P)
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DS Case Number	Case Title	ROI Type	Report Date
RS-2007-00397	20070829, UODFI, BAGHDAD, [REDACTED]	CASE INTERIM	30-AUG-07
Case Type	Program	Dates Investigated	
ADMINISTRATIVE	REGIONAL SECURITY	29-AUG-07 -	
Case Impact	Case Status	Open/Close Case Dates	
MEDIUM	OPEN	24-OCT-07	

This report summarizes statements that team members of Blackwater Personal Security Detail [REDACTED] made to US Embassy Baghdad Assistant Regional Security Officer David Farrington in an interview that took place between 1120 and 1140 on the day of the incident described below. All times, speeds and distances are approximate.

At 1115 on August 29, 2007, [REDACTED] left the Baghdad International Zone. [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] vehicle motorcade that was operating without a principal in support of [REDACTED] which was going to Tobchi Juvenile Prison. The Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) was the [REDACTED] vehicle in the [REDACTED] motorcade, and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the front and rear ERV turret gunners. On the back of each [REDACTED] vehicle, there was a written warning to the effect that all vehicles should stay 100 meters back from the motorcade.

At 1120, [REDACTED] was traveling southwest in heavy traffic near the Baghdad Central Rail Station, which is located at [REDACTED]. Traffic came to a stop, and team members tried to use lights and sirens to clear a lane. A driver brought his dark colored four-door hatchback into the traffic from a street on the right side of the motorcade. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] saw a passenger in the car but did not get a clear view of that person.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ordered the hatchback driver to stop by shouting in Arabic and using hand signals. The driver stopped the hatchback, but then he started driving around stopped traffic. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ordered the hatchback driver to stop again, and [REDACTED] made eye contact with the driver. However, the hatchback driver continued to accelerate toward [REDACTED]. The hatchback was [REDACTED] meters from [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] raised his [REDACTED] rifle. Fearing for his life and for the lives of his teammates, [REDACTED] aimed for, shot at, and hit the hatchback's grill.

The hatchback stopped, and there was no sign of any injury to any person. [REDACTED] continued to aim in on the hatchback while [REDACTED] scanned the area. [REDACTED] reversed out of the traffic and continued the mission.

Reporting Official:	Distribution:
Farrington, David S	
SA	
Aug-30-07 08:00	
Approving Official(s):	
Carpenter, Theodore- APPROVED	
ASAC	
Aug-31-07 07:59	

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)		Date/Time of Statement 21/Aug/07 Approx. 1500 hrs.	
Name _____ b6 b7c		Team _____		Situation Shoot to disable	
Location/Venue SE of _____ b7E, F		Time Occurred Approx. 1120		Date Occurred 29/Aug. 07	

Incident Report BW 08-29-07 (1) Weapons Discharge Baghdad

At approximately 0745 hours on 29 August 2007, _____ Shift Leader _____ conducted a pre-mission brief. The mission brief included rules of engagement per the mission firearms policy, escalation of force, team movements, routes to be taken, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The brief also included an intelligence brief from the embedded Intelligence Analyst.

At approximately 0900 hours, _____ departed the International Zone (IZ) en route to a staging area centrally located in Baghdad to conduct its tactical support function. The vehicle configuration for the day was _____

traveling in that order. The _____ Tactical Support Team (TST) vehicles in the motorcade were clearly stenciled with bold red lettering in both English and Arabic, warning all vehicles to stay back 100 meters. The warning is located on the back of each vehicle. Also _____ had the vehicles' emergency lights and sirens activated to warn traffic of the motorcades approach.

At approximately 1120 hours while traveling southwest from the intersection commonly referred to as _____ encountered "grid lock" traffic. The Lead vehicle was approximately 100 meters away from the intersection of _____ attempting to locate a lane for the motorcade to continue through the intersection. This placed the ERV directly adjacent to a north/south side street located just east of Baghdad Rail Station which is a building located on the Northeast corner of _____. While completely stopped in traffic, the ERV rear turret PSS _____ observed an older model gray hatchback drive south on the side street towards the ERV. PSS _____ immediately shouted stop in Arabic and signaled the vehicle to stop with hand and arm signals. The vehicle came to a complete stop behind another car which was waiting for our motorcade to pass.

ERV lead turret PSS _____ and PSS _____ began monitoring their sectors when they observed the gray suspect vehicle drive around the stopped car and start accelerating toward the ERV. PSS _____ immediately presented his _____ rifle as a warning and at the same time PSS _____ shouted stop in Arabic and signaled the vehicle to stop with hand and arm signals. The driver of the vehicle ignored all warnings and continued driving toward the ERV. Due to the speed and distance of the vehicle and believing it to be a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED), PSS _____ fired two shots from his Department of State _____ rifle into the grill of the gray hatchback. The vehicle's driver brought the car to an immediate stop and no further use of force was necessary.

The vehicle was occupied by one male driver and an unidentifiable front seat passenger wrapped with a head garment. Neither occupant in the suspect vehicle appeared to be injured in the incident. Due to the possible threat and traffic issues, _____ conducted a "Y" turn to reverse direction, and departed the area. _____ proceeded on the mission without further incident. No _____ personnel were injured nor were any Team _____ vehicles damaged during the incident.///END///

Person giving Statement _____ b6 b7c



Date 29 Aug 07	Time Approx. 1500 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, [redacted]^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement at the request of _____.

David S. Farrington, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience

In [redacted], I attended Blackwater DSS WPPS II training where I received instruction in all aspects of PSD. [redacted] and thorough explanations of [redacted]

There were numerous shoot / no shoot scenarios, and thorough explanations of the Department of State standards for Use of Force. Upon completion of vetting I was assigned to the Blackwater WPPS contract in Baghdad, Iraq.

Incident

DECLASSIFIED

On 29 Aug 2007 at approximately 0745 hours, I attended [] pre-mission brief which included use of force and escalation of force per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy. A brief from our imbedded intelligence analyst, [] reported increased Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) activity in our area of operations. [] vehicle motorcade consisted of []

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[] All [] vehicles were clearly marked with red lettering, warning drivers to stay back 100 meters written in both English and Arabic. All [] of our vehicles were also utilizing emergency lights and sirens to warn Local Nationals (LNs) of our presence.

I was assigned as the rear turret PSS of the second vehicle in the motorcade (ERV) during our mission for the day. [] departed the International Zone (IZ) in direct support of []. Due to heavy traffic, we were stationary a few hundred meters east of an intersection commonly referred to as []. My vehicle (ERV) was stopped in front of a side street that runs north and south and led to a market in the area of Central Rail Station. The motorcade was utilizing its lights and sirens in an attempt to open a lane through traffic in order to continue on our route. A covered market area was also located east of the Rail Station. Halfway down the road, there was a small Iraqi Police checkpoint. A dark colored four door sedan left the market area and was let through the Iraqi checkpoint. I stopped the car, by gaining the drivers attention with hand and arm signals. A few moments later, a grey four door hatchback pulled out of the market area parking lot and was waved through the checkpoint. I again used hand and arm signals to get the drivers attention and the driver stopped the vehicle behind the first stopped vehicle. I resumed scanning my sector. Upon looking back in the direction of the market, I saw the grey car pull around the first stopped car and begin accelerating towards the motorcade. I again used both verbal and visual hand signals (yelling and signaling) to warn the driver to stop the vehicle. The suspect driver ignored my verbal and visual hand signals and the lights and sirens that were blaring from our vehicles. At this time, from my training and experience, I believed the vehicle to be a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) and I was in fear for my life and the lives of my fellow teammates. As I raised my Department of State issued [] to engage the fast approaching suspect car, PSS [] engaged the threat by shooting two rounds into the grill of the car. The vehicle stopped immediately. I saw no signs of any injuries. The vehicle made no further movements while we were in the area.

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I heard PSS [] report the shoot to disable to our Vehicle Commander. The Vehicle Commander advised our Shift Leader of the shoot to disable. We continued on with the mission without further incidents. No [] personnel were injured and none of our vehicles were damaged in the incident.

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
DECLASSIFIED

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 30th day of August, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	K M Hammons

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	John D. Davis
Address	



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04R000039

Sworn Statement

Date	29 August 2007	Time	Approx. 1500 Hours
Location			
WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq			

I, [redacted] b6
b7C , hereby make the following statement at the request of

David S. Farrington, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience

[T was selected by Blackwater Security

_____ I was selected by Blackwater Security Consulting to attend the Department of State High Threat Protection Course where I was further trained on "shoot or no shoot" scenarios as well as The Department of State High Threat Protection Rules of Engagements. I deployed to Baghdad, Iraq in _____ on the Department of State Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract where I have worked numerous Protective Details.

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DELOSPIRE



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
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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 30th day of August 2007.

Signed	
Printed	Ross M. Hammons

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	For, David
Address	

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

MA 0920

(P)

b7E, F

Date of Report: 02 Sept 07

Location: _____

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

03:15:57:030

U0126

Date of Incident: 02 Sept 07

Time of Incident: 1225

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: Doura Power Plant

Personnel Involved: _____

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Incident Synopsis: On 2 Sept 07 at 1225 hours, _____, a PSD Team providing protection for four (4) principals at the Doura Power Plant, received 10-15 rounds of small arms fire (SAF) directed at them. Upon receipt of the SAF the team _____ to a secure location within the compound. As the team and principals were _____ a PSS positioned at the landing zone (LZ) identified and returned fire towards the building from which the SAF was emanating. The PSS fired approximately 10-15 rounds _____ from his _____ rifle engaging the individual firing from the roof of the building. As the mission was a fly-away, RSO air assets were briefed and by order of the DRSO and High Threat Protection (HTP) they were placed on standby for the extraction of the team and principals. Tactical Support Team (TST) assets were repositioned to provide additional support if required. At approximately _____ the DRSO and HTP authorized the movement of air assets for extraction. RSO medium lift and little birds were dispatched and the team and principals were extracted and returned to the IZ without further incident. There was no damage to CoM assets or injuries to CoM personnel.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

03:15:57:030

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00351: 20070902, UODFI, BAGHDAD, [REDACTED]

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00114

DECLASSIFIED

Impact:

Status: OPEN

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070902, UODFI, BAGHDAD, [REDACTED]

Status: OPEN

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ GENERAL

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-05167

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: Blackwater

Name: [REDACTED]

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore ASAC BAGHDAD

Lopez, Lisa M SA BAGHDAD

SCOLLAN, MICHAEL T ARSO BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On 09/02/2007, [REDACTED] Tactical Commander for Blackwater [REDACTED], participated in a pre-planned mission for the transportation and protection of four principals to the Daura Power Plant by rotary wing aircraft. In preparation from departure from the power plant, [REDACTED] and members of his team return to the landing zone and received fire while securing the site for departure. [REDACTED] immediately identified and exchanged fire with target until individual falls from sight. The principals were [REDACTED] inside the power plant dining facility until RSO Air was cleared to resume operations and recover the detail from the venue. No injuries to principals or team members occur as a result of this incident.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
09/02/2007	20070902 [REDACTED]

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
Sworn Statements	Adobe PDF	1,941 kB

Related Cases

RS-2007-00425: RSO USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS

Comment:

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

09/10/2007	OPEN
	OPEN - PENDING PQ APPROVAL
09/25/2007	OPEN

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

DECLASSIFIED



Diplomatic Security Service
Baghdad

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

U0128

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DS Case Number RS-2007-00351	Case Title 20070902, UODFI, BAGHDAD	RQI Type CASE INTERIM	Report Date 02-SEP-07
Case Type ADMINISTRATIVE	Program REGIONAL SECURITY	Dates Investigated 02-SEP-07 - 03-SEP-07	
Case Impact	Case Status OPEN	Open/Close Case Dates 25-SEP-07	

20070902

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SYNOPSIS:

On 09/02/2007, [redacted] Tactical Commander for Blackwater [redacted] participated in a pre-planned mission for the transportation and protection of four principals to the Daura Power Plant by rotary wing aircraft. In preparation from departure from the power plant, [redacted] and members of his team return to the landing zone and received fire while securing the site for departure. [redacted] immediately identified and exchanged fire with target until individual falls from sight. The principals were [redacted] inside the power plant dining facility until RSO Air was cleared to resume operations and recover the detail from the venue. No injuries to principals or team members occur as a result of this incident.

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DETAILS:

On 09/01/2007, Blackwater [redacted] conducted an operational brief for an air mission to the Daura Power Plant with four principals. The briefing was conducted in accordance with all standard operating procedures.

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On 09/02/2007, Blackwater [redacted] executed the mission and arrived safely at the power plant. In preparation for departure, [redacted] lead several members of the team to secure the Landing Zone (LZ). The principals were positioned [redacted] until the site is secure. When [redacted] reached the LZ, he was engaged by an individual with an AK-47 from a rooftop 250 meters west of his location. He immediately identified and engaged the individual with one controlled burst from his [redacted] is engaged again and returned fire with another controlled burst. Individual then fell from sight. During the engagement, the principals were [redacted] inside the power plant dining facility until RSO Air was cleared to resume operations and recovered the detail from the venue. [redacted] estimated that he received approximately 10-15 rounds of fire and returned approximately the same number. No injuries to principals or team members occur as a result of this incident.

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[redacted] and his team reported the incident to the RSO TOC. Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) Lisa Lopez took the report.

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END REPORT

Reporting Official: Lopez, Lisa M SA	Distribution:
Approving Official(s): Carpenter, Theodore- WAITING FOR APPROVAL ASAC	



~~ORR 000360~~ 51E11
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Sworn Statement

Vol. 29

Date	September 2, 2007	Time	1600 hours
Location			
WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq			

I, _____^{b6}_{b7c}, hereby make the following statement at the request of _____.

Ted Carpenter, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting therefrom may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience

--

In 1 _____ I attended Blackwater DSS WPPS II training where I received instruction in all aspects of PSD.

aspects of PSD. _____
 _____ There were numerous shoot / no shoot scenarios, and thorough explanations of the Department of State standards for Use of Force. Upon completion of vetting, I was assigned to the Blackwater WPPS contract in Baghdad, Iraq.

Incident

DECLASSIFIED

On Saturday, September 1, 2007 at 1630 hours, [] conducted an operational brief for a mission to take place the following day. The mission was to the Daura Power Plant and would be an air move due to the high threat area of the venue. The brief was conducted in accordance with [] standard operating procedures and included the overall situation in Baghdad, mission brief, and load plan for all four rotary wing [] as well as the Department of State rules of engagement per the Mission Firearms Policy. The intelligence portion of the brief highlighted an increased threat of VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) attacks on coalition forces within our area of operations.

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On Sunday, September 2, 2007, [] executed the pre-planned mission, which included the safe transportation and protection of four principals to the Daura Power Plant by rotary wing aircraft. I arrived on venue with the first set of helicopters transporting part of the team to the power plant and met with the head of security. The head of security advised me that there had been four incidents of sniper activity at the Power Plant in the past 30 days. This updated intelligence information was relayed to the Shift Leader (SL), [] when he arrived with the second set of helicopters. On this second set of helicopters were the remaining team members and the principals.

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When the mission was over, I led several members of the team to the Landing Zone (LZ) to secure it for the principal's departure. Directly behind me was SL []. The principals were positioned [] until the security at the LZ could be established.

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As I reached the top of the stairs and stepped up onto the LZ, I was immediately engaged by an individual shooting at me with an AK-47. The shooter appeared to be a military aged male who was located approximately 250 meters west of my location and was firing from a rooftop. When the shooter opened fire on me, I immediately feared for my life and the lives of my team members. At least one round hit the landing zone about 15 feet in front of me and I could hear other rounds flying past me. I got down into the prone position, identified the threat and returned fire. I fired one controlled burst at the shooter using my Department of State issued []. The shooter then fired a second burst at me. I responded by firing a second controlled burst at the shooter and he fell from my line of sight. I did not see the shooter anymore and there were no more rounds fired. The shooter fired approximately 10 to 15 rounds. In response, I also fired approximately 10 to 15 rounds.


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Once the attack began, the principals were [] inside the Daura Power Plant dining facility. At this point, I was assisted by team members in securing the LZ. Prior to RSO Air departing LZ Washington, they were advised of the situation and air operations were temporarily suspended in support of the mission. At approximately 1250 hours, RSO Air was cleared to resume operations in support of the mission and directed to recover [] and principals from the venue. The extraction of [] and principals by RSO Air occurred minutes later with no problems. The team and principals returned to LZ Washington with out further incident. There were no injuries to the principals or any team members during the incident.///End///

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
I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

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
Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 3rd day of September 2007.


Signed	
Printed	Ted R. Carpenter

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE. DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Jonathan Dawson
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

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Blackwater USA		Statement Form				Date/Time of Statement 2 Sep 07 / 1600 hours	
Name [Redacted] b6 b7C			Team		Incident Type Attack on Venue		
Location Of Incident (Grid or Terrain Feature) Daura Power Plant				Incident Time 1225 hours		Incident Date 2 Sep 07	

Incident Report BW 09-02-07 Attack on Venue Baghdad (1)

On Saturday, September 1, 2007 at 1630 hours, [Redacted] conducted an operational briefing for the next day's mission, which was to provide the safe transportation and close protection for four principals to the Daura Power Plant. Due to the high threat location of the venue, the movement was to be conducted by air. The brief was conducted in accordance with [Redacted] standard operating procedures and included the overall situation in Baghdad, mission brief, and load plan for all four rotary wing [Redacted] as well as the Department of State rules of engagement per the Mission Firearms Policy. The intelligence portion of the brief highlighted an increased threat of VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) attacks on Coalition Forces.

On Sunday, September 02, 2007, at 0900 hours, [Redacted] departed LZ Washington, via RSO Air, en route to the Daura Power Plant. Upon arrival at the Power Plant, [Redacted] Tactical Commander (TC), [Redacted] liaised with the head of security on the venue. While discussing recent security issues at the venue, TC [Redacted] was advised that there had been four sniper incidents at the venue in the last 30 days. Upon arrival of [Redacted] Shift Leader (SL), [Redacted] TC [Redacted] advised him of the recent attacks at the venue. SL [Redacted] advised the PSO, Al Deleon, of these incidents.

At approximately 1225 hours, as the team was preparing to depart the venue, TC [Redacted] was leading SL [Redacted] up the stairs to the Landing Zone (LZ) to provide advance security for the departure of the principals. Upon arriving at the top of the stairs, TC [Redacted] was engaged by two bursts from what he believed to be an AK-47 totaling approximately ten to fifteen rounds of small arms fire. One of the rounds struck the ground approximately 15 feet in front of TC [Redacted] who immediately dropped to the prone position. TC [Redacted] in fear for his life and the lives of his team mates identified the threat and immediately fired ten to fifteen rounds to stop the threat. As soon as the first rounds were fired, [Redacted] Shift Leader, [Redacted] contacted the PSO and advised him that there were shots fired at the LZ and to [Redacted] the principles.

[Redacted] Shift Leader notified the Tactical Operations Center of the situation. RSO Air was also advised of the situation and suspended operations in support of the mission. At approximately 1250 hours, RSO Air was cleared to resume air operations and recovered the principals and the members of [Redacted] along with the principals flew back to LZ Washington without further incident. There were no injuries to the principals or [Redacted] team members during the attack. ///End///

[Redacted] b6 b7C 0315071030

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

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U.S. Embassy Baghdad

September 09, 2007



Spot Report – 090907-01

SUBJECT: Complex attack against COM PSD Teams**REPORTING OFFICE:** RSO Baghdad, Iraq

SUMMARY: On 09 September 2007 at 1048, a COM PSD Advance Team providing support for a COM PSD escorting PRT principals received small arms fire (SAF). The advance team [redacted] of Amanant City Hall received SAF from approximately 200 meters south of their positions. The primary COM PSD team immediately moved their principals to [redacted] within Amanant City Hall. The Tactical Support Team (TST), tactically staged near the venue, responded to the scene and was attacked with SAF and RPG from multiple locations surrounding the venue. The TST returned fire and with the assistance of RSO air assets all teams (Advance, Primary and TST) returned to the International Zone without further incident. There was minor damage to several TST vehicles from SAF impacts and peripheral blast damage. One COM TST member received minor shrapnel wounds to his leg, later treated and released by medical personnel.

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RSO ACTION: The RSO TOC monitored and directed assets for assistance. U.S. Army was notified for fire support and safe extraction of all COM personnel if necessary. DS/CC was notified.

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LOCATION: Baghdad, Iraq

DRAFTED BY: Roque Salas, RSO TOC Watch Officer, Baghdad
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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31 DECEMBER 2007

SBU

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC

SUBJECT: ATTACK ON A RSO PSD ADVANCE TEAM

(SBU) On September 9, 2007 at approximately 1048 hours, a Regional Security Office (RSO) Personal Security Detail (PSD) Advance Team, providing security for a RSO PSD escort of three members of the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and an interpreter, received small arms fire (SAF) at the Amanant Municipal Building in Baghdad. The PRT employees were evacuated without further incident by their primary PSD team and returned safely to the International Zone (IZ). Immediately after their departure, the Advance Team and later three Tactical Support Teams that arrived to assist the Advance Team, came under heavy gunfire from outside the venue from approximately 30-50 gunmen armed with AK-47,s, hand grenades, and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG). The teams successfully engaged the enemy and were able to return to the IZ with only a minor injury and minor damage to their vehicles.

2. (U) DETAILS:

(SBU) On 07 September, a security escort request was submitted to the Regional Security Office (RSO) Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to escort three PRT Baghdad members and their interpreter (hereinafter, the &Principals8) to a 09 September meeting at the Amanant Municipal Building (grid coordinates (hereinafter referred to as the &Venue8). A departure time of 1000 from PRT Baghdad (grid coordinates) was requested with a return time of 1330 hours. Pursuant to

the RSO TOC requested a

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B. (U) Approval and Assignment of RSO Security Assets

1. (SBU) On 08 September the security escort request was approved by the RSO High Threat Division (HTD) after a

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standard evaluation including the review of the

The following RSO PSD assets were assigned by HTD to provide protection to the PRT Baghdad Principals:

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--(SBU) Additionally, the following Tactical Security Teams were on stand-by to provide for a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) if required.

C. (U) Details of Incident

1. (SBU) The following has been compiled from debriefings of the security personnel involved, a review of their statements and reports, and the RSO TOC event log. All times are approximate.

2. (SBU) At 0945 hours, [] arrived at the Venue and conducted an advance security sweep with [] and pre-posted security personnel.

After this deployment of personnel, the [] shift-leader reported to the RSO TOC that the Venue was secure for the arrival of

3. (SBU) At 1020 hours, [] departed the PRT Baghdad and arrived at the Venue at 1029 hours without incident. The Principals were escorted to a meeting located on the seventh floor of the building.

4. (SBU) At 1040 hours, the [] shift-leader reported to the RSO TOC of having received Small Arms Fire (SAF). The [] of the building reported receiving one round of SAF impacting in their vicinity. The origin of the round could not be determined from the [] unit. In response to the report of SAF, [] shift-leader instructed [] to cancel the meeting and move the Principals to their vehicles. While [] was escorting their Principals to their vehicles, [] personnel observed the Venue's local security personnel putting on their body armor and distributing AK-47s (NFI).

5. (SBU) At 1048 hours, the [] reported additional SAF originating from the vicinity of the intersections commonly referred to as [] and

6. (SBU) At 1050 hours, the [] shift leader reported the SAF had ceased. The RSO TOC first directed that [] and remain at the venue. [] responded that

[] was loaded in their vehicles and prepared to depart, and that [] could cover their departure. Additionally, [] reported that RSO Air Assets were on site to escort [] back to the IZ. RSO TOC granted that request and instructed [] to depart following [] RSO TOC instructed [] to secure the intersection of [] on the west side of the river, to help clear [] path across Bridge [] safely departed the Venue without encountering further gunfire. Following the departure of [], all [] members returned to their vehicles and prepared to depart.

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7. (SBU) On departure, [] observed a number of Iraqi Army (IA) vehicles heading northbound in front of the Venue (note: this convoy was not engaged in the incident) and after traveling approximately 300 meters from the venue, [] heard an explosion in the vicinity of the Venue. [] continued to the IZ without further incident supported by RSO Air Assets.

8. (SBU) After the departure of [], started receiving a large volume of SAF directed at them from across the street (west) to include multiple rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). [] responded by maneuvering in their vehicles to [] behind the Venue (note: still within the confines of the Venue), and reported their situation to the RSO TOC.

9. (SBU) In response to this contact, RSO TOC directed [] to secure the intersection commonly referred to as [] immediately south of the venue.

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10. (SBU) [] moved from [] and arrived at the Venue and placed its vehicles between the Venue and the direction of the principal threat (coming from across the street, west of the Venue). At approximately 1105 hours, [] reported to the RSO TOC of being engaged by heavy SAF and multiple grenades from gunmen located in multiple locations outside the Venue, with the heaviest concentration of gunfire coming from an area just across the street from the entrance/exit to the Venue (west). One grenade detonated near the rear passenger side of their Command Vehicle (CV) (minor damage). [] engaged visible gunman to their north and south using their []

[] also engaged gunmen firing at them from rooftops and windows from four buildings immediately to their west. Approximately 10 gunmen were observed firing AK-47,s on their position over the short walls on top of these buildings and another five gunmen observed firing from positions in windows located on the top floors of the buildings. [] also reported being engaged by SAF from the intersection commonly referred to as [] where gunman were firing on their position from windows located on the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building (northeast corner of this intersection).

11. (SBU) [] arrived at the intersection known as [] and were immediately engaged by SAF. [] observed gunmen firing on their position from the rooftops of a Mosque just north of [] a round building northwest of [] a large building southeast of [] and a large building southwest of []. There were approximately three gunmen per rooftop armed with AK-47,s and belt-fed machine guns.

Additionally, there were 4-5 gunmen firing from windows of the fourth and fifth floors of each of these buildings. [redacted] returned fire with their issued weapons at all visible gunmen.

12. (SBU) Supported by [redacted] departed the Venue in their vehicles heading south towards the intersection of [redacted]. On departure, they were engaged by heavy SAF and RPG fire in front of the Venue. [redacted] turned west at [redacted] where [redacted] was providing security and headed to the IZ across [redacted] followed by [redacted].

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13. (SBU) After the departure from [redacted] arrived from the north at the intersection of [redacted] and observed [redacted] departing the area heading south then west through intersection [redacted]. Due to unreliable communications, [redacted] continued south towards the Venue, then briefly stopped in front of the entrance/exit at the Venue to determine if any other RSO teams were still at the Venue. Seeing no other RSO teams, [redacted] continued south to the intersection of [redacted]. They received constant SAF in this area but did not return fire. [redacted] had the intersection blocked which enabled them to follow [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] and the IZ.

14. (SBU) [redacted] having secured intersection [redacted], followed [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] and the IZ.

D. (U) Injuries and Damage

(SBU) [redacted]: Personnel: No injuries. Vehicles: Minor damage

(SBU) [redacted]: Personnel: The Shift-Leader received minor shrapnel wound to his left-calf; Vehicles: Minor Damage.

(SBU) [redacted]: Personnel: No Injuries. Vehicles: Minor Damage

(SBU) [redacted]: Personnel: No Injuries. Vehicles: No Damage

E. (U) Preliminary Findings Regarding EOF

(SBU) Preliminary analysis of the Escalation of Force (EOF) by RSO PSD personnel for this incident reflects the EOF was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

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INCIDENT REPORT
This report may be in addition to DS, SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 09 Sept 07
Location:
Task Order: 6
Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti
Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 09 Sept 07
Time of Incident: 1048
Contractor Involved: Blackwater
Detail Location of Incident: Amanant City Hall
Personnel Involved:

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Incident Synopsis: On 9 Sept 07 at 1048 hours, [redacted], an Advance Team providing support for [redacted] at Amanant City Hall, reported their [redacted] receiving small arms fire (SAF) while [redacted] of the venue. Upon receipt of the SAF [redacted] their principals to a secure location within the compound. Responding Tactical Support Teams (TSTs) were engaged with SAF and RPG from multiple locations surrounding the venue and returned fire. With assistance from RSO Air Assets all teams were able to break contact and return to the IZ without further incident. There was minor damage to several TST vehicles consisting of SAF hits and peripheral blast damage. One CoM TST member received minor shrapnel wounds to his left leg and is being evaluated by medical personnel.

Outline injuries if applicable: Minor left leg shrapnel wounds to one TST member

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief



Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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City Hall Engagement

09 Sep 2007

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The Overall Classification is SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED



Contents

- Statements of Events
- Maps and Locations
- Imagery
- Recent activity and threats to area
- Analysis and Conclusion

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Statement of Events

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CONFIDENTIAL



Reference for Statement of Events

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03/15/2011



Arrival on Venue

On 09Sep07, [REDACTED] was assigned to escort a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Baghdad Amanat City Hall [REDACTED] for a routine meeting. [REDACTED], with [REDACTED] assets, was assigned to secure the venue in advance of the meeting and to facilitate [REDACTED] arrival to venue. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] arrived on venue via [REDACTED] at approximately 0930 without incident, and reported no suspicious activity while securing the building. [REDACTED] informed the TOC that the site was secure for [REDACTED] arrival. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] arrived on venue, via [REDACTED] at approximately 1030; The PRT principals entered the building and began their meeting without incident. [REDACTED]

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✓



RSQ:JOC instructed [redacted] to return to base (RTB), but [redacted] did not want to expose the
[redacted]to small arms fire on the shallow roof by moving them during a firefight.;
advised [redacted] to extract their principals during a lull in fire, and the [redacted]
[redacted] ;;; (for the extraction. [redacted]

At 1054, Tactical Support Team (TST) _____ departed _____ in order to lock down the intersection of _____ for _____ while TST _____ staged at _____.

RSQ Aviation arrived on station, allowing [redacted] to exfiltrate the venue without incident. [redacted] turned North out of the venue towards [redacted], then west at [redacted] towards Bridge One. [redacted] turned west at [redacted] the follow turret gunner reported explosions behind their convoy, i/o Amanat City Hall.

returned to the International Zone without further incident.



Secondary Contact

At 1103, as [] was turning west at [] reported that Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were donning protective gear and distributing AK-47s. Not knowing if this action was friendly or hostile, [] requested TST support during departure from venue. [] then departed [] en route to venue in direct support of [] extraction.

As [] approached venue from [] enemy elements began an assault on venue with multiple RPG rounds and a large volume of small arms fire. [] repositioned their vehicles on the east side of City Hall, seeking standoff and cover from the RPGs and SAF. [] halted their convoy between the enemy fire and [] position, allowing [] to begin their extraction process.

While [] maneuvered to exit the venue compound, [] received RPG fire, grenades and SAF. One grenade or RPG detonated immediately behind the [] Command Vehicle, causing 1 x BW WIA. [] personnel identified and engaged numerous enemy combatants firing AK-47s on the buildings to the west, north and south of the venue.

At 1105, [] crossed Bridge [] to secure [], and [] crossed Bridge [] to secure []



[] Extraction

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Upon arrival at [] was immediately engaged by enemy combatants from 4 of the 5 major buildings surround [] most notably including the mosque on the northern point of [] the old MO Commerce building on the Western point of [] and [] Ministry of Justice Building to the Southeast. Turret gunners were able to PID approximately 2-3 enemy combatants on each rooftop, and approximately 4-8 additional gunmen firing from multiple windows in each of these buildings. [] defended their motorcade by engaging the combatants as [] and [] prepared to depart venue to their northwest.

[] departed venue and turned south towards [] as they were departing, 2 RPGs streaked behind their motorcade, but did not hit their vehicles. [] followed closely behind [] continuing to defend the convoy as they broke contact.

[] and [] were engaged by the enemy at [] as they turned west towards [] bridge.



Breaking Contact

During the engagement, all [] teams experienced a significant degradation in communication, and were often unable to communicate with each other or to RSO TOC....

[] had virtually no communication with the other teams once they approached [] and [] had similar communication issues once they crossed Bridge [] to []: As [] approached [] they turned south as [] and [] were moving towards []: Due to this radio degradation, [] did not know which teams if any were still on venue; so they continued south towards [] and were immediately engaged by the enemy elements west of venue. Receiving heavy volume of SAF fired on their [] motorcade, [] halted briefly in order to scan the venue for remaining [] elements. Seeing no other teams, [] continued south to [] and encountered additional SAF from the MO Commerce building.

At 1112, [] turned west at [], then held their position west of the traffic circle in order to support [] follow-on departure from [] and [] then departed [] together, following [] and [] onto Bridge []

[] received additional SAF from an area southeast of Bridge [] but that combatant was quickly neutralized. At 1115, all 4 teams crossed Bridge [] without further incident.




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Routes and Locations

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Routes and Engagements



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Legend

— Route to Venue

- - - Route to IZ

○ Enemy Combatants

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Legend:


Route to Venue

Route to IZ

Enemy Combatants



Routes and Engagements



Legend:

Route to Venue


Route to IZ

Enemy Combatants

03 4 5 7 10 11




Routes and Engagements




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


Routes and Engagements



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Legend:


Route to Venue

Route to IZ


Enemy Combatants



All Engagement Areas



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
from City Hall

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


In Front of City Hall, looking West





In Front of City Hall, looking North-West






In Front of Water Building, looking South-West




In Front of Water Building, looking West







In Front of Water Building, looking West





In Front of Water Building, Looking North-West



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


In Front of Water Building, looking North-Northwest





View of Shallow Roof





Recent Activity and Threats

03/14/08 10:00

03/14/08 10:00




Recent Threats

- In the past year, there have been numerous reports indicating a strong sniper presence in vicinity of Amanat City Hall.
- Several Chief of Mission teams have reported SAF activity directed at venue, including a very similar 23May07 incident that resulted in numerous RPGs fired at [REDACTED]
- There have been strong indicators in the past of enemy intent to kill or capture US personnel at Amanat City Hall and PSD teams are continuously advised to remain extra vigilant while on venue.
- In general, recent activity indicates a strong desire for enemy organizations to kidnap US personnel for propaganda purposes.

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Enemy Activity 15 days prior to 09SEP07



03 JUL 08 10 30



- During the 15 days prior to the engagement, there was a heavy surge of enemy activity to the north of the venue, but few incidents within 300m.
- Friendly military operations north of venue had increased the amount of direct fire activity on the periphery of the operation, as enemy combatants sought to attack coalition forces.

A 5x5 grid of dots forming the number 97030. The dots are arranged in a pattern that resembles the digits 9, 7, 0, 3, and 0.

Las Vegas, NV



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Analysis and Conclusion

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Analysis

1. Who were the enemy combatants?
2. What was their goal?
3. Is this a new TTP?
4. Why wasn't attacked while leaving venue?

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Analysis

1. Who were the enemy combatants?

- Elements of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) most likely perpetrated this attack
- The surrounding neighborhood is mostly Shia
- The majority of staff are Shia and many have JAM affiliations
- The two mosques in vicinity of the compound are Shia
- Threat reporting has indicated JAM elements operate in the neighborhoods and mosques surrounding the City Hall
- Sunni elements would not be allowed to operate freely in a JAM controlled neighborhood, nor would they have the logistical support required to set up an ambush with a large number of fighters
- Rival Shia groups would also not be allowed to operate in a JAM controlled neighborhood



Analysis

2. What was their goal?

- Most likely: JAM combatants were attempting to kill or capture US personnel for propaganda or for ransom
- Media attention would likely result in additional funding from high level (possibly foreign) financiers
- A successful kill or capture would legitimize the element ("street creds")
- Killing or capturing US personnel would garner negative media attention in the United States and put additional pressure on the Bush Administration to withdraw troops.
- Capturing contractors can be financially lucrative
- Other possibilities: Orders from Muqtada al-Sadr to freeze all operations, followed by contradictory orders from other leaders to continue operations may have led to a "target of opportunity" attack in lieu of solid guidance




Analysis

3. Is this a new TTP?

- No it is not new, but the overall attack plan has evolved.

- On 23 May 2007, enemy combatants attempted a similar ambush at the same venue, using RPGs and SAF to attack [] and []

- This attack demonstrated an expansion of enemy fighting positions, indicating they learned from their previous attempt



- There are reasons to believe the combatants in the 23 May attack were attempting to push [] back into the building for a secondary attack; however, [] got into their vehicles and departed venue

- The presence of combatants directly west of the venue indicates a more robust attempt at pinning down the teams



Analysis

4. Why wasn't [] attacked while leaving venue?


a. The enemy combatants were not yet set up with RPGs due to hasty departure

b. []

was not the intended victim

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Conclusion

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.....
.....

- As this is the 2nd significant attack on CoM affiliated personnel on venue in 4 months, followed by months of threats intimating these attacks, RSO assesses this venue will remain unfriendly and follow-on attacks will likely occur.
 - Teams on this venue have done an excellent job of maintaining situational awareness, and this hyper-vigilance must be maintained in order to continue to extract all personnel safely.

\$PROVACA (P)

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)		BLACKWATER		Date/Time of Statement 10 September 2007/0800 hours	
Name [redacted] b6 b7C		Team [redacted]		Situation [redacted]		Extraction/Small Arms Engagement	
Location/Venue Amanat City Hall		Time Occurred 1048 hours		Date Occurred 09 Sept 2007			

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b7C
00135

Incident Report BW 09 September 2007(1) Weapons Discharge Baghdad

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, [redacted] activities during a small arms engagement on Route [redacted], adjacent to Amanat City Hall (grid) [redacted]. This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. [redacted] personnel involved in this incident included the following:

b7E, F
b6
b7C

On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0730 hours, [redacted] conducted a pre-mission brief at [redacted] staging area. The brief began with intelligence passed on from the team intelligence representative which was received from the imbedded intelligence analyst for [redacted] Detail. Rules of engagement and escalation of force were briefed per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy by [redacted] Shift Leader (SL), [redacted]. The vehicle configuration for the day was [redacted]

b7E, F


At approximately 1050 hours, [redacted] was staged at the Crossed Swords in support of multiple PSD team's operating in the Red Zone. At this time, a distress call came over [redacted] radio channel to the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) from [redacted] that their [redacted] were receiving small arms fire on venue. [redacted] was the advance team for [redacted] at Amanat City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] was ordered by the TOC to lock down the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]

[redacted] exited the International Zone (IZ) via Checkpoint [redacted]. En-route to [redacted] requested the immediate assistance of TST on venue. [redacted] advised the TOC that a large number of Local National (LN) males were gathering body armor and AK-47's just outside the venue. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was in the process of departing venue with their principals, however, they were receiving a large volume of gun fire along with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). [redacted] approached [redacted] venue from the north on Route [redacted], and [redacted] SL placed the TST vehicles near the entrance of the venue between the threats and the team to allow [redacted] to safely depart the venue.

Upon coming to a complete stop in front of the venue, [redacted] was engaged by heavy small arms fire and multiple grenades. One grenade detonated near the rear passenger side of the Command Vehicle (Bear Cat). Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [redacted] personnel engaged visible targets using Department of State issued [redacted]

[redacted] SL immediately advised the TOC via [redacted] that [redacted] was being engaged by multiple gunmen. The heaviest concentration of enemy gunfire was coming from the west side of Route [redacted] directly across from the venue. [redacted] engaged hostile individuals who were firing at them from rooftops and windows of the four buildings immediately to the teams west, directly in front of the venue's exit. [redacted] turret PSS observed approximately 10 gunmen holding their AK-47's over the short walls on top of the buildings and firing at [redacted] motorcade. Approximately five gunmen were also visible

[redacted] b6 b7C

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)				Date/Time of Statement 10 September 2007/0800 hours	
Name <u>b6 b7C</u>		Team <u> </u>		Situation Extraction/Small Arms Engagement			
Location/Venue Amanat City Hall		Time Occurred 1048 hours		Date Occurred 09Sept2007			

throughout various windows located on the top floors of the four buildings to the west of [redacted] motorcade.

[redacted] was also being engaged by small arms fire from the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. Approximately five gunmen were observed shooting from the windows located on the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building on the northeast corner of the intersection known as [redacted].

[redacted] made communications, via hand held radio with the [redacted] SL and coordinated [redacted] departure from venue and the route to be used. As [redacted] departed the venue, [redacted] SL gave the order to break contact and follow directly behind [redacted] south toward [redacted]. There was constant enemy gun fire directed at [redacted] along Route [redacted] while departing the area. (TST) had locked down the intersection of [redacted] and was receiving small arms fire at that traffic circle. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details relative to this incident. While [redacted] was following [redacted] across Bridge [redacted] was again engaged by small arms fire. The small arms fire was received from approximately three gunmen who were located south of Bridge [redacted] on a roof top. As [redacted] were traveling west from [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] they were stopped due to heavy traffic congestion. [redacted] in order to clear lanes for the Chief of Mission PSD vehicles to get through.

[redacted] returned to the IZ through Checkpoint [redacted] without further incident. The [redacted] SL [redacted] received a minor shrapnel wound to the left calf, and the Command Vehicle sustained minor damage due to small arms fire and a grenade attack. [redacted] was advised to return to [redacted] parking lot to inspect the Bear Cat and treat the individual wounded. All parties were apprised of the complete details of this incident.

It should be noted that while in route to [redacted] venue, [redacted] Command Vehicle (Bearcat) was experiencing serious mechanical problems. The Bearcat tactical vehicle used by TST shut down several times while en route, causing power steering and anything electrical to fail to include radio communications. This occurred approximately 10 times before arriving at [redacted] position, causing a delay in our response to the emergency and endangering the team during the engagement.///END///

[redacted] b6
b7C 03115507030

00136

(P)
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b7C

Date 9 Sep 2007	Time Approx. 1330 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, , hereby make the following statement at the request of , who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident

I, was assigned as a during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, activities during a small arms engagement on Route adjacent to Amanat City Hall (). This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. personnel involved in this incident included the following:

On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0730 hours, conducted a pre-mission brief at staging area. The brief began with intelligence passed on from the team intelligence representative which was received from the imbedded intelligence analyst for Detail. Rules of engagement and escalation of force were briefed per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy by Shift Leader (SL) The vehicle configuration for the day was

At approximately 1050 hours, was staged at the Crossed Swords in support of multiple PSD team's operating in the Red Zone. At this time, a distress call came over radio channel

03:15:00:00

to the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) from [redacted] that their [redacted] were receiving small arms fire on venue. [redacted] was the advance team for [redacted] at Amman City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] was ordered by the TOC to lock down the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted] b7E, F

[redacted] exited the International Zone (IZ) via Checkpoint [redacted] En-route to [redacted] requested the immediate assistance of TST on venue. [redacted] advised the TOC that a large number of Local National (LN) males were gathering body armor and AK-47's just outside the venue. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was in the process of departing venue with their principals, however, they were receiving a large volume of gun fire along with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). [redacted] approached [redacted] venue from the north on Route [redacted] and [redacted] SL placed the TST vehicles near the entrance of the venue between the threats and the team to allow [redacted] to safely depart the venue. ↓

Upon coming to a complete stop in front of the venue, [redacted] was engaged by heavy small arms fire and multiple grenades. One grenade detonated near the rear passenger side of the Command Vehicle (Bear Cat). Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [redacted] personnel engaged visible targets using Department of State issued [redacted] b7E, F

[redacted] SL immediately advised the TOC via [redacted] that [redacted] was being engaged by multiple gunmen. The heaviest concentration of enemy gunfire was coming from the west side of Route [redacted] directly across from the venue. [redacted] engaged hostile individuals who were firing at them from rooftops and windows of the four buildings immediately to the teams west, directly in front of the venue's exit. [redacted] turret PSS observed approximately 10 gunmen holding their AK-47's over the short walls on top of the buildings and firing at [redacted] motorcade. Approximately five gunmen were also visible throughout various windows located on the top floors of the four buildings to the west of [redacted] motorcade. ↓

[redacted] was also being engaged by small arms fire from the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. Approximately five gunmen were observed shooting from the windows located on the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building on the northeast corner of the intersection known as [redacted]

[redacted] made communications, via hand held radio with the [redacted] SL and coordinated [redacted] departure from venue and the route to be used. As [redacted] departed the venue, [redacted] SL gave the order to break contact and follow directly behind [redacted] south toward [redacted]. There was constant enemy gun fire directed at [redacted] along Route [redacted] while departing the area. [redacted] (TST) had locked down the intersection of [redacted] and was receiving small arms fire at that traffic circle. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details relative to this incident. While [redacted] was following [redacted] across Bridge [redacted] was again engaged by small arms fire. The small arms fire was received from approximately three gunmen who were located south of Bridge [redacted] on a roof top. As [redacted] were traveling west from [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] they were stopped due to heavy traffic congestion. [redacted] in order to clear lanes for the Chief of Mission PSD vehicles to get through. ↓ b7E, F

03:15:00:10:30

[redacted] returned to the IZ through Checkpoint [redacted] without further incident. The [redacted] received a minor shrapnel wound to the left calf, and the Command Vehicle sustained minor damage due to small arms fire and a grenade attack. [redacted] was advised to return to parking lot to inspect the Bear Cat and treat the individual wounded. All parties were apprised of the complete details of this incident. b6 b7C

It should be noted that while in route to [redacted] venue, [redacted] Command Vehicle (Bearcat) was experiencing serious mechanical problems. The Bearcat tactical vehicle used by TST shut down several times while en route, causing power steering and anything electrical to fail to include radio communications. This occurred approximately 10 times before arriving at [redacted] position, causing a delay in our response to the emergency and endangering the team during the engagement.///END/// b6, F ↓

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[redacted]
Printed	[redacted]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

 b6 b7C

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	Mario A. Rite

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

03 JUL 2007 10:30

(P)

b7E,F
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00137

Date 9 Sep 2007	Time Approx. 1330 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, [redacted] ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement at the request of Merid A. Reta, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident ^{b6}_{b7C}

I, [redacted] was assigned as a [redacted] during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, [redacted] activities during a small arms engagement on Route [redacted] adjacent to Amanat City Hall ([redacted]). This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. [redacted] personnel involved in this incident included the following:

[Redacted area]

On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0730 hours, I [redacted] conducted a pre-mission brief at [redacted] staging area. The brief began with intelligence passed on from the team intelligence representative which was received from the imbedded intelligence analyst for [redacted] Detail. Rules of engagement and escalation of force were briefed per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy by [redacted] Shift Leader (SL), [redacted]. The vehicle configuration for the day was [redacted]

[Redacted area]

At approximately 1050 hours, [redacted] was staged at the Crossed Swords in support of multiple PSD team's operating in the Red Zone. At this time, a distress call came over [redacted] radio channel

[redacted]

to the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) from [redacted] that their [redacted] were receiving small arms fire on venue. [redacted] was the advance team for [redacted] at Amanat City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] was ordered by the TOC to lock down the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted].

[redacted] exited the International Zone (IZ) via Checkpoint [redacted]. En-route to [redacted] requested the immediate assistance of TST on venue. [redacted] advised the TOC that a large number of Local National (LN) males were gathering body armor and AK-47's just outside the venue. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was in the process of departing venue with their principals, however, they were receiving a large volume of gun fire along with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). [redacted] approached [redacted] venue from the north on Route [redacted], and [redacted] SL placed the TST vehicles near the entrance of the venue between the threats and the team to allow [redacted] to safely depart the venue.

Upon coming to a complete stop in front of the venue, [redacted] was engaged by heavy small arms fire and multiple grenades. One grenade detonated near the rear passenger side of the Command Vehicle (Bear Cat). Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [redacted] personnel engaged visible targets using Department of State issued [redacted].

[redacted] SL immediately advised the TOC via [redacted] that [redacted] was being engaged by multiple gunmen. The heaviest concentration of enemy gunfire was coming from the west side of Route [redacted] directly across from the venue. [redacted] engaged hostile individuals who were firing at them from rooftops and windows of the four buildings immediately to the teams west, directly in front of the venue's exit. [redacted] turret PSS observed approximately 10 gunmen holding their AK-47's over the short walls on top of the buildings and firing at [redacted] motorcade. Approximately five gunmen were also visible throughout various windows located on the top floors of the four buildings to the west of [redacted] motorcade.

[redacted] was also being engaged by small arms fire from the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. Approximately five gunmen were observed shooting from the windows located on the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building on the northeast corner of the intersection known as [redacted].

[redacted] made communications, via hand held radio with the [redacted] SL and coordinated Team departure from venue and the route to be used. As [redacted] departed the venue, [redacted] SL gave the order to break contact and follow directly behind [redacted] south toward [redacted]. There was constant enemy gun fire directed at [redacted] along Route [redacted] while departing the area. [redacted] TST) had locked down the intersection of [redacted] and was receiving small arms fire at that traffic circle. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details relative to this incident. While [redacted] was following [redacted] across Bridge [redacted] was again engaged by small arms fire. The small arms fire was received from approximately three gunmen who were located south of Bridge [redacted] on a roof top. As Teams [redacted] were traveling west from [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] they were stopped due to heavy traffic congestion. [redacted] in order to clear lanes for the Chief of Mission PSD vehicles to get through.

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_____ returned to the IZ through Checkpoint _____ without further incident. The _____ SL _____ received a minor shrapnel wound to the left calf, and the Command Vehicle sustained minor damage due to small arms fire and a grenade attack. _____ was advised to return to _____ parking lot to inspect the Bear Cat and treat the individual wounded. All parties were apprised of the complete details of this incident.

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b7E, F
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It should be noted that while in route to _____ venue, _____ Command Vehicle (Bearcat) was experiencing serious mechanical problems. The Bearcat tactical vehicle used by TST shut down several times while en route, causing power steering and anything electrical to fail to include radio communications. This occurred approximately 10 times before arriving at _____ position, causing a delay in our response to the emergency and endangering the team during the engagement.///END///

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Redacted Signature]
Printed	[Redacted Name]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	Mario A. Pate

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

03110007030

(P)
b7E, F
b6
b7C

ORD 002509

I, ^{b6}
^{b7c}, hereby make the following statement at the request of
Mario A. Rota, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

Incident

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, _____ activities during a small arms engagement on Route _____ adjacent to Amanat City Hall _____. This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. _____ personnel involved in this incident included the following) _____

On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0730 hours, [] conducted a pre-mission brief at [] staging area. The brief began with intelligence passed on from the team intelligence representative which was received from the imbedded intelligence analyst for [] Detail. Rules of engagement and escalation of force were briefed per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy by [], Shift Leader (SL), []. The vehicle configuration for the day was [].

At approximately 1050 hours, [redacted] was staged at the Crossed Swords in support of multiple PSD team's operating in the Red Zone. At this time, a distress call came over [redacted] radio channel

b7E, F

to the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) from [redacted] that their [redacted] were receiving small arms fire on venue. [redacted] was the advance team for [redacted] at Amanat City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] was ordered by the TOC to lock down the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]

[redacted] exited the International Zone (IZ) via Checkpoint [redacted] En-route to [redacted] requested the immediate assistance of TST on venue. [redacted] advised the TOC that a large number of Local National (LN) males were gathering body armor and AK-47's just outside the venue. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was in the process of departing venue with their principals, however, they were receiving a large volume of gun fire along with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). [redacted] approached [redacted] venue from the north on Route [redacted] and [redacted] SL placed the TST vehicles near the entrance of the venue between the threats and the team to allow [redacted] to safely depart the venue.

Upon coming to a complete stop in front of the venue, [redacted] was engaged by heavy small arms fire and multiple grenades. One grenade detonated near the rear passenger side of the Command Vehicle (Bear Cat). Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [redacted] personnel engaged visible targets using Department of State issued [redacted]

[redacted] SL immediately advised the TOC via [redacted] that [redacted] was being engaged by multiple gunmen. The heaviest concentration of enemy gunfire was coming from the west side of Route [redacted] directly across from the venue. [redacted] engaged hostile individuals who were firing at them from rooftops and windows of the four buildings immediately to the teams west, directly in front of the venue's exit. [redacted] turret PSS observed approximately 10 gunmen holding their AK-47's over the short walls on top of the buildings and firing at [redacted] motorcade. Approximately five gunmen were also visible throughout various windows located on the top floors of the four buildings to the west of [redacted] motorcade.

[redacted] was also being engaged by small arms fire from the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. Approximately five gunmen were observed shooting from the windows located on the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building on the northeast corner of the intersection known as [redacted]



[redacted] made communications, via hand held radio with the [redacted] SL and coordinated Team departure from venue and the route to be used. As [redacted] departed the venue, [redacted] SL gave the order to break contact and follow directly behind [redacted] south toward [redacted]. There was constant enemy gun fire directed at [redacted] along Route [redacted] while departing the area. [redacted] (TST) had locked down the intersection of [redacted] and was receiving small arms fire at that traffic circle. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details relative to this incident. While [redacted] was following [redacted] across Bridge [redacted] was again engaged by small arms fire. The small arms fire was received from approximately three gunmen who were located south of Bridge [redacted] on a roof top. As [redacted] and [redacted] were traveling west from [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] they were stopped due to heavy traffic congestion. [redacted] in order to clear lanes for the Chief of Mission PSD vehicles to get through.

_____ returned to the IZ through Checkpoint _____ without further incident. The _____ SL _____ received a minor shrapnel wound to the left calf, and the Command Vehicle sustained minor damage due to small arms fire and a grenade attack. _____ was advised to return to _____ parking lot to inspect the Bear Cat and treat the individual wounded. All parties were apprised of the complete details of this incident.

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
It should be noted that while in route to _____ venue, _____ Command Vehicle (Bearcat) was experiencing serious mechanical problems. The Bearcat tactical vehicle used by TST shut down several times while en route, causing power steering and anything electrical to fail to include radio communications. This occurred approximately 10 times before arriving at _____ position, causing a delay in our response to the emergency and endangering the team during the engagement. ///END///


I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	Marie A. Reta
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE	

Witness Signature	
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

b6
b7c

CRD 0250

I, [redacted]^{b6}_{b7c}, hereby make the following statement at the request of
Nicolas A. Rost, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

Incident

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, [redacted] activities during a small arms engagement on Route [redacted] adjacent to Amanat City Hall ([redacted]). This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. [redacted] personnel involved in this incident included the following: [redacted]

At approximately 1050 hours, [redacted] was staged at the Crossed Swords in support of multiple PSD team's operating in the Red Zone. At this time, a distress call came over [redacted] radio channel

to the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) from [redacted] that they [redacted] were receiving small arms fire on venue. [redacted] was the advance team for [redacted] at Afmanat City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] was ordered by the TOC to lock down the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]

b7c, F

[redacted] exited the International Zone (IZ) via Checkpoint [redacted]. En-route to [redacted] requested the immediate assistance of TST on venue. [redacted] advised the TOC that a large number of Local National (LN) males were gathering body armor and AK-47's just outside the venue. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was in the process of departing venue with their principals, however, they were receiving a large volume of gun fire along with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). [redacted] approached [redacted] venue from the north on Route [redacted], and [redacted] SL placed the TST vehicles near the entrance of the venue between the threats and the team to allow [redacted] to safely depart the venue.

Upon coming to a complete stop in front of the venue, [redacted] was engaged by heavy small arms fire and multiple grenades. One grenade detonated near the rear passenger side of the Command Vehicle (Bear Cat). Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [redacted] personnel engaged visible targets using Department of State issued [redacted]

[redacted] SL immediately advised the TOC via DPD that [redacted] was being engaged by multiple gunmen. The heaviest concentration of enemy gunfire was coming from the west side of Route [redacted], directly across from the venue. [redacted] engaged hostile individuals who were firing at them from rooftops and windows of the four buildings immediately to the teams west, directly in front of the venue's exit. [redacted] turret PSS observed approximately 10 gunmen holding their AK-47's over the short walls on top of the buildings and firing at [redacted] motorcade. Approximately five gunmen were also visible throughout various windows located on the top floors of the four buildings to the west of [redacted] motorcade.

[redacted] was also being engaged by small arms fire from the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. Approximately five gunmen were observed shooting from the windows located on the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building on the northeast corner of the intersection known as [redacted]

[redacted] made communications, via hand held radio with the [redacted] SL and coordinated Team [redacted] departure from venue and the route to be used. As [redacted] departed the venue, [redacted] SL gave the order to break contact and follow directly behind [redacted] south toward [redacted]. There was constant enemy gun fire directed at [redacted] along Route [redacted] while departing the area. [redacted] (TST) had locked down the intersection of [redacted] and was receiving small arms fire at that traffic circle. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details relative to this incident. While [redacted] was following [redacted] across Bridge [redacted] was again engaged by small arms fire. The small arms fire was received from approximately three gunmen who were located south of Bridge [redacted] on a roof top. As Teams [redacted] were traveling west from [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] they were stopped due to heavy traffic congestion. [redacted] in order to clear lanes for the Chief of Mission PSD vehicles to get through.

_____ returned to the IZ through Checkpoint _____ without further incident. The _____ SL _____ received a minor shrapnel wound to the left calf and the Command Vehicle sustained minor damage due to small arms fire and a grenade attack. _____ was advised to return to _____ parking lot to inspect the Bear Cat and treat the individual wounded. All parties were apprised of the complete details of this incident.

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
It should be noted that while in route to _____ venue, _____ Command Vehicle (Bearcat) was experiencing serious mechanical problems. The Bearcat tactical vehicle used by TST shut down several times while en route, causing power steering and anything electrical to fail to include radio communications. This occurred approximately 10 times before arriving at _____ position, causing a delay in our response to the emergency and endangering the team during the engagement.///END///

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

b6
b7C

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	Mario A. Pelt

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

(D)
b7E, F
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00140

Date 9 Sep 2007	Time Approx. 1830 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement at the request of Mario A. Reta who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident ^{b6}_{b7C}

I, was assigned as a during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, activities during a small arms engagement on Route adjacent to Amanat City Hall . This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. personnel involved in this incident included the following:

On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0730 hours, conducted a pre-mission brief at staging area. The brief began with intelligence passed on from the team intelligence representative which was received from the imbedded intelligence analyst for Detail. Rules of engagement and escalation of force were briefed per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy by Shift Leader (SL), . The vehicle configuration for the day was

At approximately 1050 hours, was staged at the Crossed Swords in support of multiple PSD team's operating in the Red Zone. At this time, a distress call came over radio channel

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to the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) from [redacted] that they were receiving small arms fire on venue. [redacted] was the advance team for [redacted] at Amanat City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] was ordered by the TOC to lock down the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted].

[redacted] exited the International Zone (IZ) via Checkpoint [redacted]. En-route to [redacted] requested the immediate assistance of TST on venue. [redacted] advised the TOC that a large number of Local National (LN) males were gathering body armor and AK-47's just outside the venue. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was in the process of departing venue with their principals, however, they were receiving a large volume of gun fire along with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). [redacted] approached [redacted] venue from the north on Route [redacted] and [redacted] SL placed the TST vehicles near the entrance of the venue between the threats and the team to allow [redacted] to safely depart the venue.

Upon coming to a complete stop in front of the venue, [redacted] was engaged by heavy small arms fire and multiple grenades. One grenade detonated near the rear passenger side of the Command Vehicle (Bear Cat). Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [redacted] personnel engaged visible targets using Department of State issued [redacted].

[redacted] SL immediately advised the TOC via DPD that [redacted] was being engaged by multiple gunmen. The heaviest concentration of enemy gunfire was coming from the west side of Route [redacted] directly across from the venue. [redacted] engaged hostile individuals who were firing at them from rooftops and windows of the four buildings immediately to the teams west, directly in front of the venue's exit. [redacted] turret PSS observed approximately 10 gunmen holding their AK-47's over the short walls on top of the buildings and firing at [redacted] motorcade. Approximately five gunmen were also visible throughout various windows located on the top floors of the four buildings to the west of [redacted] motorcade.

[redacted] was also being engaged by small arms fire from the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. Approximately five gunmen were observed shooting from the windows located on the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building on the northeast corner of the intersection known as [redacted].

[redacted] made communications, via hand held radio with the [redacted] SL and coordinated Team [redacted] departure from venue and the route to be used. As [redacted] departed the venue, [redacted] SL gave the order to break contact and follow directly behind [redacted] south toward [redacted].

There was constant enemy gun fire directed at [redacted] along Route [redacted] while departing the area. [redacted] (TST) had locked down the intersection of [redacted] and was receiving small arms fire at that traffic circle. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details relative to this incident. While [redacted] was following [redacted] across Bridge [redacted] was again engaged by small arms fire. The small arms fire was received from approximately three gunmen who were located south of Bridge [redacted] on a roof top. As [redacted] were traveling west from [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] they were stopped due to heavy traffic congestion. [redacted] in order to clear lanes for the Chief of Mission PSD vehicles to get through.

_____ returned to the [redacted] through Checkpoint [redacted] without further incident. The [redacted] SL [redacted] received a minor shrapnel wound to the left calf, and the Command Vehicle sustained minor damage due to small arms fire and a grenade attack. [redacted] was advised to return to [redacted] parking lot to inspect the Bear Cat and treat the individual wounded. All parties were apprised of the complete details of this incident.

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It should be noted that while in route to [redacted] venue, [redacted] Command Vehicle (Bearcat) was experiencing serious mechanical problems. The Bearcat tactical vehicle used by TST shut down several times while en route, causing power steering and anything electrical to fail to include radio communications. This occurred approximately 10 times before arriving at [redacted] position, causing a delay in our response to the emergency and endangering the team during the engagement.///END///

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	[Redacted]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	Mario A. Reta

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad ↓ Lisa M. Lopez

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b7E, F



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_____, returned to the _____ through Checkpoint _____ without further incident. The _____ SL _____ received a minor shrapnel wound to the left calf, and the Command Vehicle sustained minor damage due to small arms fire and a grenade attack. _____ was advised to return to parking lot to inspect the Bear Cat and treat the individual wounded. All parties were apprised of the complete details of this incident.

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
It should be noted that while in route to _____ venue, _____ Command Vehicle (Bearcat) was experiencing serious mechanical problems. The Bearcat tactical vehicle used by TST shut down several times while en route, causing power steering and anything electrical to fail to include radio communications. This occurred approximately 10 times before arriving at _____ position, causing a delay in our response to the emergency and endangering the team during the engagement.///END///

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	Mario A. Reta

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

8/20/07

(P)
b7E, F
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Date 9 Sep 2007	Time Approx. 1330 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

UO142

I, ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement at the request of Mario A. Rosta, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident

I, ^{b6}_{b7C}, was assigned as a during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, activities during a small arms engagement on Route adjacent to Amanat City Hall . This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. personnel involved in this incident included the following:

On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0730 hours, conducted a pre-mission brief at staging area. The brief began with intelligence passed on from the team intelligence representative which was received from the imbedded intelligence analyst for Detail. Rules of engagement and escalation of force were briefed per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy by , Shift Leader (SL). The vehicle configuration for the day was

At approximately 1050 hours, was staged at the Crossed Swords in support of multiple PSD team's operating in the Red Zone. At this time, a distress call came over radio channel

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to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) from [redacted] that their [redacted] were receiving small arms fire on venue. [redacted] was the advance team for [redacted] at Arbat City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] was ordered by the TOC to lock down the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]

[redacted] exited the International Zone (IZ) via Checkpoint [redacted]. En-route to [redacted] requested the immediate assistance of TST on venue. [redacted] advised the TOC that a large number of Local National (LN) males were gathering body armor and AK-47's just outside the venue. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was in the process of departing venue with their principals, however, they were receiving a large volume of gun fire along with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). [redacted] approached [redacted] venue from the north on Route [redacted] and [redacted] SL placed the TST vehicles near the entrance of the venue between the threats and the team to allow [redacted] to safely depart the venue.

Upon coming to a complete stop in front of the venue, [redacted] was engaged by heavy small arms fire and multiple grenades. One grenade detonated near the rear passenger side of the Command Vehicle (Bear Cat). Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [redacted] personnel engaged visible targets using Department of State issued [redacted]

[redacted] SL immediately advised the TOC via [redacted] that [redacted] was being engaged by multiple gunmen. The heaviest concentration of enemy gunfire was coming from the west side of Route [redacted] directly across from the venue. [redacted] engaged hostile individuals who were firing at them from rooftops and windows of the four buildings immediately to the teams west, directly in front of the venue's exit. [redacted] turret PSS observed approximately 10 gunmen holding their AK-47's over the short walls on top of the buildings and firing at [redacted] motorcade. Approximately five gunmen were also visible throughout various windows located on the top floors of the four buildings to the west of motorcade.

[redacted] was also being engaged by small arms fire from the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. Approximately five gunmen were observed shooting from the windows located on the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building on the northeast corner of the intersection known as [redacted]

[redacted] made communications, via hand held radio with the [redacted] SL and coordinated Team [redacted] departure from venue and the route to be used. As [redacted] departed the venue, [redacted] SL gave the order to break contact and follow directly behind [redacted] south toward [redacted]. There was constant enemy gun fire directed at [redacted] along Route [redacted] while departing the area. [redacted] (TST) had locked down the intersection of [redacted] and was receiving small arms fire at that traffic circle. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details relative to this incident. While [redacted] was following [redacted] across Bridge [redacted] [redacted] was again engaged by small arms fire. The small arms fire was received from approximately three gunmen who were located south of Bridge [redacted] on a roof top. As [redacted] were traveling west from [redacted] to Bridge [redacted] they were stopped due to heavy traffic congestion. [redacted] in order to clear lanes for the Chief of Mission PSD vehicles to get through.

[redacted] b6 b7c


_____ returned to the _____ Checkpoint _____ without further incident. The _____ SL _____ received a minor shrapnel wound to the left calf, and the Command Vehicle sustained minor damage due to small arms fire and a grenade attack. _____ was advised to return to _____ parking lot to inspect the Bear Cat and treat the individual wounded. All parties were apprised of the complete details of this incident.

It should be noted that while in route to _____ venue, _____ Command Vehicle (Bearcat) was experiencing serious mechanical problems. The Bearcat tactical vehicle used by TST shut down several times while en route, causing power steering and anything electrical to fail to include radio communications. This occurred approximately 10 times before arriving at _____ position, causing a delay in our response to the emergency and endangering the team during the engagement.///END///


I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	Mario A. Peta

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

(P)

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)		Date/Time of Statement 10 September 2007/0800 hours	
Name b6 b7C		Team		Situation Extraction/Small Arms Engagement	
Location/Venue Amanat City Hall		Time Occurred 1048 hours		Date Occurred 09 September 2007	

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Incident Report BW 09-09-07 (1) Weapons Discharge Baghdad

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, activities during a small arms engagement on Route [redacted] adjacent to the Amanat City Hall [redacted]. This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. personnel involved in this incident included the following [redacted]

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On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0830 hrs, [redacted] conducted a pre-mission brief at [redacted] staging area. The mission brief included rules of engagement, firearms policy, escalation of force, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included threat intelligence to include sniper activity, recent small arms attacks, and explosive attacks [redacted] was the primary Tactical Support Team (TST) for the day and [redacted] was on standby as secondary due to the light mission load. The vehicle configuration for the day was [redacted]

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At approximately 1048 hrs, [redacted] heard [redacted] via [redacted] radio notify the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) that their [redacted] were receiving gun fire on venue. [redacted] was an advance team for [redacted] at Amanat City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] advised the TOC that [redacted] was loading their principals and preparing to leave. [redacted] immediately loaded their vehicles at the [redacted] staging area and prepared to assist if required.

A short time later, [redacted] advised they were being engaged by enemy small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades. As [redacted] left venue, [redacted] requested immediate TST support. [redacted] was ordered by the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to deploy and lock down [redacted] in order to be in closer proximity to [redacted] (TST), who was responding to the venue.

[redacted] reported arriving on venue and immediately advised they were being engaged by heavy enemy small arms fire and hand grenades. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details regarding their involvement in this incident. A short time later, the TOC advised [redacted] to respond to the venue from [redacted] by way of bridge [redacted] in order to assist with the extraction of [redacted] approached the venue from the north and immediately came under a heavy enemy small arms attack shortly after traveling south of the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. The enemy small arms fire was directed at [redacted] personnel and vehicles, as evidenced by visible muzzle flashes and bullet impacts hitting around the team. The hostile fire was coming from various windows, rooftops of buildings, and street level locations on the west side of Route [redacted] starting just south of [redacted] through to [redacted]. Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates [redacted] turret and fire team [redacted]

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Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)				Date/Time of Statement	
						10 September 2007/0800 hours	
Name <u> </u> <i>b6 b7c</i>			Team <u> </u>		Situation Extraction/Small Arms Engagement		
Location/Venue Amanat City Hall			Time Occurred 1048 hours		Date Occurred 09 September 2007		

personnel engaged identifiable targets on the west side of route using their Department of State Shift Leader (S/L) immediately reported the contact to the TOC via radio. *b6 b7c*

While traveling south from to observed departing the area south and then west from toward Bridge . Throughout this incident, radio communications with the TOC and between teams was often unintelligible and the status of COM (Chief of Mission) teams on venue became uncertain. stopped in front of Amanat City Hall in order to verify that all COM teams had departed venue. No other COM teams were visible on venue, therefore, continued south toward . There was constant hostile gun fire directed at along Route while departing the immediate area surrounding the venue. (TST) had locked down and was receiving enemy gun fire from buildings surrounding the traffic circle. Reference is made to report for complete details of their involvement in this incident. drove past and onto Bridge held a position on the west end of bridge awaiting departure from . Upon departure, both teams continued west onto bridge breaking contact and departing the immediate danger area. Teams converged on due to heavy traffic congestion. in order to clear lanes for the COM vehicles to get through. All teams entered the International Zone (IZ) through Checkpoint without further incident. *b6 b7c*

 personnel suffered no injuries and no vehicles were damaged as a result of this incident. The TOC advised to go to Checkpoint to continue covering COM teams that would be returning to the IZ. Upon completion of missions, returned to the staging area. All required parties were then apprised of the complete incident details.///END///

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(P)

b7E, F
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Date 9 Sep 2007	Time Approx. 1230 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, , hereby make the following statement at the request of , who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident

I, , was assigned as a during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, activities during a small arms engagement on Route adjacent to the Amanat City Hall . This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. personnel involved in this incident included the following:

On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0830 hrs, conducted a pre-mission brief at staging area. The mission brief included rules of engagement, firearms policy, escalation of force, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included threat intelligence to include sniper activity, recent small arms attacks, and explosive attacks. was the primary Tactical Support Team (TST) for the day and was on standby as secondary due to the light mission load. The vehicle configuration for the day was

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature

Lisa M. Lopez

Printed

Lisa M. Lopez

Address

US Embassy Baghdad

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date 9 Sep 2007	Title Approx. 1330 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, ^{b6}_{b7C}, hereby make the following statement at the request of
_____, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident

I, ^{b6}_{b7C}, was assigned as a during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, activities during a small arms engagement on Route adjacent to the Amanat City Hall. This incident occurred on 09 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. personnel involved in this incident included the following:

On 09 September 2007 at approximately 0830 hrs, conducted a pre-mission brief at staging area. The mission brief included rules of engagement, firearms policy, escalation of force, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included threat intelligence to include sniper activity, recent small arms attacks, and explosive attacks. was the primary Tactical Support Team (TST) for the day and was on standby as secondary due to the light mission load. The vehicle configuration for the day was

At approximately 1048 hrs, [redacted] heard [redacted] via [redacted] radio notify the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) that their [redacted] were receiving gun fire on venue. [redacted] was an advance team for [redacted] at Amanat City Hall. [redacted] was also on venue with their principals. [redacted] advised the TOC that [redacted] was loading their principals and preparing to leave. [redacted] immediately loaded their vehicles at the [redacted] staging area and prepared to assist if required.

A short time later, [redacted] advised they were being engaged by enemy small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades. As [redacted] left venue, [redacted] requested immediate TST support. [redacted] was ordered by the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to deploy and lock down [redacted] in order to be in closer proximity to [redacted], and [redacted] (TST), who was responding to the venue.

[redacted] reported arriving on venue and immediately advised they were being engaged by heavy enemy small arms fire and hand grenades. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details regarding their involvement in this incident. A short time later, the TOC advised [redacted] to respond to the venue from [redacted] by way of bridge [redacted] in order to assist with the extraction of [redacted] approached the venue from the north and immediately came under a heavy enemy small arms attack shortly after traveling south of the intersection commonly referred to as [redacted]. The enemy small arms fire was directed at [redacted] personnel and vehicles, as evidenced by visible muzzle flashes and bullet impacts hitting around the team. The hostile fire was coming from various windows, rooftops of buildings, and street level locations on the west side of Route [redacted] starting just south of [redacted] through to [redacted].

Fearing for their lives and the lives of their teammates, [redacted] turret and fire team personnel engaged identifiable targets on the west side of route Wilde, using their Department of State [redacted] Shift Leader (S/L) [redacted] immediately reported the contact to the TOC via [redacted] radio.

While traveling south from [redacted] to [redacted] observed [redacted] departing the area south and then west from [redacted] toward Bridge [redacted]. Throughout this incident, radio communications with the TOC and between teams was often unintelligible and the status of COM (Chief of Mission) teams on venue became uncertain. [redacted] stopped in front of Amanat City Hall in order to verify that all COM teams had departed venue. No other COM teams were visible on venue, therefore, [redacted] continued south toward [redacted]. There was constant hostile gun fire directed at [redacted] along Route [redacted] while departing the immediate area surrounding the venue. [redacted] (TST) had [redacted] locked down and was receiving enemy gun fire from buildings surrounding the [redacted] traffic circle. Reference is made to [redacted] report for complete details of their involvement in this incident. [redacted] drove past [redacted] and onto Bridge [redacted] held a position on the west end of bridge [redacted] awaiting [redacted] departure from [redacted]. Upon [redacted] departure, both teams continued west onto bridge [redacted] breaking contact and departing the immediate danger area. Teams [redacted] and [redacted] converged on Bridge [redacted] due to heavy traffic congestion. [redacted] in order to clear lanes for the COM vehicles to get through. All teams entered the International Zone (IZ) through Checkpoint [redacted] without further incident.

[redacted] personnel suffered no injuries and no [redacted] vehicles were damaged as a result of this incident. The TOC advised [redacted] to go to Checkpoint [redacted] to continue covering COM teams that

would be returning to the [redacted] Upon completion of missions [redacted] returned to the staging area. All required parties were then apprised of the complete incident details. ///END///

b7E, F

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	[Signature]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	David A. Motus

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

Name _____		Team _____	10 Sep 2007 / 1200 Hours	
Location/Venue Amanat City Hall		Situation _____	Extraction	
Time Occurred 1050 hours		Date Occurred 9 Sept 2007		

Incident Report BW 09-09-07 (1) Weapons Discharge Baghdad

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, activities during the extraction of Team _____ and _____ from the Amanat City Hall and subsequent engagement of hostile forces at the intersection commonly referred to as _____. This incident occurred on 9 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. _____ personnel having an active roll in this incident included the following:

--

On 9 September 2007, at approximately 1048 hours, _____ Shift Leader (SL) heard a distress call on _____ from _____ who was at Amanat City Hall _____ reported that their _____ were receiving small arms fire. _____ had been on stand by awaiting an afternoon TTT mission.

At approximately 1055 hours, _____ conducted an emergency mission briefing. The mission brief included rules of engagement, firearms policy, escalation of force, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included the venue location, teams at the venue, and the number of personnel. _____ immediately stood up and staged at Checkpoint _____ and awaited further instructions from the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The vehicle configuration was as follows:

Shortly after _____ direct request for TST support, _____ reported a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack directed at their venue. At this time, the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) advised _____ to depart Checkpoint _____ and go to the area of _____ and secure the intersection for _____ egress. Throughout the rest of this incident, radio communications between the TOC and other teams was intermittent at best.

_____ departed Checkpoint _____ and shortly thereafter arrived at _____ where they were immediately engaged by small arms fire. _____ SL _____ immediately notified the TOC they were being engaged with hostile forces. Enemy combatants were visibly firing at _____ personnel and vehicles from the mosque Northeast of _____, the round building Northwest of _____, a large building Southeast of _____ and a large building Southwest of _____. _____ was being engaged from all of the rooftops mentioned above, by approximately 3 individuals per rooftop with what appeared to be AK-47's and belt fed machine guns. There were also approximately 4-6 individuals from the windows of each building on the 4th and 5th floors. All of the buildings were directly positioned facing _____. In fear for their lives and the lives of their teammates, all _____ turret PSS engaged identifiable threats with their Department of State issued _____

Shortly after _____ arrival at _____, left Amanat City Hall and drove through the _____ intersection turning west towards Bridge _____ followed by _____ and _____, waited until all teams had safely driven through _____. Reference is made to Team _____ and _____ reports for complete

--

Name _____ b6 b7C		Team _____	Situation _____	10 Sep 2007/1200 Hours
Location/Venue Amanat City Hall		Extraction		
		Time Occurred 1050 hours	Date Occurred 9 Sept 2007	

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details relative to their role in this incident. _____ attempted to contact the TOC via _____ to verify all COM PSD teams had left the area with limited success.

_____ broke contact as soon as possible while covering the egress of all departing teams. _____ joined _____ and _____ on Bridge _____ where there was heavy traffic congestion. Once a lane was formed, all teams returned to the International Zone (IZ) through Checkpoint _____ without further incident.

Upon return, it was confirmed there were no injuries to _____ personnel. _____ lead vehicle received a single round to the driver's side window, and the follow vehicle received two rounds, one in the driver's side window, and one round to the passenger side window which is located on the door. _____ was advised to stand by at Checkpoint _____ to cover teams returning to the IZ. Upon completion of all missions, the _____ SL apprised all necessary parties of the incident.///END///

_____ b6 b7C

0311007030
Page 2 of 2

(P)
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Date 9 Sep 2007	Time Approx 1330 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

UO147

I, _____, hereby make the following statement at the request of _____, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident

I, _____, was assigned as _____ during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, _____ activities during the extraction of _____ and _____ from the Amanat City Hall and subsequent engagement of hostile forces at the intersection commonly referred to as _____. This incident occurred on 9 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. _____ personnel having an active role in this incident included the following:

--

On 9 September 2007, at approximately 1048 hours, _____ Shift Leader (SL) heard a distress call on _____ from _____, who was at Amanat City Hall. _____ reported that their _____ were receiving small arms fire. _____ had been on standby awaiting an afternoon TTT mission.

At approximately 1055 hours, _____ conducted an emergency mission briefing. The mission brief included rules of engagement, firearms policy, escalation of force, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included the venue location, teams at the venue, and the number of personnel. _____ immediately stood up and staged at Checkpoint _____ and awaited further instructions from the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The vehicle

03:15:00

configuration was as follows:

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

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Shortly after [] direct request for TST support, [] reported a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack directed at their venue. At this time, the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) advised [] to depart Checkpoint [] and go to the area of [] and secure the intersection for Team [] egress. Throughout the rest of this incident, radio communications between the TOC and other teams was intermittent at best.

[] departed Checkpoint [] and shortly thereafter arrived at [] where they were immediately engaged by small arms fire. [] SL Goss immediately notified the TOC they were being engaged with hostile forces. Enemy combatants were visibly firing at [] personnel and vehicles from the mosque Northeast of [] the round building Northwest of [] a large building Southeast of [] and a large building Southwest of []. Team [] was being engaged from all of the rooftops mentioned above, by approximately 3 individuals per rooftop with what appeared to be AK-47's and belt fed machine guns. There were also approximately 4-6 individuals from the windows of each building on the 4th and 5th floors. All of the buildings were directly positioned facing []. In fear for their lives and the lives of their teammates, all [] turret PSS engaged identifiable threats with their Department of State issued [].

Shortly after [] arrival at [], [] left Amanat City Hall and drove through the [] intersection turning west towards Bridge [] followed by [] and []. [] waited until all teams had safely driven through []. Reference is made to [] and [] reports for complete details relative to their roll in this incident. [] attempted to contact the TOC via [] to verify all COM PSD teams had left the area with limited success.

[] broke contact as soon as possible while covering the egress of all departing teams. [] joined [] and [] on Bridge [] where there was heavy traffic congestion. Once a lane was formed, all teams returned to the International Zone (IZ) through Checkpoint [] without further incident.

Upon return, it was confirmed there were no injuries to [] personnel. [] lead vehicle received a single round to the driver's side window, and the follow vehicle received two rounds, one in the driver's side window, and one round to the passenger side window which is located on the door. [] was advised to stand by at Checkpoint [] to cover teams returning to the IZ. Upon completion of all missions, the [] SL apprised all necessary parties of the incident.///END///

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Redacted]
Printed	[Redacted]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	David A. M. [Signature]

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Redacted]
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	125 Embassy Baghdad

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Date	9 Sep 2007	Time	Approx. 1330 hours
Location	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq		

Vol 48

I, _____<sup>b6
b7C</sup>, hereby make the following statement at the request of _____, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the _____.

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident

I, [redacted] was assigned as [redacted] during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following After Action Report reflects, in summary, _____ activities during the extraction of _____ and _____ from the Amanat City Hall and subsequent engagement of hostile forces at the intersection commonly referred to as _____. This incident occurred on 9 September 2007 at approximately 1048 hours. _____ personnel having an active role in this incident included the following:

On 9 September 2007, at approximately 1048 hours, [redacted] Shift Leader (SL) heard a distress call on [redacted] from [redacted] who was at Amanat City Hall [redacted] reported that their [redacted] were receiving small arms fire. [redacted] had been on standby awaiting an afternoon TTT mission.

At approximately 1055 hours, [REDACTED] conducted an emergency mission briefing. The mission brief included rules of engagement, firearms policy, escalation of force, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included the venue location, teams at the venue, and the number of personnel. [REDACTED] immediately stood up and staged at Checkpoint 1 and awaited further instructions from the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The vehicle

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Upon return, it was confirmed there were no injuries to [redacted] personnel. [redacted] lead vehicle received a single round to the driver's side window, and the follow vehicle received two rounds, one in the driver's side window, and one round to the passenger side window which is located on the door. [redacted] was advised to stand by at Checkpoint [redacted] to cover teams returning to the IZ. Upon completion of all missions, the [redacted] SL apprised all necessary parties of the incident.///END///

Page 2 of 3

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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	[Redacted]
Printed	[Redacted]
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	[Signature]
Printed	David A. Motley

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	[Signature]
Printed	Lisa M. Lopez
Address	US Embassy Baghdad

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(P)

Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)		Date/Time of Statement 090907/1130 hours	
Name	(Shift Leader)	Team	Situation		
Location/Venue Baghdad Amanat City Hall			Time Occurred 1030 hours		Date Occured 090907

Incident Report BW-09-09-07 (b) Contact on Venue

The following is a summary of the actions of [redacted] in relation to the events that occurred on 9 September 2007 at Baghdad Amanat City Hall.

On 9 September 2007, at approximately 0815 hours, [redacted] conducted a pre-mission brief to outline the plan for conducting an Advance, in support of [redacted] to the Baghdad Amanat City Hall. The brief was conducted in accordance with [redacted] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and included the overall situation in Baghdad, mission brief, and rules of engagement. The intelligence portion of the brief highlighted threats specific to the venue and planned routes. Specific threats included reported sniper activity to the west, south and north of the venue, as well as the possibility of multiple SVBIEDs (Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices) in the vicinity.

On 9 September 2007 at approximately 0915 hours, [redacted] departed the WPPS Camp in a [redacted] vehicle motorcade configuration. At approximately 0930 hours, [redacted] arrived on venue. Upon arrival, contact was made with the venue Point of Contact (POC), [redacted] who is the Director of Essential Services. Shortly thereafter, [redacted] set up security on the interior meeting room located on seventh floor (ninth American floor) along with exterior security. As part of the exterior security, [redacted] deployed three [redacted] and one Protective Security Specialist (PSS) armed with an [redacted] of the venue. [redacted] were utilized to conduct sweeps of the venue, vehicle traffic entering the venue, and the immediate perimeter. With security set and [redacted] completed, [redacted] notified the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) that the venue was secure for the arrival of [redacted].

At approximately 1030 hours, [redacted] arrived on venue. At approximately 1040 hours, [redacted] reported to the Shift Leader (SL) [redacted] that the [redacted] were receiving fire directed at their position of the venue. SL immediately notified the TOC of the situation and provided a situation report. The SL advised [redacted] to cancel the meeting and evacuate the principles to the trucks for immediate departure, while [redacted] remained in position in order to cover their evacuation. As [redacted] was escorting their principles to the vehicles, several members of [redacted] observed the City Hall security personnel putting on body armor and distributing AK-47 weapons. At approximately 1050 hours, the TOC instructed [redacted] to hard point [redacted] at the venue. Team SL notified the TOC that [redacted] and all principles were secured in their trucks and were ready to depart the venue. At this time, due to the cessation of hostile fire and the supporting assets on station, [redacted] SL requested from the TOC that [redacted] be able to depart without further delay. The TOC was also notified that [redacted] were in position, along with RSO Air Assets, to cover [redacted] egress back to the International Zone (IZ). The TOC granted permission for [redacted] to depart the venue and they returned to the IZ without further incident. As [redacted] departed, the [redacted] SL called for all [redacted] to recover to the vehicles. At 1053 hours, [redacted] was staged and ready to depart the venue when the team began to receive heavy small arms fire and multiple Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). The fire appeared to come from directly across the street (west) from the venue. The [redacted] SL maneuvered all vehicles and personnel to the rear of the venue in order to gain cover and stand off from the immediate threat. The SL notified the TOC of the situation and coordinated with the Tactical Support Team (TST) and RSO Air to support the team's extraction from the venue.

At approximately 1055 hours, [redacted] (TST) arrived on the scene only to receive heavy machine gun fire. [redacted] occupied a support by fire position which provided cover for [redacted] to exit the venue. During the departure, [redacted] along with support assets was engaged with multiple RPG's and heavy small arms fire. [redacted] drove through the contact and returned to the IZ without further incident. [redacted] sustained neither injuries nor vehicle damage as result of this incident.///END///

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00313: 20070909 EOF Amanat City Hall

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00096

Impact:

Status: OPEN

Case Title: 20070909 EOF Amanat City Hall
Raven 9,

Status: OPEN

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-05156

On 09/09/2007 at approx. 1045hrs reported that its
started taking SAF. was on scene with the principal. RSOair
assets were called in to provide overhead cover along with
and All teams evacuated the are with only one team
member receiving a minor leg injury from shrapnel.

Title	Type	Size
07 Baghdad03076	Adobe PDF	3,046 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	2,773 kB
statement 20...	Adobe PDF	2,339 kB
stateme...	Adobe PDF	3,124 kB
statemen...	Adobe PDF	3,117 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,124 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,286 kB
statement 20...	Adobe PDF	3,310 kB
statement 2...	Adobe PDF	3,318 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,314 kB
statement 20...	Adobe PDF	1,436 kB
Documents	Adobe PDF	5,984 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,301 kB
statement 2007...	Adobe PDF	3,272 kB
statement 20...	Adobe PDF	3,282 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,127 kB
statement 200...	Adobe PDF	3,130 kB
statement 2...	Adobe PDF	3,133 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	2,784 kB
statement 20...	Adobe PDF	3,310 kB
statement 2...	Adobe PDF	2,789 kB
statement 2007...	Adobe PDF	2,779 kB
statement 2 2007...	Adobe PDF	2,490 kB
statement 20070909.	Adobe PDF	1,431 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,114 kB
statement 200...	Adobe PDF	3,139 kB
statement 20...	Adobe PDF	3,293 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,105 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,572 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,127 kB
statement 20070909	Adobe PDF	3,542 kB

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Synopsis

On September 10, 2007 several Regional Security Officer (RSO) Personal Security Details (PSD) were involved in use of force incidents while at the Amanat City Hall. There was a minor injury to RSO personnel and property. The shooting was reported immediately to the RSO TOC (see team member statements for further details). The escalation of force was within the DS Embassy Baghdad Use of Force policy.

Case Details

On September 10, 2007 several Regional Security Officer (RSO) Personal Security Details (PSD), were involved in use of force incidents while at Amanat City Hall.

PSD [] arrived at the scheduled venue at 0945 and proceeded to conduct a security sweep of the area with [] security personnel. A three member [] unit was deployed [] of the building, along with a security specialist that was armed with an []. Once [] was deployed and had secured the venue, the RSO TOC was notified that the venue was secured for the arrival of [].

[] departed the International Zone (IZ) at 10:20 and arrived at the venue site at 10:29 without incident, at which time the Principals were escorted to the meeting location on the seventh floor. [] Shift Leader (SL) reported receiving Small Arms Fire (SAF) to the TOC at 10:40, [] reported an SAF round impacting their vicinity, from an unknown direction. [] SL instructed [] to depart with Principals to their vehicles. [] was escorting Principles to their vehicles, and [] team members reported seeing the venue's local security personnel putting on body armor and distributing AK-47's. [] on the rooftop reported additional SAF at 10:48 hours from the vicinities referred to as [].

[] SL reported cessation of SAF at 10:50, and TOC requested that [] and [] remain at the venue. [] reported that [] was in their vehicles and were prepared to depart, with [] covering the departure. [] also reported that RSO air assets were on site to help in escorting [] to the IZ. TOC granted the request for [] departure and instructed [] to secure the intersection of [] on the west side of the river in order to help clear []'s path across Bridge []. [] safely departed the venue, at which time [] moved back to their vehicles in preparation for imminent departure.

[] departed and observed a number of Iraqi Army (IA) vehicles heading northbound in front of the venue (and not engaged in the incident), and after traveling approximately 300 meters heard an explosion in the vicinity of the venue. [] started to receive large volumes of SAF, to include Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) from across the street (west). [] positioned their vehicles behind a hard point in the [].

venue. The TOC directed [] to secure an intersection known as [] located immediately to the south of the venue.

[] moved from [] and arrived at the venue, positioning its vehicles between the venue and the direction of the SAF. At 1105, [] then reported receiving heavy SAF and RPG fire from gunmen located at multiple locations outside the venue, with the heaviest coming from across the street (west). [] engaged visible gunmen to their north and south using their []

[] also engaged approximately 10 gunmen who were firing from rooftops and windows of four buildings to the west. [] also reported SAF from intersection [], where gunmen were firing from windows on the third, fourth, and fifth floors of the building located on the northeast corner of the intersection.

[] arrived at the intersection known as [] and were immediately engaged by SAF. Gunmen were observed firing from the rooftops of the mosque just north of [] and the buildings located southeast, southwest, and northwest of [].

[] departed the venue towards [], with [] providing support, and they were engaged by heavy SAF and RPG fire in front of the venue. [] turned west at [] where [] was providing security and headed towards the IZ across bridge [] followed by []

Once [] departed, [] arrived from the north at the intersection of [] and observed [] departing the area heading south then west through []. Due to unreliable communication, [] continued south towards the venue, briefly stopping in front of the entrance/exit, to determine if any RSO teams were still in the venue. [] noticed that there were no RSO teams at the venue and continued south on to [] received constant SAF but did not return fire. [] was holding [] blocking traffic, which allowed [] the opportunity to follow [] to Bridge [] and on to the IZ, [] followed.

There was minor damage to RSO property/vehicles and the [] shift leader received minor shrapnel wound to his left calf. All members involved were interviewed by DS Special Agents Mario A. Reta and Ted Carpenter. See enclosed sworn statements. The escalation of force was within the DS Embassy Baghdad Use of Force policy.

03:15:58:1030

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

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Date of Report: 09 Sep 07
Location: Vicinity of [REDACTED]
Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti
Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 09 Sep 07

Time of Incident: 1505

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: 12.9 miles southeast of LZ Washington

Personnel Involved: DOS Air Assets (Boeing Medium Lift 412) A/C [REDACTED]

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Incident Synopsis: On 9 Sep 07 at 1505, Air 2 reported a down aircraft in the vicinity of [REDACTED]. Air 2, flying in a [REDACTED] aircraft configuration, was on return to LZ Washington from Hillah REO with a total of 16 passengers when A/C [REDACTED] was struck by an RPG. All personnel and most sensitive equipment was recovered, loaded onto the [REDACTED] aircraft and returned to LZ Washington without further incident. Army elements were briefed and air and ground units responded to secure the scene. Recovery of essential equipment from the downed aircraft was initiated and upon completion the remainder of the aircraft will be destroyed.

Outline injuries if applicable: Head laceration to one IC who was treated and released.

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW AIR OPS, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report

12SEP07

DTM Notes:

From: Victor Esposito [mailto:vesposito@blackwaterusa.com]

Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2007 2:31 PM

To: Isaac, Paul C; Danielle Esposito

Cc: Kasey Johnson; DS HTPOPS; McKennan, John B; Richter, Jean C; Schaeffer, William T; Moneyppenny, Kiazan; Hubbard, Edmund W; Sincavage, Justine M

Subject: RE: Incident Report BW 09-10-07 (1) Downed Aircraft due to enemy action

Paul -

Per your request, the injured personnel are expected to make a full recovery and report back to work within the next few days. [REDACTED] lead pilot for the downed Bell 412 received lower back pain and has since been released from the CSH, [REDACTED]

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[] received minor injuries as a result from the crash and
[] lead aviation mechanic received a minor
shrapnel wound to the head and has since been released from the
CSH (injury occurred during the recovery effort);

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There were eight individuals onboard of the downed Bell 412 (see
below names);

Aircrew:

	Pilot
	Co-Pilot
	Door Gunner
	Door Gunner

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

U0153

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Date of Report: 10 Sep 07

Location: IVO

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

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Date of Incident: 10 Sep 07

Time of Incident: Approximately 1545

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: 12.9 miles southeast of LZ Washington

Personnel Involved: Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART)

Incident Synopsis: On 10 Sep 07 at approximately 1545 a Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART) was providing support for a downed RSO Air Asset. While providing security for the recovery of aircraft equipment the team and supporting U.S. Army units were engaged with SAF from various locations surrounding the crash site. Clearly identifying the sources of the SAF, members of the DART, along with members of the Army ground support units, returned fire to suppress the attack. Additional engagement of the threat was conducted by U.S. Army attack aviation. There were no injuries to CoM or US Army personnel.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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U0154

Date 10 Sep 2007	Time Approx. 2030 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, _____, hereby make the following statement at the request of

_____, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident

I, _____, was assigned as a Protective Security Specialist during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following after action report reflects, in summary, _____ activities during a small arms engagement with hostile forces at the crash site of a RSO aircraft at grid _____. This incident occurred on 10 September 2007 at approximately 1538 hours. The _____ personnel involved in this incident include the following:

On 10 September 2007 at approximately 1500 hours, _____ received word an RSO air asset had crashed, and an element of _____ would be performing a Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART) mission. DART team leader _____ conducted a pre-mission brief at the LZ Washington hanger/staging area. The mission brief included rules of engagement, firearms policy, escalation of force, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included threat intelligence, from the _____ Detail imbedded intelligence analyst, to include sniper activity, recent small arms attacks and explosive attacks throughout the area of operation.

All of the aforementioned DART team members were flown to the crash site on two 412 medium lift helicopters. Once at the site, the team formed a 360 degree outer perimeter around the crashed aircraft to allow mechanics and air personnel to _____ the downed aircraft. Also located at the site were several US Army personnel in HMMWV's, a Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicle, and Army

00:00:00

Attack Helicopters circling above assisting with site security. Army personnel advised the team to watch for suspicious activity occurring in the tree line located on the southwest side of the site.

Two clusters of buildings were observed in the immediate vicinity of the crash site. The first set was approximately 550 yards to the southwest of the site and the second was over 1200 yards to the west from the site. A tree line separated the two clusters of buildings. Shortly after arriving on location Army assets were observed in a firefight around the buildings located over 1200 yards to the west of the crash site. An Army Captain advised the DART element that several armed subjects in civilian clothing were seen running toward the buildings located to the southwest. The Captain stated Army attack helicopters engaged the subjects, however, they believed several of the armed subjects made it through to the buildings located at the southwest.

After several minutes on the ground, [redacted] observed, through his [redacted] rifle, several armed men in civilian clothing enter the buildings located toward the southwest. [redacted] observed one of the men enter a building and appear in a window with what appeared to be a scoped rifle. [redacted] advised all of the team members of his observations while closely watching the subject with the scoped rifle in the window. [redacted] observed the subject present the scoped weapon pointing it in the direction of the team apparently about to fire. Fearing for the lives of himself and his team, [redacted] fired his Department of State [redacted] rifle at the suspect at which time the hostile suspect dropped out of site and did not appear again.

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Almost simultaneously, the team began receiving small arms fire from windows and rooftops of the buildings to the southwest, at ground level in a grassy area, and from the tree line. All DART personnel repositioned in a line on the southwest except for PSSI [redacted] who remained to cover the rear with an Army HMMWV and a MRAB Mine sweeping vehicle. Additionally, the little birds and medium lifts were landed a distance away to the northeast. DART and Army personnel continued to receive small arms fire from the above mentioned locations. Fearing for their lives and the lives of the team, all team members except [redacted] returned accurate fire at visible threats using their Department of State issued [redacted]. Additionally, the Army engaged the same targets with their Bradley 25mm main gun and .50 caliber machine guns. A US Army Captain met with DART personnel and advised he was calling in an air strike. A short time later, the Army attack helicopters attacked the enemy firing positions stopping the threat.

b6
b7C

b6 b7C
b7E, F


Team Leader [redacted] accounted for all DART members and no injuries were reported. Upon [redacted] the aircraft, the air mechanics and crew members were returned to LZ Washington via 412 medium lift helicopters. Approximately ten (10) minutes later, the 412 medium lift helicopters returned to the crash site and picked up the entire DART element returning to LZ Washington. All team members and equipment were accounted for. No injuries or damage were reported. All Command members were later apprised of the complete details of the incident.///END///

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b7C

03:15:38:10:30


DECLASSIFIED


I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signed	
Printed	
Address	
WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

b6
b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	David A. Mother
SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE	

Witness Signature	
Printed	Mario A. Reta ARSU
Address	Am Emb Baghdad

DECLASSIFIED

00155

(9)
b7E, F
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b7C

REDACTED

Date 10 Sep 2007	Time Approx. 2030 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, _____, hereby make the following statement at the request of _____, who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

Incident

I, _____, was assigned as a Protective Security Specialist during the below incident. I swear that the below summary is a true and accurate representation of the events as they occurred.

The following after action report reflects, in summary, _____ activities during a small arms engagement with hostile forces at the crash site of a RSO aircraft at grid _____. This incident occurred on 10 September 2007 at approximately 1538 hours. The _____ personnel involved in this incident include the following:

On 10 September 2007 at approximately 1500 hours, _____ received word an RSO air asset had crashed, and an element of _____ would be performing a Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART) mission. DART team leader _____ conducted a pre-mission brief at the LZ Washington hanger/staging area. The mission brief included rules of engagement, firearms policy, escalation of force, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included threat intelligence, from the _____ Detail imbedded intelligence analyst, to include sniper activity, recent small arms attacks and explosive attacks throughout the area of operation.

All of the aforementioned DART team members were flown to the crash site on two 412 medium lift helicopters. Once at the site, the team formed a 360 degree outer perimeter around the crashed aircraft to allow mechanics and air personnel to _____ the downed aircraft. Also located at the site were several US Army personnel in HMMWV's, a Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicle, and Army

Attack Helicopters circling above assisting with site security. Army personnel advised the team to watch for suspicious activity occurring in the tree line located on the southwest side of the site.

Two clusters of buildings were observed in the immediate vicinity of the crash site. The first set was approximately 550 yards to the southwest of the site and the second was over 1200 yards to the west from the site. A tree line separated the two clusters of buildings. Shortly after arriving on location Army assets were observed in a firefight around the buildings located over 1200 yards to the west of the crash site. An Army Captain advised the DART element that several armed subjects in civilian clothing were seen running toward the buildings located to the southwest. The Captain stated Army attack helicopters engaged the subjects, however, they believed several of the armed subjects made it through to the buildings located at the southwest.

After several minutes on the ground, [redacted] observed, through his [redacted] rifle, several armed men in civilian clothing enter the buildings located toward the southwest. [redacted] observed one of the men enter a building and appear in a window with what appeared to be a scoped rifle. [redacted] advised all of the team members of his observations while closely watching the subject with the scoped rifle in the window. [redacted] observed the subject present the scoped weapon pointing it in the direction of the team apparently about to fire. Fearing for the lives of himself and his team, [redacted] fired his Department of State [redacted] rifle at the suspect at which time the hostile suspect dropped out of site and did not appear again.

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b7E, F

Almost simultaneously, the team began receiving small arms fire from windows and rooftops of the buildings to the southwest, at ground level in a grassy area, and from the tree line. All DART personnel repositioned in a line on the southwest except for PSS [redacted] who remained to cover the rear with an Army HMMWV and a MRAB Mine sweeping vehicle. Additionally, the little birds and medium lifts were landed a distance away to the northeast. DART and Army personnel continued to receive small arms fire from the above mentioned locations. Fearing for their lives and the lives of the team, all team members except [redacted] returned accurate fire at visible threats using their Department of State issued [redacted]. Additionally, the Army engaged the same targets with their Bradley 25mm main gun and .50 caliber machine guns. A US Army Captain met with DART personnel and advised he was calling in an air strike. A short time later, the Army attack helicopters attacked the enemy firing positions stopping the threat.

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b7E, F

Team Leader [redacted] accounted for all DART members and no injuries were reported. Upon [redacted] the aircraft, the air mechanics and crew members were returned to LZ Washington via 412 medium lift helicopters. Approximately ten (10) minutes later, the 412 medium lift helicopters returned to the crash site and picked up the entire DART element returning to LZ Washington. All team members and equipment were accounted for. No injuries or damage were reported. All Command members were later apprised of the complete details of the incident.///END///

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
DECLASSIFIED

I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq

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b7c

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of September, 2007.

Signed	
Printed	David A. M. H.

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Mario A. Retu APSU
Address	AmEmb Baghdad

DECLASSIFIED

INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

W10937

(P)
57E, F
b6
b7C

UO156

Date of Report: 10 Sep 07

Location: IVO

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: !

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

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b7E, F
b7C

Date of Incident: 10 Sep 07

Time of Incident: 1620

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: IVO

Personnel Involved: (TST)

b7E, F



Incident Synopsis: On 10 Sep 07 at approximately 1620 a Tactical Support Team (TST) was providing support for the downed RSO Air Asset. While approaching the intersection at , a truck aggressively approached the motorcade. The driver of the truck failed to obey several verbal and visual warnings to stop. In an escalation of force, the rear turret PSS of the ERV fired one (1) round from his into the grill of the vehicle causing it to immediately stop. There were no injuries to COM personnel and no damage to any COM assets or vehicles. The team continued with their mission in support of COM PSD teams.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

0315087030



DECLASSIFIED

Bell 412 Manifest

HILLAH - WAHP

(P)
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b7c
b7E, F

U0157

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#	Name	SSN (Last 4)	Blood Type	Pax Weight w/ PPE	# of Bags	Baggage Weight	Reason for Travel
16, F ↓	Aircraft 1						
1				180	1	23	R&R
2				230	1	13	R&R
3				210	1	17	R&R b6
4				290	1	45	R&R b7c
	Aircraft 2						
5				200	1	15	R&R
6				210	1	10	R&R
7				230	1	21	R&R
8				250	1	39	R&R
	Aircraft 3						
9							
10							
11							
12							
	Aircraft 4						
13							
14							
15							
16							

Admin notes:

The 412 manifest will accompany the ATO anytime you are specifically requesting transportation by the medium lift helicopters. The BW Air Asset Controller needs all of the above information before transportation will be scheduled.

Pax Weight should include the weight of any PPE being worn or carried

Email to: baghdadpsdrequests@state.gov

ATTN: Air Asset Controller

DECLASSIFIED


UOI58 (P)
b6
b7C
b7E F

To be completed by requester:

LEG 1:	START TIME:	0830	END TIME:	UTC
MISSION TYPE:	Passenger(s)			
Acft and Number Requested:	2	412 (Med. Lift)		
START POINT:	<input type="checkbox"/>	VENUE:	END POINT:	Hillah
DESCRIPTION:	Move 2 Pax and Cargo to Hillah			

b7E, F

LEG 3:	START TIME: (1430)	END TIME:	UTC
MISSION TYPE:	Passenger(s)		
Acft and Number Requested:	2	412 (Med. Lift)	
START POINT:	Camp Echo	VENUE:	END POINT: Hillah
DESCRIPTION:	RTB 8 Pax		

LEG 4:	START TIME: TBD	END TIME:	UTC
MISSION TYPE:	Passenger(s)		
Acft and Number Requested:	2 412 (Med. Lift)		
START POINT:	Hillah	VENUE:	END POINT: 
DESCRIPTION:	RTB 8 Pax to WAHP		

LEG 5:	START TIME:	END TIME:
MISSION TYPE:		
Acft and Number Requested:		
START POINT:	VENUE:	END POINT:
DESCRIPTION:		

The following is to be completed by Blackwater Aviation during customer face to face coordination:

Mission Number: _____ Blackwater Aviation POC: _____

Communications: _____ Frequencies / Channel: _____

Route(s):

Actions on Contact: Downed Vehicle Procedures: 5 5 7 0 2 3 4
Downed Aircraft Procedures: 5 5 7 0 2 3 4

Remarks:



(P)
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b7C
b7E, F



UO1.59

17/3/60/30/40

Bell 412 Manifest

WAHP - HILLAH

#	Name	SSN (Last 4)	Blood Type	Pax Weight w/ PPE	# of Bags	Baggage Weight	Reason for Travel
	Aircraft 1 [redacted]						
1	[redacted]	[redacted]	TBD	250	1	45	Perini <i>Log</i>
2	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	225	2	140	BW
3							
4							
	Aircraft 2 [redacted]						
5	5 Bags of Dog Food				5	200	Drop in Hillah
6	2 Pelican cases				2	100	Drop in Hillah
7							
8							
	Aircraft 3 [redacted]						
9							
10							
11							
12							
	Aircraft 4 [redacted]						
13							
14							
15							
16							

Admin notes:

The 412 manifest will accompany the ATO anytime you are specifically requesting transportation by the medium lift helicopters. The BW Air Asset Controller needs all of the above information before transportation will be scheduled.

Pax Weight should include the weight of any PPE being worn or carried

Email to: baghdadpsdrequests@state.gov
ATTN: Air Asset Controller ::





DECLASSIFIED

Bell 412 Manifest

HILLAH - CAMP ECHO - HILLAH

(P)
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b7c
b7c, F

U0160

#	Name	SSN (Last 4)	Blood Type	Pax Weight w/ PPE	# of Bags	Baggage Weight	Reason for Travel
1	Aircraft 1			250	1	10	Principal
2				300	1	20	Medic
3					1	20	Principal
4				200	1	20	PSD
5	Aircraft 2			240	1	25	Principal
6				210	1	15	SL
7				265	1	15	ARSO
8				200	1	20	Principal
9	Aircraft 3						
10							
11							
12							
13	Aircraft 4						
14							
15							
16							

Admin notes:

The 412 manifest will accompany the ATO anytime you are specifically requesting transportation by the medium lift helicopters. The BW Air Asset Controller needs all of the above information before transportation will be scheduled.

Pax Weight should include the weight of any PPE being worn or carried

Email to: baghdadpsdrequests@state.gov
ATTN: Air Asset Controller

DECLASSIFIED

Synopsis

On September 10, 2007, a Chief of Mission (COM) Personal Security Detail (PSD) was involved in a use of force incident after support of recovery operations for a downed RSO air asset. There were no known injuries or damages to COM property or personnel. The shooting was reported immediately to the RSO TOC (see team member statements for further details). The escalation of force was within the DS Embassy Baghdad Use of Force policy.

Case Details

On September 10, 2007 a Chief of Mission (COM) Personal Security Detail (PSD), [redacted] was involved in use of force incidents after support of recovery operations for a downed RSO air asset. [redacted] members noticed a vehicle that had swerved around stopped traffic and drove towards the motorcade, disregarded verbal and arm/hand signals, and being driven in an aggressive manner by a male. The PSD member fired a pen flare which hit the windshield of the suspicious vehicle and was ignored. The PSD member then fired multiple well aimed shots at the vehicle, striking and disabling the vehicle. The use of force was reported to the shift leader, and then reported by the shift leader to the RSO TOC.

There was no damage to COM property or personnel. All members involved were interviewed by DS Special Agent Kory Hammond and Kevin G. Tehan. See enclosed sworn statements. The escalation of force was within the DS Embassy Baghdad Use of Force policy.

03:15:57:030

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
DECLASSIFIED

U.S. Embassy Baghdad

September 10, 2007



Spot Report – 091007-01

Subject: PSD Team EOF on Aggressive Vehicles**Reporting Office:** RSO TOC - Kirkuk

Summary: On 10 September 2007, a Kirkuk [redacted] COM PSD motorcade [redacted] en-route from the Kirkuk Regional Embassy Office (REO) to Patrol Base Andrea, Sulimaniyah encountered two aggressive vehicles (Black BMW & White Toyota Land Cruiser).

At 0730, the motorcade was traveling east on ASR [redacted] in the City of Chamchamal Province [redacted]. As the motorcade was entering the province the rear gunners in the rear vehicle (CAT) noticed a black BMW with 1 military aged male approaching the rear of the motorcade at a high rate of speed.

The left rear gunner moved to the gunner's hatch through the roof of the CAT vehicle and began giving hand and arms signals to the driver to stay back. The right rear gunner then opened his door and utilized hand and arm signals in an attempt to signal the driver. When the vehicle continued its approach, the right rear gunner then pointed his [redacted] at the vehicle while using left hand signals in an attempt to stop the vehicle. The aggressive vehicle continued to close in on the rear of the motorcade, disregarding as well, the "Stay back 100 meters" sign written in English and Arabic on the rear of the CAT vehicle.

DECLASSIFIED

At approximately [] meters out from the follow vehicle, the left rear gunner discharged one pen flare round at the black BMW. The black BMW continued its approach at which time the left rear gunner discharged one round into the grill of the vehicle. The BMW then stopped and pulled off the shoulder of the roadway. The left rear gunner did not notice any injuries to the driver of the black BMW, and the motorcade continued on its mission.

b7E, F
↓

At 0800, the motorcade approached a checkpoint [] prior to entering Sulimaniyah Province and was stopped in a bubble formation awaiting clearance. All vehicles to the rear of the motorcade had come to a complete stop, approximately 100 meters to the rear. The left rear gunner moved to the gunner's hatch through the roof of the CAT vehicle and noticed a white Toyota Land Cruiser passing the stopped vehicles at a high rate of speed. The left rear gunner noticed the vehicle pick up speed at which time he discharged 2 pen flares for the vehicle to stop. The vehicle then stopped and pulled to the shoulder of the roadway.

The motorcade continued on its mission with no further incidents. There were no COM Principals in the vehicles during these incidents.

RSO Action: PSD members will be debriefed and written statements will be taken. RSO will complete an ROI and provide documentation to the RSCC upon completion.

Locations: Chamchamal []
Sulimaniyah CP []

DRAFTED BY: Michael D. Rohlf, RSO Kirkuk, Iraq
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

03115507030

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00327: 20070910.EOF Kirkuk, Iraq

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00103

Status: OPEN - PENDING CLOSING ROI

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070910 EOF Kirkuk, Iraq

Status: OPEN - PENDING CLOSING ROI

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ GENERAL

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-05208

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

■ IRAQ

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: Department of State,
COM PSD Team

Name: RSO Kirkuk, Iraq Michael D. Rohlf

Phone: (202) _____

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore ASAC BAGHDAD

Lopez, Lisa M SA BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On 09/10/2007, a Kirkuk COM PSD motorcade en- route from the Kirkuk Regional Embassy Office (REO) to Patrol Base Andrea, Sulimaniyah encountered two aggressive vehicles (Black BMW & White Toyota Land Cruiser) along two different points of the route. The BMW pulled off only after being engaged with one pen flare and one ground into the grill. The Land Cruiser pulled off only after being engaged with two pen flares. There were no COM Principals in the vehicles during these incidents.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
Spot Report 09/10/2007		272 kB

Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

09/11/2007	OPEN
	OPEN - PENDING PQ APPROVAL
09/12/2007	OPEN
09/12/2007	OPEN - PENDING CLOSING ROI

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

03115507030

From: Isaac, Paul C
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2007 8:30 PM
To: Chong, Daniel Minkyo; Martin, Darin T
Subject: FW: SIR

DECLASSIFIED

Importance: High

Wahoso

(P)

b7E, F

b6
b7C

U0164

Paul Isaac
Division Chief
High Threat Protection
DS/OPO/HTP
Office: (571) 345-2399
Cell: _____

b6
b7C

From: Budge, Pascal [_____] b6
Sent: Monday, September 10, 2007 9:18 AM b7C
To: Isaac, Paul C; Desilets, Paul H; HTPOPS@state.gov
Cc: Thomas Jr, Donald P; Richter, Jean C; Schaeffer, William T; Dobson, Patrick; Crouse, Matthew
Subject: SIR
Importance: High

Gentlemen,

Earlier today, _____ (Kirkuk) shot one round at a Black BMW while in route to Sulamaniya. The BMW approached the motorcade from the rear and failed to respond to verbal instruction, hand signals, high-intensity lights, and pen flares. One round was fired into the engine compartment of the vehicle, at which time the driver pulled over without further incident. No injuries were noted and the motorcade continued on its mission.

The team was scheduled to remain in Sulamaniya overnight so the formal SIR will be delayed until they return.

If you have any questions, please let me know.

Pascal J. Budge

Work: (703) 462-7270
Mobile: (817) 907-9827
Email: _____

b6
b7C

This message may contain DynCorp International Privileged/Proprietary information. If this email is not intended for you, and you are not responsible for the delivery of this email message to the addressee, do not keep, copy or deliver this email message to anyone. Please destroy this email in its entirety and notify the sender by reply email. Your cooperation is appreciated.

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PSD - After Action Report



W00933 (P)

b7E, F b6 b7C

U0165

Team: D7 Mission #: 091007-7-1 Departure Time: 0700 Return Time: 1600

Venue/Location:

Perizh Hotel b7E, F

Principal(s):

Jennifer Mergy b6 b7C

Shift Leader:

Agent-in-Charge:

Cody Lyon

TC:

YES NO

Mission Planning Phase

- ☒ ☐ 1. Did the Shift Leader coordinate available support?

Remarks: SFC at PB Andrea and at PB Andrea (IPLO side) b6 b7C

- ☐ ☒ 2. Any Issues coordinating with the Principal or their representatives?

Remarks:

- ☒ ☐ 3. Was there an advance packet for this venue?

Remarks:

- ☐ ☒ 4. Was coordination made with someone at the venue prior to departure?

Remarks:

- ☒ ☐ 5. Was Intel consulted concerning incidents/threats pertaining to venue, routes and principal(s)?

Remarks:

031150070300

Document Last Updated: 18 April 2007
Sensitive But Unclassified



Mission Execution Phase

YES NO

- ☒ ☐ 1. Were any MSR's used for movement? (Name and Entry/Exit Grey Codes)

Remarks: Route 2, Route 4

03115007030

- ☐ ☒ 2. Did the team encounter any unplanned barricades, checkpoints or obstacles?

Remarks:

- ☐ ☒ 3. Did the team encounter impassable traffic?

Remarks:

- ☐ ☒ 4. Did team experience any problems relating to bridges, overpasses or tunnels?

Remarks:

- ☐ ☒ 5. Did any team vehicle make contact with any other vehicle or object? If YES, include vehicle GP#.

Remarks:

- ☐ ☒ 6. Did the team believe they were under dedicated surveillance at any point?

Remarks:

- ☐ ☒ 7. Did the team come under direct attack or witness an attack on others?

Remarks:

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YES NO

Actions at Venue

- ☐ ☒ 1. Has the barrier plan or guard force procedures changed for the venue?

Remarks:

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- ☐ ☐ 2. What were the composition, disposition and location of local security?

Remarks: Friendly

- ☒ ☐ 3. Does the venue have rules against rifles or the use of K9 assets?

Remarks: Long guns are discouraged but not of limits at both venues.

- ☐ ☐ 4. How many ways can you enter and exit the building and grounds?

Remarks: The Perizh hotel has one entrance in the front and one in the back The Revan restaurant has one entrance at the front and one at the back.

- ☐ ☒ 5. Was there an established POC to meet your Principal?

Remarks:

- ☐ ☐ 6. In what room was the meeting held and what was the location of the safe room?

Remarks: The meeting at the Perizh Hotel was held on the 2nd floor in the conference room. It is located on the left hand side as you exit the stairs. The _____ located on the right hand side as you exit the stairs. The meeting at the Revan Restaurant was held in the dining room and the _____ at the back of the restaurant.

b7E, F

- ☐ ☒ 7. Did the team experience any type of incident while at the venue?

Remarks:

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Shift Leader Comments**Remarks:**

On the 10th of September, while stopped in a [redacted] car, motorcade west bound on route 4 [redacted] at 0730), a Black BMW with one occupant approached the motorcade from the rear. The motorcade was stopped in the check point and the CAT vehicle was still moving while approaching the motorcade. The left rear [redacted] and right rear [redacted] used verbal commands and hand signals to attempt to stop the car. The car failed to stop. The right rear fired one pen flare and the vehicle stopped in the middle of the road.

On the 10th of September, while the motorcade was stopped at a check point [redacted] at 0758). A white Land Cruiser with two occupants approached the rear of the motorcade at a high rate of speed. The left and right rear used verbal commands and hand signals to attempt to stop the car. The car failed to stop and the left rear and right rear fired one pen flare each. The vehicle then stopped in the middle of the road.

On the 11th of September, while the motorcade was moving [redacted], A white town car with one occupant approached the rear of the motorcade at a high rate of speed. The left and right rear used verbal commands and hand signals to attempt to stop the car. The car failed to stop and the left rear and right rear fired one pen flare each. The vehicle then stopped in the middle of the road.

On the 11th of September, while the motorcade was stopped at a check point [redacted] at 1658), A Black Opel with one occupant approached the rear of the motorcade at a high rate of speed. The left and right rear used verbal commands and hand signals to attempt to stop the car. The car failed to stop and the left rear fired one pen flare. The vehicle then pulled over to the right shoulder and stopped.

On the 11th of September, while the motorcade was moving [redacted], A red sedan with one occupant approached the rear of the motorcade at a high rate of speed. The left and right rear used verbal commands and hand signals to attempt to stop the car. The car failed to stop and the left rear and right rear fired one pen flare each. The vehicle then stopped in the middle of the road.

On the 11th of September, while the motorcade was moving [redacted], A White sedan with one occupant approached the rear of the motorcade at a high rate of speed. The white sedan passed the red sedan, that was just stopped, and began flashing its head lights. The left and right rear used verbal commands and hand signals to attempt to stop the car. The car failed to stop and the left rear fired one pen flare. The vehicle continued to approach the rear of the motorcade. The left rear and right rear muzzled the car with their weapons. The vehicle then slowed down and backed off of the motorcade.

Detail Leader note: When the Team reported the pen flare fired at the Black Opel the TOC thought they had fired a round into the vehicle. When the Team returned to the REO an were questioned it was determined that it was a miscommunication between the Team and the TOC. All members of the CAT vehicle and the Team Leader were interviewed by RSO Hislop and RSO Rohlf. Procedures were put in place to make sure all incidents were reported and understood clearly.

Detail Leader

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Document Last Updated: 18 April 2007
Sensitive But Unclassified

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY



DECLASSIFIED

U.S. Embassy Baghdad

September 12, 2007



Spot Report – 091207-01

SUBJECT: Complex attack against COM team**REPORTING OFFICE:** RSO Baghdad, Iraq

SUMMARY: On 12 September 2007 at 10:23 hours, a COM Tactical Support Team (TST) was attacked with an improvised explosive device (IED). The initial blast was followed with small arms fire (SAF) attacks from two separate locations. The TST returned defensive _____ fire and requested immediate emergency support. One armored Puma vehicle was severely damaged by the IED and its occupants were evacuated into other TST vehicles. The TST gathered all personnel and relocated to a safer location approximately 300 meters northeast of the scene. Additional TST and COM air assets provided immediate support. Three injured team personnel were evacuated to the 28th Combat Support Hospital, located inside the International Zone, for treatment. U.S. Army ground forces recovered the damaged Puma and secured all sensitive items. Two of the TST members incurred non-life threatening injuries and were returned to duty. The third had a head laceration and suspected broken ribs. He was admitted into the 28th CSH for further treatment and observation.

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RSO ACTION: The RSO TOC coordinated the deployment of tactical response teams and air assets. All team members and equipment were accounted for. DS/CC was notified.

DRAFTED BY: ~~Darren Hanner, RSO TOC Watch Officer~~
APPROVED BY: ~~Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad~~

00167 (1)
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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 13 Sep 07
Location: IVO
Task Order: 6
Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti
Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

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Date of Incident: 12 Sep 07
Time of Incident: 1023
Contractor Involved: Blackwater
Detail Location of Incident: 500 meters west of
Personnel Involved: Tactical Support Team (TST)

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Incident Synopsis: On 12 Sep 07 at 1023 a Tactical Support Team (TST) was providing support for. While in the vicinity of, reported they were struck with an IED which followed with small arms fire (SAF). reported two injuries and requested MEDEVAC. RSO Air assets responded, sanitized the damaged vehicle, evacuated the attack zone, and established an LZ. The most critical injury was air evacuated to the CSH. With support from transported the other injured IC to the CSH. The damaged vehicle was recovered by the 1/32 MP company and transported to FOB Shield. Further recovery efforts are pending. The two injured ICs are being evaluated and treated for non-life threatening injuries at the CSH.

Outline injuries if applicable: Initial reports indicate one IC sustained a closed wound arm injury and the other IC sustained a possible concussion.

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)		Date/Time of Statement 12 Sep 07 / 1600 hours	
Name _____		Team _____		Situation EFP Attack	
Location/Venue _____		Time Occurred 1023 hours		Date Occurred 12 Sep 2007	

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Incident Report BW 09-12-07 (1) Weapons Discharge Baghdad

The following after action report reflects, in summary, _____ activities during an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) attack and subsequent small arms fire attack. This incident occurred on 12 September 2007 at approximately 1023 hours. The attack occurred southwest of the intersection commonly referred to as _____. The exact grid of the explosion, per _____, was _____. _____ personnel involved in this incident include the following:

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On 12 September 2007 at approximately 0730 hours, _____ conducted a pre-mission briefing. The mission brief included rules of engagement and escalation of force per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy, routes to be taken, and actions on contact in the event the team was attacked. The briefing also included threat intelligence to include sniper activity, recent small arms attacks, and explosive attacks in the Baghdad area of operation. The motorcade was comprised of _____

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On 12 September 2007 at approximately 1023 hours, _____ was traveling northeast between the intersections commonly referred to as _____ and _____ in direct support of Team _____. _____ was traveling to the State Vet Company located near the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. After passing through an unmarked intersection approximately one quarter of a mile northeast of _____, at grid _____ there was a large explosion coming from the outside curb of the northeast bound lanes. The explosion, later identified as a multi array EFP hidden in a display of watermelons stacked on the side of the road, was directed at the ERV. The ERV was hit on the front right side of the vehicle damaging the right front tire and engine compartment. The force of the explosion and resulting damage led the ERV to turn right disabling it on the outside shoulder at a right angle to the street with the rear end still in the outside lane of traffic. _____ who was being trained as a Shift Leader in the Command vehicle, immediately notified the Tactical Operations Center of the incident via _____ radio. Shift Leader (actual) _____ then took over all radio communications. After the explosion, the _____ vehicles set up defensive positions in front, beside and behind the downed ERV.


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Immediately following the explosion and setting up of the defensive positions, the fire team was deployed to treat injured members of the ERV. Turret PSS _____ was located in the middle of the roadway after being ejected from the rear turret position. _____ began treating _____ for head injuries when almost simultaneously _____ was engaged by a secondary attack of small arms fire. The small arms fire was directed at _____ from rooftops, windows, and street level from buildings located on the northeast and southwest of _____'s position by subjects wearing civilian clothing and carrying what appeared to be AK-47 rifles. In fear for their lives and the lives of their teammates, fire team members and turret PSS from

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Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)				Date/Time of Statement 12 Sep 07 / 1600 hours	
Name			Team		Situation EFP Attack		
Location/Venue			Time Occurred 1023 hours		Date Occurred 12 Sep 2007		

the [redacted] engaged visible targets with their Department of State issued [redacted] was radioed to respond to the incident. After a short period of time, the small arms fire became only sporadic.

[redacted] and several fire team members, continued to treat the wounded and cross load personnel and sensitive items from the ERV into the Command vehicle. RSO Air was contacted to evacuate [redacted] who was unconscious and appeared seriously injured. RSO Air arrived overhead but was advised not to land at location due to continued sporadic small arms fire.

Upon loading the wounded and sanitizing the ERV, [redacted] accounted for all personnel and equipment then drove to [redacted] and set up a Landing Zone (LZ) for the evacuating helicopter. Immediately upon arrival, [redacted] was loaded into the helicopter and transported to the Combat Support Hospital (CSH) in the International Zone (IZ). [redacted] then departed the area en route to FOB Shield for a second evacuation of turret PSS [redacted] who also received shrapnel wounds in the explosion. While en route to FOB Shield, it was determined that [redacted] was stable enough to be ground transported to the CSH. [redacted] transported [redacted] to the CSH in the IZ and turned him over to medical personnel. [redacted] who was also in the ERV at the time of the explosion, was turned over to medical staff after complaining of dizziness and left leg pain.

[redacted] then drove to the [redacted] staging area without further incident. The [redacted] remaining vehicles were inspected and found to have no damage. All remaining personnel were again accounted for and no other injuries were reported. All command personnel were apprised of the incident and liaison was set up at the CSH.

Note: Currently there are still 2 weapon systems lost in the incident. They are (1) [redacted] and (1) [redacted] was witnessed by several [redacted] personnel to be completely destroyed. At the time of the incident, the front end of the Puma was engulfed in flames making the [redacted] unrecoverable. The extreme heat and shrapnel damage to the [redacted] made it unusable and the barrel itself appeared through the flames to be wilted from the initial heat of the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP). The condition of the [redacted] is unknown. Also, the [redacted] system is unaccounted for with a serial# [redacted]. Puma number 3 has not been recovered back to [redacted] and is currently being stored at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shield.///END///

AR 000456

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY



U.S. Embassy Baghdad

September 12, 2007



SPOT REPORT - 091207-02

SUBJECT: COM TST Team attacked by SAF**REPORTING OFFICE:** RSO Baghdad

SUMMARY: On 12 September, at 1703 hours, a COM PSD was engaged by SAF (small arms fire). The PSD team consisted of _____ Suburbans followed by a CAT (Counter Assault Team), an armored HMMWV. The PSD team departed the International Zone and traveled to the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). The PSD team exited the BIAP and was proceeding east on Route _____ back to the International Zone. As the PSD team approached the intersection of _____ they reduced speed slightly to allow the slower CAT vehicle to catch up. Near this point stands a large abandoned six story concrete building on the south side of the road (to their right) which has been the location of three previous small arms attacks against COM personnel (9 January, 10 January, and 2 February 2007).

As the CAT vehicle rejoined the rear of the motorcade, the lead vehicle of the motorcade was abreast of the abandoned building. Three individuals were observed on the top floor of the building. One individual had a rifle of unknown type and began firing at the motorcade. The two other individuals were each armed with what appeared to be RPG-7's. The command was given to drive through the ambush. The gunner in the turret of the CAT vehicle engaged the attackers with his _____ firing approximately _____ rounds.

A member of the CAT team opened the right window of the HMMWV and fired an additional 15-20 rounds of _____ ammunition.

As the CAT vehicle passed the building the insurgents were observed running from room to room through the top floor in retreat. There were no injuries to COM personnel and none of the vehicles were damaged or struck.

RSO ACTION: The RSO TOC U.S. Army LNO notified contact the Army Quick Reactionary Force (QRF) however the engagement happened so quickly they did not need to deploy. PSD members are completing written statements. RSO is investigating the incident.

LOCATION: 200 meters west of [REDACTED], Route [REDACTED], Baghdad, Iraq

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DRAFTED BY: Sam Pikula, RSO TOC Watch Officer, Baghdad
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

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Date of Report: 12 Sept 07

Location:

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report:

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 12 Sept 07

Time of Incident: 1703

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident:

Personnel Involved:

Incident Synopsis: On 12 Sept 07 at 1703 hours, [] a protection team, was returning to the IZ from BIAP. As the team approached [] the motorcade slowed to allow the CAT support vehicle [] the opportunity to close on the follow vehicle. Both teams were engaged with small arms fire (SAF) from an abandoned building to the right of the highway. The turret PSS of the CAT vehicle returned fired to targets identified in the building. The teams continued to move through the attack area and returned to the IZ without further incident. There were no injuries to CoM personnel and no apparent damage to CoM assets.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00443: 20070912 EOF [REDACTED] Baghdad

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REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00166

Impact: NOT SPECIFIED

Status: OPEN

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070912 EOF [REDACTED] Baghdad

Status: OPEN

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ CRIME / INCIDENT

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-07316

Optional Case Info

Impact: NOT SPECIFIED

Principal Judicial District:

NOT APPLICABLE

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

■ IRAQ
■ UNITED STATES

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: RSO TOC

Name: RSO

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Reta, Mario

ARSO

BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On September 12, 2007 an RSO PSD was involved in a use of force while traveling on Route [REDACTED] en route to the International Zone from BIAP. The PSD reported being engaged by SAF (small arms fire) and team members reported seeing individuals armed with RPG-7 and engaged the individuals. There were no injuries to COM personnel and none of the vehicles were damaged or struck.

Primary Subjects**Case Reports****Attachments**

Title	Type	Size
Spot Report		293 kB
Team member statements	Adobe PDF	6,520 kB

Related Cases**Outstanding Warrants****Status History**

11/25/2007	OPEN
11/25/2007	OPEN

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

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Incident

On Saturday September 12th, at 1220 hours, I attended [redacted] mission briefing. [redacted] Shift Leader (SL) for [redacted] briefed the day's mission, routes, rules of engagement and use of force per the Department of State firearms policy. The motorcade consisted of [redacted] I was the Turret PSS in the Rear Counter Assault Vehicle, the vehicle of [redacted] motorcade.

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On 12 September 2007 at 1703 hours, [redacted] and [redacted] were returning from Baghdad International Airport to the International Zone on Route [redacted] was traveling eastbound in the vicinity of [redacted] in a [redacted] motorcade, approximately 200 meters behind [redacted] As [redacted] approached the five story vacant building located approximately 500 meters west of [redacted] on the south side of Route [redacted] I observed three males on the top floor of the building. This building has been the origin of numerous attacks on coalition forces traveling along Route [redacted] Just before we reached the building, [redacted] advised me the building was in sight. I oriented the turret toward the south side of the road where the building was located. As we approached the building, I clearly observed at least three subjects on the top floor of the building which is gutted with no windows or walls. One of the subjects appeared to be holding a rifle, possibly an AK-47 and the other two were holding what appeared to be Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) Launchers. After seeing the individuals, I yelled down to my teammates, notifying them of the threat. Reference is made to [redacted] report for further details relative to his activities during this incident. All of the males were wearing light maroon shirts, matching the color of the building. The males were located in the northwest corner of the top floor.

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I then observed the male subject with the AK-47 point it at [redacted] motorcade and start firing as evidenced by clearly visible muzzle flashes. The other two individuals were kneeling down with the RPG's angled down across their chests. In fear for the lives of my teammates and the eight principals in [redacted] motorcade, I immediately engaged visible threats with my Department of State issued [redacted] As I was engaging the individuals, [redacted] motorcade continued driving through the attack. One of the individuals appeared to run toward the east side of the building while the other continued firing. I engaged the threat until the individuals stopped firing at [redacted] motorcade. [redacted] immediately reported the incident to [redacted] SL who in turn notified the Tactical Operations Center via DPD. Our motorcade was able to break contact and returned to the International Zone, without further incident. No damage was located after an inspection of all vehicles in the motorcade was completed and no injuries were reported.///End///



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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 13th day of 2007.

Signed	
Printed	Mario A. Peta

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Ted A. Carpenter
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad

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DE CLASSE 3120

Sworn Statement

Date 12 Sep 2007	Time 1930 hours
Location WPPS Camp Baghdad, Iraq	

I, [redacted], hereby make the following statement at the request of

[redacted], who has been identified to me as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. I understand that this statement is made in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry regarding potential misconduct or improper performance of official duties and that disciplinary action, including dismissal from the Department's Worldwide Personnel Protective Services contract, may be undertaken if I refuse to provide this statement or fail to do so fully and truthfully. I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001. I agree that the statements I furnish and any information or evidence resulting therefrom may be used in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which could result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.

General Military/Civilian Experience

During my enlistment, I was trained in the use of rifles, pistols, machine guns and grenade launchers. I also received training in target recognition and threat assessment as well as shooting from a moving platform.

I received further training while attending WPPS II with Blackwater USA, in August of 2006. During this time, I received training in personal security details, use of [REDACTED] I further trained in target recognition, threat assessment, and shooting from a moving platform. I am currently assigned to the Blackwater WPPS contract in Baghdad, Iraq.

Incident

On Saturday September 12th, at 1220 hours, I attended _____ mission briefing. _____ Shift Leader (S/L) for _____ briefed the day's mission, routes, rules of engagement and use of force per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy. The motorcade consisted of _____ I was the _____ PSS in the rear Counter Assault Vehicle, a tan HMMWV, the last vehicle of the _____ motorcade.

On 12 September 2007 at approximately 1655 hours, [redacted] and [redacted] departed from Baghdad International Airport en route to the International Zone (IZ) via Route [redacted] was traveling eastbound in the vicinity of [redacted] in a [redacted] motorcade approximately 250 meters behind [redacted] in the eastbound lanes of traffic. As the motorcade approached the five story light maroon in color, vacant building located approximately 500 meters west of [redacted] on the south side of the road, Tactical Commander (TC) [redacted] advised all PSS team members of the upcoming threat. This building is known to be the origin of numerous attacks on coalition forces traveling this route. At this time, turret PSS [redacted] orientated his [redacted] in the direction of the vacant building. As the counter assault vehicle got closer to the building, turret PSS [redacted] advised he observed what appeared to be at least three armed subjects on the top floor of the building.

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As I heard turret PSS [redacted] yell out the threat of armed subjects, one subject with an AK-47 and two armed with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG's), I looked to the upper floor of the building and located the subjects. All of the males were wearing light maroon shirts, matching the color of the building. The males were located in the northwest corner of the building. I first observed the male subject with a rifle firing at [redacted] motorcade. I could clearly see the muzzle flashes from the subject's rifle as he was firing at [redacted]. I also observed the other two subjects were kneeling down with RPG's angled down across their chest. In fear for the lives of my teammates and the eight principals [redacted] was escorting, I immediately engaged the subjects with my Department of State issued [redacted] TC [redacted] advised Shift Leader (SL) [redacted] of the engagement who contacted the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) via [redacted] radio. I continued to engage visible targets on the top floor until my field of fire was obstructed by the door jam of the HMMWV. [redacted] and [redacted] broke contact and were able to drive through the threat.

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[redacted] and [redacted] returned to the International Zone (IZ) through Check Point [redacted] without further incident. No [redacted] or [redacted] personnel reported any injuries and no vehicles were damaged in the incident.///END///

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I hereby swear or affirm that the information contained in this statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge.


Signed	
Printed	1
Address	WPPS Camp Baghdad

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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 13th day of 2007.

Signed	
Printed	Mario A. Reta

SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Witness Signature	
Printed	Ted A. Carpenter
Address	USEMB BAGHDAD

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Blackwater USA		After Action Report (AAR)		Date/Time of Statement 12 September 2007/1930 hours	
Name	log b7c	Team	Situation Small Arms Engagement		
Location/Venue	BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT		Time Occurred 1708 hours	Date Occurred 12 Sep 2007	

Incident Report BW 09-12-07 (2) Weapons Discharge Baghdad

On Saturday September 12th, at 1220 hours, [redacted] attended [redacted] mission briefing. [redacted] Shift Leader (SL) for [redacted], briefed the day's mission, routes, rules of engagement and use of force per the Department of State Mission Firearms Policy. The motorcade consisted of [redacted] Counter Assault Vehicle, a tan HMMWV, was the [redacted] vehicle in the motorcade. [redacted] team members involved in this incident included the following: [redacted]

On 12 September 2007 at approximately 1655 hours, [redacted] and [redacted] departed from Baghdad International Airport en route to the International Zone via Route [redacted] was traveling eastbound in the vicinity of [redacted] in a [redacted] motorcade approximately 250 meters behind [redacted] in the eastbound lanes of traffic. As the motorcade approached the five story skeleton of a building located approximately 500 meters west of [redacted] on the south side of the road, Tactical Commander (TC) [redacted] advised all PSS team members of the upcoming threat. This building is known to be the origin of numerous attacks on coalition forces on this route. At this time, Turret PSS [redacted] orientated the [redacted] in the direction of the vacant building. As the Counter Assault Vehicle got closer to the building, Turret PSS [redacted] advised he observed what appeared to be at least three armed subjects on the top floor of the building.

One of the individuals was armed with a rifle that appeared to be an AK-47, and two other subjects were armed with what appeared to be Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG's) launchers. Turret PSS [redacted] observed the subject with the rifle, point it in the direction of [redacted], and start firing at the motorcade as evidenced by clearly visible muzzle flashes. Turret PSS [redacted] saw the two subjects kneeling with the RPG's strapped across their chests. Fearing for the lives of his teammates and the eight (8) principles in [redacted] motorcade, turret PSS [redacted] engaged the visible threats with his Department of State issued [redacted] PSS [redacted] also engaged visible threats with his Department of State issued [redacted] from the right rear window of the HMMWV.

TC [redacted] advised SL [redacted] of the engagement who contacted the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) via [redacted] radio. Turret PSS [redacted] observed one of the subjects run towards the east side of the building and one of the subjects continued to engage the motorcade. Turret PSS [redacted] continued to engage the visible threats until the small arms fire stopped. [redacted] and [redacted] broke contact and were able to drive through the threat.

[redacted] and [redacted] returned to the International Zone (IZ) through Check Point [redacted] without further incident. No [redacted] or [redacted] personnel reported any injuries and no vehicles were damaged.///END///

[redacted] log
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BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

U.S. Embassy Baghdad

September 15, 2007



Spot Report – 091507-01

SUBJECT: PSD Team EOF on Aggressive Vehicle**REPORTING OFFICE:** RSO Kirkuk, Iraq

SUMMARY: On 15 September, 2007 at approximately 1052, a DynCorp PSD Team traveling in a [redacted] motorcade to the Kurdish Islamic Group (KIG) encountered an aggressive motorist.

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The motorcade was stopped at a traffic light in the vicinity of grid location [redacted]. The trailing vehicles stopped at an appropriate distance behind the last suburban. The motorcade vehicles were offset with the [redacted]. Based on the road size and the configuration of the vehicle lane, there was a vehicle-sized gap between the motorcade and the curb.

A taxi cab, with two male occupants, by-passed the halted vehicles on the curb side using the exposed gap. The PSD member providing rear security for the Counter Assault Team vehicle (vehicle [redacted]) attempted to gain the attention of the driver with hand signals and a water bottle. The vehicle was traveling too fast for the given signals to be effective and appeared to be heading straight toward the limousine; the rear security team member fired one well-aimed [redacted] round into the grill of the taxi cab.

The taxi cab immediately came to a stop and it is undetermined whether the shot actually disabled the vehicle. No one exited the vehicle and there were

no visible injuries. The shift leader immediately notified the Erbil TOC and the motorcade continued to the scheduled venue with no further incidents.

RSO ACTION: PSD members will be debriefed and written statements will be taken. RSO will complete an ROI and provide documentation to the RSCC upon completion.

LOCATION: Traffic light in the vicinity of grid coordinate

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DRAFTED BY: Jesse Thomas, ARSO Erbil
CLEARED BY: Michael Rohlf, RSO Kirkuk
APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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Case Summary

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.

RS-2007-00337: 20070915 EOF Erbil



Impact:
Status: OPEN

REGIONAL SECURITY

BAGHDAD #: BAGHDAD-2007-00108

Required Case Info

Case Title: 20070915 EOF Erbil

Status: OPEN

Case Type: ADMINISTRATIVE

Program Type: REGIONAL SECURITY

Categories:

■ INFORMATION

Preliminary Inquiry: PQ-2007-05340

Optional Case Info

Impact:

Principal Judicial District:

Due Date:

Countries Impacted:

■ IRAQ
■ UNITED STATES

Violations:

Nexus:

TECS Lookout: No

Case Origin/Source

Source Organization: DS, RSO-Kirkuk

Name: RSO-Kirkuk Michael Rohlf

Phone:

Source Comments:

Personnel Assignment

Carpenter, Theodore ASAC BAGHDAD
Reta, Mario ARSO BAGHDAD

Synopsis

On 15 September, 2007 at approximately 1052, a DynCorp PSD Team traveling in a motorcade to the Kurdish Islamic Group (KIG) encountered an aggressive motorist and was involved in a use of force incident. There were no known injuries or damages to COM property or personnel. The shooting was reported immediately to the RSO TOC in Erbil.

Primary Subjects

Case Reports

Date	Snippet
09/15/2007	See attached ROI by Kirkuk ...

Attachments

Title	Type	Size
PSD after action report	MS Word	128 kB
ROI by ARSO Jesse Thomas	MS Word	96 kB
Spot Report	MS Word	271 kB
Spot report/Info Probe	MS Word	272 kB


Related Cases

Outstanding Warrants

Status History

09/16/2007	OPEN
09/16/2007	OPEN

This document was generated on a system classified for up to and including SBU information.



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Diplomatic Security Service
Baghdad

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

U0177

DS Case Number	Case Title	ROI Type	Report Date
RS-2007-00337	20070915 EOF Erbil	CASE INTERIM	15-SEP-07
Case Type	Program	Dates Investigated	
ADMINISTRATIVE	REGIONAL SECURITY	15-SEP-07 - 21-SEP-07	
Case Impact	Case Status	Open/Close Case Dates	
	OPEN	16-SEP-07	

See attached ROI by Kirkuk ARSO Jesse Thomas.

On September 15, 2007, [redacted] was en route to the KIG when they encountered an aggressive orange and white taxi cab. [redacted] was temporarily halted at a stop light at grid [redacted] (near PSD blue-gray code). [redacted] the rear gunner of the PSD team stopped vehicles approximately [redacted] meters from the last PSD vehicle, as to provide a protective bubble around the motorcade. The counter assault team (CAT) vehicle had warning signs [in English and Arabic] clearly displayed on the rear of the vehicle and personnel, the rear gunner positioned in the roof hatch directing traffic.

All vehicles to the rear of the motorcade had come to a complete stop; approximately 100 meters behind the CAT vehicle. There was a vehicle-sized gap between the curb and the stopped vehicles; this was largely due to the layout of the traffic lane and the location where vehicles halted. At this time, an aggressive orange and white taxi cab passed all stopped vehicles using the previously mentioned gap and headed straight toward the motorcade at a high rate of speed, estimated at 60 miles per hour. When the taxi cab was approximately [redacted] meters away from the motorcade, DynCorps personal security specialist [redacted] (left rear gunner of the CAT vehicle) began giving hand and arm signals in order to stop the vehicle. Additionally, passengers of the other halted vehicles unsuccessfully began to warn the taxi cab with hand and arm signals as well. At approximately [redacted] meters out, [redacted] then escalated to a water bottle. A water bottle was deployed in the direction of the swiftly approaching taxi cab in hopes to stop the vehicle. It was made clear that the aforementioned warning signals in addition to repeated voice commands were not going to halt the aggressive taxi cab.

DANILOFF assessed that the taxi cab was an immediate threat to the safety of the motorcade. At approximately [redacted] meters out, he raised his [redacted] rifle and established a sight picture on the engine block of the approaching taxi cab. A single [redacted] round was fired into the engine block of the aggressive taxi cab. Due to the speed and the close proximity of the taxi cab, the aggressive vehicle came to a complete stop adjacent to the CAT vehicle. [redacted] gave commands for the two occupants to remain in the taxi cab and keep their hands visible. There were no observed injuries to the vehicle occupants and it is unknown as to the severity of damage to the taxi cab.

The motorcade continued on to the KIG building with no further incidents.

RA note: On September 11, 2007, PSD personnel were briefed to use extreme caution while conducting missions due to Ramadan and the historical spike in hostilities during this occasion. Specifically, a threat assessment produced by the Regional Embassy Office in Kirkuk warned of eight suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices throughout Iraq during the first week of Ramadan and the use of limpet grenades on U.S. armored vehicles. Furthermore, RA will inform the appropriate authorities to follow-up on the Kurdish translation for the vehicle warning signs.

Based on the facts of the case, the reporting agent (RA) concluded the escalation of force was appropriate and within the parameters of the force continuum policy. No injuries to the occupants were observed

Reporting Official:	Distribution:
Reta, Mario	
ARSO	
Approving Official(s):	
Carpenter, Theodore- WAITING FOR APPROVAL	
ASAC	

Case closed.

DECLASSIFIED

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PSD - After Action Report

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Team: (choose) Mission #: 091607-11-1 Departure Time: 1030 Return Time: 1245

Venue/Location: Kurdistan Islamic Group

Principal(s): Jennifer Mergy

Shift Leader:

Agent-in-Charge: George Phillips

TC:

Mission Planning Phase

YES NO

☒ ☐ 1. Did the Shift Leader coordinate available support?

Remarks:

Remarks:

☐ ☒ 2. Any Issues coordinating with the Principal or their representatives?

Remarks:

☒ ☐ 3. Was there an advance packet for this venue?

Remarks:

☐ ☒ 4. Was coordination made with someone at the venue prior to departure?

☒ ☐ 5. Was Intel consulted concerning incidents/threats pertaining to venue, routes

Remarks:

and principal(s)?

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PSD – After Action Report



Mission Execution Phase

YES NO

☐☒

1. Were any MSR's used for movement? (Name and Entry/Exit Grey Codes)

Remarks:

☐☒

2. Did the team encounter any unplanned barricades, checkpoints or obstacles?

Remarks:

☒☐

3. Did the team encounter impassable traffic?

Remarks: Motorcade was unable to pass traffic at [redacted] due to heavy congestion at intersection.

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4. Did team experience any problems relating to bridges, overpasses or tunnels?

Remarks:

☐☒

5. Did any team vehicle make contact with any other vehicle or object? If YES, include vehicle GP#.

Remarks:

☒☐

6. Did the team believe they were under dedicated surveillance at any point?

Remarks: Possible probing of motorcade at [redacted]

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☐☒

7. Did the team come under direct attack or witness an attack on others?

Remarks:

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PSD – After Action Report



YES NO

Actions at Venue

- ☐ ☒ 1. Has the barrier plan or guard force procedures changed for the venue?

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Remarks:

- ☒ ☐ 2. What were the composition, disposition and location of local security?

Remarks: Security asked probing questions of PSD team and DOS interpreter. Security asked PSD what we do and what government agency we work for. They wanted to know specifically if PSD was CIA, FBI, Police or US Army. They also asked how long PSD had been in country and if we spoke Kurdish or Arabic. Continued below.

- ☐ ☒ 3. Does the venue have rules against rifles or the use of K9 assets?

Remarks:

- ☒ ☐ 4. How many ways can you enter and exit the building and grounds?

Remarks: You can enter and exit from the east, west and south of the building.

- ☒ ☐ 5. Was there an established POC to meet your Principal?

Remarks:

- ☒ ☐ 6. In what room was the meeting held and what was the location of the safe room?

Remarks: The meeting was conducted on the second level in a conference room located in the first room to the left as you enter the venue.

- ☐ ☒ 7. Did the team experience any type of incident while at the venue?

Remarks:

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Shift Leader Comments

Remarks: Continued from local security remarks. Local security wanted to know where PSD operators were from in the US. They also inquired where PSD lives in Erbil. The security guard who was asking most of the questions spoke English well and tried to give [redacted] his e-mail address in hopes that [redacted] would e-mail him. He asked SL [redacted] if PSS [redacted] was Korean or Japanese. It should be noted that this guard conducted his questions in law enforcement style interview tactics. He would talk to one PSS and move to another. This guard who seemed to be high in his chain of command, was not seen on venue when the TSS was conducted by [redacted] (Mission # 091207-11-01). The security also spoke with DOS interpreter and asked who our principal was and her job. They specifically asked if our principal was the Erbil Consulate or the Iraqi Consulate. They asked how long the PSD operators stay in country before going on leave. They also made the statement that Americans are only brave because they possess superior weapons. These questions are sometimes asked however the number of questions and frequency of questions added to the totality of the circumstances and created a heightened state of awareness with the PSD operators.

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Escalation of Force.

While en route from USAID Compound to the Kurdistan Islamic Group at [redacted] the motorcade was stopped in traffic due to heavy congestion at the intersection [redacted]. While waiting for congestion to clear, an orange and white local taxi with two male occupants (driver and right front) passed traffic that was stopped 100 meters back from the motorcade and approached the motorcade at a high rate of speed (estimated at over 60 MPH). The taxi disregarded all attempts (verbal commands, hand and arm signals and a water bottle thrown in the air) to stop the vehicle starting at [redacted] meters. The taxi continued on a direct path toward the limo without slowing. At that time the left rear of the CAT vehicle, fearing for the safety and lives of the Principal and PSD team, was forced to engage the taxi with one round to the engine block in an attempt to disable the vehicle. The taxi stopped abruptly and the passengers remained in the vehicle. There were no injuries. The incident was immediately reported to Erbil TOC and the motorcade continued to venue with no further incidents.

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



TITLE PSD (Erbil) Fires a [redacted] Round on Aggressive Vehicle		DS CASE NUMBER / REPORT NUMBER 09/15/2007 - Erbil	
TRUE NAME N/A		CASE TYPE Escalation of Force	
POST RRT - Erbil	DATE REPORTED 09-15-2007	DATES INVESTIGATED 09/15/2007 - 09/19/2007	REPORTING AGENT A/RSO Jesse Thomas

SYNOPSIS

Summary: On September 15, 2007, at approximately 1052 hours, an Erbil [redacted] Chief of Mission personal security detachment (PSD) motorcade ([redacted])—en route to the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) from the Erbil USAID compound—fired a single [redacted] round into an aggressive vehicle. The rear gunner from [redacted] made the determination that the aggressive vehicle was an immediate threat to their motorcade. Based on the facts of the case, the reporting agent (RA) concluded the escalation of force was appropriate and within the parameters of the force continuum policy. No injuries to the occupants were observed. End Summary.

The following chain of events is derived from the statements provided by the team members involved in the shooting:

1. [redacted] was en route to the KIG when they encountered an aggressive orange and white taxi cab. [redacted] was temporarily halted at a stop light at grid [redacted] (near PSD blue-gray code [redacted]). [redacted] the rear gunner of the PSD team stopped vehicles approximately [redacted] meters from the last PSD vehicle, as to provide a *protective bubble* around the motorcade. The counter assault team (CAT) vehicle had warning signs [in English and Arabic] clearly displayed on the rear of the vehicle and personnel—the rear gunner positioned in the roof hatch—directing traffic.
2. All vehicles to the rear of the motorcade had come to a complete stop; approximately 100 meters behind the CAT vehicle. There was a vehicle-sized gap between the curb and the stopped vehicles; this was largely due to the layout of the traffic lane and the location where vehicles halted. At this time, an aggressive orange and white taxi cab passed all stopped vehicles using the previously mentioned gap and headed straight toward the motorcade at a high rate of speed—estimated at 60 miles per hour. When the taxi cab was approximately [redacted] meters away from the motorcade, DynCorps personal security specialist [redacted] (left rear gunner of the CAT vehicle) began giving hand and arm signals in


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REVIEWED BY AGENT SUPERVISOR

(Initials)

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OPTIONAL FORM 249
(FORMERLY DS-838)
JULY 1996
DEPT. OF STATE

Exempt From Automatic Decontrol By Statute
CONTENT MUST NOT BE DISCLOSED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

order to stop the vehicle. Additionally, passengers of the other halted vehicles unsuccessfully began to warn the taxi cab with hand and arm signals as well. At approximately [] meters out, [] then escalated to a water bottle. A water bottle was deployed in the direction of the swiftly approaching taxi cab in hopes to stop the vehicle. It was made clear that the aforementioned warning signals in addition to repeated voice commands were not going to halt the aggressive taxi cab. b7E, F b6 b7C

3. [] assessed that the taxi cab was an immediate threat to the safety of the motorcade. At approximately [] meters out, he raised his [] rifle and established a sight picture on the engine block of the approaching taxi cab. A single [] round was fired into the engine block of the aggressive taxi cab. Due to the speed and the close proximity of the taxi cab, the aggressive vehicle came to a complete stop adjacent to the CAT vehicle. [] gave commands for the two occupants to remain in the taxi cab and keep their hands visible. There were no observed injuries to the vehicle occupants and it is unknown as to the severity of damage to the taxi cab. b6 b7C b7E, F

4. The motorcade continued on to the KIG building with no further incidents.

RA note: On September 11, 2007, PSD personnel were briefed to use extreme caution while conducting missions due to Ramadan and the historical spike in hostilities during this occasion. Specifically, a threat assessment produced by the Regional Embassy Office in Kirkuk warned of eight suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices throughout Iraq during the first week of Ramadan and the use of "limpet" grenades on U.S. armored vehicles. Furthermore, RA will inform the appropriate authorities to follow-up on the Kurdish translation for the vehicle warning signs.

Case closed.

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED



U.S. Embassy Baghdad

September 16, 2007



SPOT REPORT – 091607-02

SUBJECT: EOF incident involving COM PSD team**REPORTING OFFICE:** RSO Al Hillah, Iraq

SUMMARY: On 16 September 2007, at approximately 1240 hours, a [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade team [] was in the process of loading the principles into their motorcade for departure from the venue. A vehicle driven by a lone occupant, of military age, matching a BOLO that the team had been briefed on earlier in the day moved aggressively toward the motorcade. All other vehicles had complied with verbal and visual cues to stop and maintain a distance from the convoy. A member of [] gave visual and verbal signals to the driver of the vehicle including flashing a spot light at the driver in an attempt to make them stop, but the vehicle continued towards the motorcade.

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Following approved rules of engagement, a team member fired 4 rounds from his [] into the vehicle engine compartment. The vehicle came to an immediate stop and the driver appeared uninjured. [] finished loading the principles into the vehicle and then returned to the REO without further incident.

RSO ACTION: Team members are being debriefed and written statements taken. RSO will continue to investigate the situation and report any further details when available.

LOCATION: Al Hillah, Iraq

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTED BY: William G. Embry, Assistant RSO Al-Hillah

APPROVED BY: Ricardo Colon, DRSO Baghdad

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 16 Sep 07

Location:

Task Order: 8

Person Releasing Report: Michael Gibson

Title of Person Releasing Report: Operations Chief RSO TOC REO Al-Hillah

Date of Incident: 16 Sep 07

Time of Incident: 1240 hours local

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: Market Area located to the east side of Shatt al-Hillah River

Personnel Involved:

Incident Synopsis: On 16 September 2007, at approximately 1240 hours, a [] vehicle COM PSD motorcade team [] was in the process of loading the principals into their motorcade for departure from the venue. A vehicle driven by a lone occupant, of military age, matching a BOLO that the team had been briefed on earlier in the day moved aggressively toward the motorcade. All other vehicles had complied with verbal and visual cues to stop and maintain a distance from the convoy. A member of [] gave visual and verbal signals to the driver of the vehicle including flashing a spot light at the driver in an attempt to make them stop, but the vehicle continued towards the motorcade.

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Following approved rules of engagement, a team member fired 4 rounds from his [] into the vehicle engine compartment. The vehicle came to an immediate stop and the driver appeared uninjured. [] finished loading the principals into the vehicle and then returned to the REO without further incident.

Team members are being debriefed and written statements taken. RSO will continue to investigate the situation and report any further details when available.

Outline injuries if applicable: N/A

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW DL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report-091607-02.

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

Date of Report: 30 October 2007

Location: [redacted] withheld due to OPSEC

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: David T. Rogers

Title of Person Releasing Report: Deputy Director of Operations

Date of Incident: 30 October 2007

Time of Incident: 1430 hours

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: Approximately 500 meters outside Check Point [redacted]

Personnel Involved: [redacted]

Incident Synopsis: On 30 October 2007 at 1430 hours, [redacted] was returning to the International Zone when a High Profile PSD Team, later identified as EODT, passed [redacted] on the left hand side just outside gate [redacted]. As the lead vehicle in the EODT motorcade got ahead of [redacted] follow vehicle the Well Gunner in the EODT motorcade fired a single shot into the driver's side windshield of [redacted] follow vehicle. [redacted] did not return fire. When the PSD Teams cleared the check point the US Military stopped the EODT motorcade to determine why it had fired on [redacted] follow vehicle. [redacted] had a Department of State Agent present in the it's motorcade who questioned EODT's SL. The SL was not aware of the fact that his motorcade fired the shot as he was not notified of the incident. No COM personnel were injured, but the windshield in the follow vehicle [redacted]) will have to be replaced.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP Director, BW PM, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report and photos generated and disseminated via secure communication to DS.

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

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Date of Report: 04 November 07

Location: _____

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: Anthony Sanganetti

Title of Person Releasing Report: RSO TOC Commander

Date of Incident: 04 November 07

Time of Incident: 1222

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: _____ intersection near: _____

Personnel Involved: _____ and CAT Support _____

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Incident Synopsis: _____ (with CAT _____ attached) was returning from Daura Oil with principles. Encountering traffic at _____, the motorcade was stopped for a short while in traffic at _____. While waiting in traffic, the up-gunner from the _____ element located in the rear of _____ motorcade noticed a **white hatchback** weaving towards the motorcade. This white vehicle was weaving in and out of traffic while approaching the stopped motorcade. The up-gunner from the CAT vehicle used physical and verbal signals, a pen flare, followed by two rounds from his _____ to the grill. The white vehicle then stopped and two local nationals (1 male and 1 female) exited. There were no apparent injuries to the local nationals as a result of this incident.

Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP, BW SDL, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report.

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U.S. Embassy Baghdad

December 14, 2007



SPOT REPORT – 121407-01

SUBJECT: EOF Involving Stray Dog.**REPORTING OFFICE:** RSO Baghdad, Iraq

SUMMARY: At approximately 1145 hrs, [redacted] was conducting an advance at the New York Times residence in the Red Zone. While the K-9 team was sweeping the perimeter for explosives, an Iraqi guard opened a gate to allow a stray dog to enter from the street. Immediately upon entering through the gate, the dog became aware of the K-9 and became extremely aggressive, lunging at the K-9 and prompting the K-9 handler to place his body between the two dogs and draw his pistol. The K-9 handler and another PSS assigned to cover him shouted at the stray dog, kicked it, and struck it with an [redacted] muzzle to try to repel it, but the stray would not back off. Ultimately, the PSS assigned to cover the K-9 team shot and killed the stray dog with two [redacted] rounds.

b7E, F

**RSO ACTION:** RSO was debriefed on incident.**LOCATION:** Red Zone, Baghdad, Iraq**DRAFTED BY:** Tek Roby, RSO TOC Watch Officer, Baghdad**CLEARED BY:** Ted Carpenter, DRSO Baghdad, Iraq**APPROVED BY:** EARL MILLER, RSO Baghdad, Iraq

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

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Date of Report: 14 December 2007

Location: [redacted] withheld due to OPSEC

Task Order: 6

Person Releasing Report: David T. Rogers

Title of Person Releasing Report: Deputy Director of Operations

Date of Incident: 14 December 2007

Time of Incident: 1145 hours

Contractor Involved: Blackwater

Detail Location of Incident: New York Times Residence in Baghdad (Red Zone)

b7E, F

Personnel Involved: [redacted]

Incident Synopsis: At approximately 1145 hrs, [redacted] was conducting an advance at the New York Times residence in the Red Zone. They had made contact with the security manager; a British guy named [redacted] (LNU) and was making arrangements for the motorcade arrival. While the K-9 team was sweeping the perimeter for explosives, an Iraqi guard opened a gate to allow a stray dog to enter from the street. This dog, we were later told, had been raised by the guards and fed by them since it was a puppy, and was basically a mascot. Immediately upon entering through the gate, the dog became aware of the K-9 and became extremely aggressive, lunging at the K-9 and prompting the K-9 handler to place his body between the two dogs and draw his pistol. The K-9 handler and another PSS assigned to cover him shouted at the stray dog, kicked it, and struck it with an [redacted] muzzle to try to repel it, but the stray would not back off. Due to the fact that the PSS member who was assigned to cover the K-9 team did not have any alternate use of force equipment (i.e. Pepper Spray) the PSS member shot the stray dog with two [redacted] rounds.

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[redacted] the security manager, was reportedly irate over the dog shooting. Several New York Times reporters subsequently came out of the residence and were saddened to learn that their "favorite" dog had been shot. [redacted] spoke to [redacted] and the reporters and did a good job smoothing things over and de-escalating the situation.

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Outline injuries if applicable: None

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: N/A

Personnel Notified of Incident: RSO, HTP Director, BW PM, Ops Chief

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: DOS Spot Report and photos generated and disseminated via secure communication to DS

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BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED



U.S. Embassy Baghdad

December 15, 2007



SPOT REPORT- 121507-03

Subject: COM PSD Team Fires on Aggressive Vehicle**Reporting Office:** RSO TOC Kirkuk

Summary: On 15 December 2007, at 1426, a REO Kirkuk [redacted] COM PSD motorcade en-route to the Erbil USAID compound encountered an aggressive white 4 door BMW with one military-age-male (MAM) operator.

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The motorcade was traveling north on Route 2 [redacted] when a **white 4 door BMW** with one occupant, traveling in the same direction at a high rate of speed, began passing other vehicles that were keeping the 100 meter distance behind the motorcade. The right and left rear gunners of the CAT (Counter Assault Team) vehicle opened their doors and made several attempts to signal the vehicle to slow down using hand and arm signals, shining a flashlight, and throwing a water bottle. The right rear gunner then fired one pen flare at the white BMW, however, the vehicle continued accelerating toward the rear of the motorcade.

When the vehicle accelerated to approximately [redacted] meters from the CAT vehicle, the right rear gunner fired one well aimed round into the grill of the white BMW. The white BMW then swerved both to the right and left, then slowed and kept its distance behind the motorcade before the vehicle dropped out of sight. The occupant appeared to be uninjured.

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The motorcade continued to Erbil USAID compound with no further incidents. A COM personnel was in the motorcade as a passenger, and an ARSO was the acting AIC. No one in the motorcade was injured during the incident.

RSO Action: PSD members will be debriefed upon return to REO Kirkuk and an ROI will be forthcoming.

DRAFTED BY: Michael Rohlf, RSO Kirkuk

APPROVED BY: Ted Carpenter, DRSO

CLEARED BY: Earl Miller, RSO

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INCIDENT REPORT

This report may be in addition to DS SPOT reporting.

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Date of Report: 15 December 2007 (SIR 38-07)
Location: Regional Embassy Office, Kirkuk, Iraq
Task Order: WPPS Northern Iraq
Person Releasing Report: Michael A Boffo
Title of Person Releasing Report: Project Manager, DynCorp WPPS, Northern Iraq

Date of Incident: 15 December 2007
Time of Incident: 14:26
Contractor Involved:
Detail Location of Incident: Northern Iraq, South of Erbil
Personnel Involved:

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Incident Synopsis:

On 15 December 2007, at approximately 1426, a REO Kirkuk _____ COM PSD motorcade en-route to the Erbil USAID compound encountered an aggressive **white 4 door BMW** with one military-age-male (MAM) operator.

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The motorcade was traveling north on Route 2 _____ when a white 4 door BMW with one occupant, traveling in the same direction at a high rate of speed, began passing other vehicles that were keeping the 100 meter distance behind the motorcade. The right and left rear gunners of the CAT (Counter Assault Team) vehicle opened their doors and made several attempts to signal the vehicle to slow down using hand and arm signals, shining a flashlight, and throwing a water bottle. The right rear gunner then fired one pen flare at the white BMW, however, the vehicle continued accelerating toward the rear of the motorcade.

When the vehicle accelerated to approximately _____ meters from the CAT vehicle, the right rear gunner **fired one well aimed round into the grill of the white BMW**. The white BMW then swerved both to the right and left, then slowed and kept its distance behind the motorcade before the vehicle dropped out of sight. The occupant appeared to be uninjured.

The motorcade continued to Erbil USAID compound with no further incidents. A COM personnel was in the motorcade as a passenger, and an ARSO was the acting AIC. No one in the motorcade was injured during the incident.

Outline injuries if applicable: NONE

Supervisor Actions to Mitigate Adverse Actions or Preclude Re-occurrence: _____ placed on administrative leave in accordance with DS regulations involving discharging a weapon.

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Personnel Notified of Incident: 1. RSO Special Agent Rohlf, Michael D, DynCorp WPPS Program Manager Pat Dobson.

Supervisor synopsis of local impact of incident: N/A

Additional Reports Generated: RSO Michael Rohlf, generated additional report.



United States Department of State
U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Iraq

Regional Security Office

ACTION MEMORANDUM
Sensitive But Unclassified

Date: March 14, 2008

To: Earl R. Miller, Regional Security Officer

Subject: UODFI Investigation 20071215, UODFI, Irbil, [redacted]

Background

1. On December 15, 2007, at approximately 1425 hrs, a Kirkuk [redacted] COM PSD motorcade, [redacted] en-route from the Kirkuk REO to RRT Erbil, fired one round from an [redacted] at a vehicle after determining that the vehicle posed an immediate threat to their motorcade. This escalation of force was appropriate and within the parameters of DS use-of-force policy. No injuries to the occupant were observed.

DRSO Adjudication

1. I submit that the investigation by Kirkuk Regional Embassy Office RSO Michael D. ROHLFS into the facts and circumstances of the December 15, 2007 use of deadly force by DynCorp International Personal Security Specialist [redacted], was conducted in accordance with the U.S. Embassy PSD Serious Incident Investigation Handbook and the subsequent findings were based on a thorough evaluation of all evidence available to the investigators.

2. I concur with all of the findings and recommendations by RSO ROHLFS which are detailed in his Final Investigative Report dated December 16, 2007 as follows:

Findings

[1] The use of force exercised by PSS [redacted] was necessary, appropriate for the circumstances, and within established policy.

[2] The [redacted] motorcade CAT vehicle [redacted] does not have any written warning advising people to stay back 100 meters, on the rear of the vehicle. The lack of warning signage on the rear of the CAT Vehicle cannot be solely blamed for causing the EOF since other vehicles kept their distance despite the lack of a written warning. Had the written warning been in place it could have served as the first indicator to drivers for them to keep a 100 meter setback from the motorcade. It is extremely unlikely, given the circumstances in this case, that the driver of the BMW would have respected the written warning any more than he did verbal signals, hand and arm gestures, flashlights, a pen flare, or being muzzled a second time.

Recommendations

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[1] It is recommended that RSO Logistics coordinate with KBR Vehicle Maintenance, Baghdad, to examine the process by which the warning signage is applied to RSO vehicles prior to issuance. Vehicles destined for Kirkuk/Erbil should have signage written in Kurdish and English applied vice Arabic, which most of the population does not understand. DynCorp weekly vehicle reports should be amended to include a category for warning signage.

3. I further find no criminal culpability relative to the actions of PSS [redacted] in this incident. 56
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4. Although the use of deadly force was found to be within the policy at the time of the shooting (Mission Firearms Policy dated August 2007), under the current MFP, this shooting may have been found to be out of policy because firing aimed rounds at approaching vehicles are only permitted as follows:

8 and 9 (Firing aimed rounds into vehicle radiators or engines to stop vehicles, and finally, firing aimed rounds at vehicle drivers to stop vehicles) are not automatic follow-on procedures to be employed solely because a vehicle does not heed the warnings. Because these warnings may not have been noticed or understood by the driver of the vehicle involved, the failure to heed them should not necessarily be construed as a hostile act that poses an imminent threat to the convoy and/or the protectee(s) absent other factors indicating hostile intent.


Therefore, when an approaching vehicle does not slow or stop in response to 1-7 (Graduated Force Responses), PSD operators generally should not move to firing aimed rounds either at the vehicle or drivers (8&9) absent other factors indicating that the vehicle or driver presents an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to the convoy.


Ted Carpenter
Deputy Regional Security Officer for
Investigations and Protective Intelligence

RSO Action

1. I concur with the adjudication of DRSO Carpenter and direct the following action be taken:

[1] RSO Rolfs shall ensure that all vehicles have the appropriate signage in the appropriate language, and ensure that all PSS are thoroughly familiar with the new Mission Firearms Policy and the Rules for the Use of Force.


Earl R. Miller
Senior Regional Security Officer
US Embassy, Baghdad

CONFIDENTIAL

Cc: DCM – Ambassador Patricia A. Butenis
Attachments: Final Report of Investigation

Vol 89

(P)
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 Last Updated: August 2005
 


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GENERAL

This manual serves as the Standard Operating Procedures for contract protective security specialists and support personnel operating under Chief of Mission (COM) authority in Iraq. All contract personnel are required to read, understand and abide by these SOPs.

A signed U.S. Embassy Mission Firearms Policy acknowledgment form will be completed and submitted to the Protection Officer prior to issuance of an Embassy ID card, firearms or any other government furnished equipment.

US EMBASSY

The US Embassy Iraq is located in the coalition controlled International Zone (IZ). The IZ is located along the Tigris River in the heart of downtown Baghdad. The Chancery (also known as [redacted]) is located within the IZ and north of the Embassy Annex. The Embassy Annex is the primary work area for most Embassy personnel. Most Departments within the United States Government have offices within the Embassy. Additionally, within the Embassy Annex are personnel from the United Nations, NATO and Multi-National Forces Iraq. Many Iraqi nationals work within the Embassy compound. b7E

REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE

The Regional Security Office (RSO) is responsible for security at the US Embassy and the protection of personnel under COM authority. Diplomatic Security (DS) special agents assigned to the office serve in various capacities within the RSO office. Currently there are approximately [redacted] DS special agents assigned to various functions. The RSO office is composed of the following sections: b7E

- High Threat Protection Office
- Logistics Office
- Facilities Security Office
- Intelligence and Investigations Office
- Emergency Plans and Training Office

DS special agents are also assigned to the Regional Embassy Offices in Al Hillah, Basrah, Kirkuk, Mosul and USAID Irbil.

In addition to the DS special agents assigned to the US Embassy, there are various other security forces that provide security to the Embassy. These security forces include the following:

- Marine Security Guards – Responsible for internal defense and safeguarding classified information
- 4th MEF Golf 2/6 Marines – Responsible for perimeter security of the US Embassy
- Global Security – Assist 4th MEF 2/6 Marines with perimeter security and man all access control points. Global also provides Ghurka guards to various sites throughout the International Zone.

HIGH THREAT PROTECTION OFFICE

The RSO High Threat Protection Office (HTPO) is responsible for all protective operations under COM authority. Currently, there are [] DS special agents assigned to the protection office. b7E

- Protection Manager
- Deputy Protection Manager
- RSO/TOC Senior Watch Officer
- Agent-in-Charge, Ambassador's Detail []
- Iraq Protective Detail Special Agents [] b7E

Blackwater, Triple Canopy and DynCorp Protective Security Specialists (PSS) deployed to Iraq in support of the Iraq WPPS program are assigned to the HTPO.

The Area of Responsibility for the RSO HTPO covers all of Iraq. PSS can expect to operate throughout Iraq. Extended operations in various regional sites are always a possibility. PSS personnel will NOT operate outside of Iraq.

Regional Protection Teams

The HTPO maintain protective details throughout Iraq. Currently, there are protective details operating in Al Hillah, Basrah, Kirkuk, Mosul, Baqubah, Najaf, Ramadi, Irbil, Karbala and Tikrit. The teams assigned to these locations are in support of Chief of Mission personnel assigned to these locations. They are also available to assist Baghdad based protective details during visits to these sites.

SPECIAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

PSS personnel will be issued appropriate SPE for protective operations. Issued SPE will be maintained in good working condition. All damaged, lost or stolen equipment will be brought to the attention of the Protection Manager via the appropriate chain-of-command. All SPE provided by the Government or purchased by the contractor under the Task Order is property of the USG.

Basic Load

The following equipment is considered basic load for all PSS personnel when conducting protective operations:

-
-
-
-
-


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Team Equipment

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The following SPE is considered team equipment and will be issued to protective details as needed. In order to maintain accountability, all team equipment will be assigned to individual personnel.



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Special Purpose Equipment

Protective details may be issued additional equipment to support special missions. The issued equipment will vary from mission to mission.

Inventory Requirements

- Contractor shall conduct an inventory check of all assets on a monthly basis, noting make, model, serial numbers, or industry recognized identifiers
- Maintain a written accounting for all assets, GFE and CFE, upon initial issuance from the government to the contractor.
- Immediately upon discovery of loss or damage to GFE or CFE, submit a written report to the RSO

FIREARMS

Prior to issuance of a firearm, all contract personnel are required to read, understand and abide by the Mission Firearms Policy (MFP). A signed Attachment C must also be submitted to the Protection Manager. The MFP is the primary policy with regards to firearms and personnel under COM authority.

Definition of "Deadly Force"

"Deadly force" is the use of any force that is likely to cause death or serious physical injury. When a Protective Security Specialist (PSS) uses such force, it may only be done consistent with this policy. Force that is not likely to cause death or serious physical injury, but unexpectedly results in such harm or death, is not governed by this policy.

Probable Cause for the Use of Deadly Force

Probable cause, ~~reason to believe or a reasonable belief~~ for purposes of this policy, means facts and circumstances, including the reasonable inferences drawn there from, known to the PSS at the time of the use of deadly force, that would cause a reasonable PSS to conclude that

the point at issue is probably true. The reasonableness of a belief or decision must be viewed from the perspective of the PSS on the scene, who may often be forced to make split-second decisions in circumstances that are tense, unpredictable, and rapidly evolving. Reasonableness is not to be viewed from the calm vantage point of hindsight.

Principles on Use of Deadly Force

The Contractor adopts the Department of State policy, which recognizes and respects the integrity and paramount value of all human life. Consistent with that primary value, but beyond the scope of the principles articulated here, is the full commitment by the Contractor to take all reasonable steps to prevent the need to use deadly force, as reflected in Diplomatic Security (DS) approved training and procedures. Yet even the best prevention policies are on occasion insufficient, as when a PSS is confronted with a threat to his or her life and/or the life of protectees or other individuals. With respect to these situations and in keeping with the value of protecting all human life, the touchstone of this policy regarding use of deadly force is necessity. Use of deadly force must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances known to the PSS at the time.

Permissible Uses of Deadly Force

The necessity to use deadly force arises when all other available means of preventing imminent and grave danger to PSS or other persons have failed or would be likely to fail. Thus, employing deadly force is permissible when there is no safe alternative to using such force, and without it the PSS or others would face imminent and grave danger. A PSS is not required to place himself or herself, another PSS, or the public in unreasonable danger of death or serious physical injury before using deadly force. PSS will fire at a person only in response to an imminent threat of deadly force or serious physical injury against the PSS, protectees, or other individuals.

Determining whether deadly force is necessary may involve instantaneous decisions that encompass many factors, such as:

- The likelihood that the subject will use deadly force on the PSS or others if such force is not used by the PSS;
- The capabilities of the subject;
- The presence of other persons who may be at risk if force is or is not used; and
- The nature and the severity of the danger posed.

Use of Lesser Means than Deadly Force

If force less than deadly force could reasonably be expected to accomplish the same end, such as restraining a dangerous subject, without unreasonably increasing the danger to the PSS or to others, then it must be used. Deadly force is not permissible in such circumstances, although the reasonableness of the PSS' understanding at the time deadly force was used will be the benchmark for assessing applications of this policy.

Prior to using deadly force, if feasible, PSS will audibly command the subject to submit to their authority. If, however, giving such a command would itself pose a risk of death or serious physical injury to the PSS or others, it need not be given.

Warning Shots and Shooting to Disable.

Warning shots are not authorized. At no time will a weapon be fired into the ground or air as a warning to stop a threat. Warning shots may pose dangers to others in the vicinity of where the shot was fired.

Shooting at a vehicle is authorized if it constitutes the appropriate level of force to mitigate a threat. In order to ensure a safe separation from motorcade and suspected or likely threat, shots may be fired into the vehicle as needed to prohibit a threat from entering into an area where the protective detail would be exposed to an attack. If feasible, shots should be directed away from the passenger compartment of the vehicle first. If at all feasible, other warnings, visible, verbal, and combination will be used before the use of these shots. If the vehicle continues to be a threat after the shooting, the next level of deadly force is authorized to mitigate the threat. Employees must use their discretion at the number of rounds fired into the engine block to stop the threat.

Vicious Animals

Deadly force may be directed against vicious animals when necessary in self-defense or the defense of others.

Investigation of Incidents of Deadly Force

The Regional Security Officer will conduct the investigation of the incident of deadly force. PSS personnel will cooperate fully with the investigating authority.

In accordance with the Mission Firearms Policy, any COM personnel involved in the discharge of a firearm shall provide an immediate verbal notification to the RSO as well as the written report within 24 hours of the incident.

Immediately after an on-duty discharge of a firearm, the following actions shall be taken by the contract WPPS employee to comply with the additional reporting obligation referenced in the Mission Firearms Policy:

- Report the incident as soon as practical via radio or cell phone to the RSO TOC. A brief description of the incident, location, and assessment of personal injuries or property damage should be provided.
- After returning to the US Embassy or REO, the Agent In Charge (AIC), Shift Leader (SL), employee who discharged the weapon shall report immediately to the RSO/TOC. All witnesses to the event shall report to the RSO Coordination Center (RSO/CC). If it took place within a vehicle, all personnel inside that vehicle shall also report to the RSO/CC.
- If the event occurs at a State Embedded Team (SET) location, the Project Manager (PM) shall immediately contact their respective RSO and Regional Military Commander (RMC):

-An Najaf & Karbala notify Al Hillah RSO

-Tikrit notifies Kirkuk RSO

-Ar Ramadi & Bagdadi notify Baghdad RSO

- After reporting to the RSO/TOC, the AIC is to brief the RSO/TOC DS Agent with specific facts to facilitate prompt and accurate reporting to the DS Command Center and State Operations Center.

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- All persons reporting to the RSO shall complete the RSO Sworn Statement Form; a handwritten unaided statement concerning the event and upon completion turn it in to the RSO TOC Agent and standby for further interview if needed.

- When the discharge has, or reasonably may be presumed to have, caused injury or death, the discharged weapon shall remain loaded, placed on safe, and then remanded to the RSO Investigations Section. The weapon shall not be altered prior to delivery to the RSO.

- The employee involved in the incident shall be placed on non-operational status for 24 hours without a reduction in pay and be offered counseling services from the State Medical Unit.

Personnel Security Specialists (PSS) exercising the use of deadly force while on duty will be placed, as circumstances dictate, on administrative leave from their details or assigned to duties not requiring the carrying of a firearm until an internal review and investigation are completed. If the exercise of deadly force is justified, PSS will be authorized to return to duty.

Carry of Firearms

No PSS shall carry a firearm unless:

- The PSS has qualified with assigned weapon(s) in accordance with contract terms and conditions.
- The PSS is not disqualified by any law of the United States including 18 USC 922(g) relating to convictions for misdemeanor crimes of violence; and
- The PSS has been authorized by the Regional Security Officer and any applicable host country authority to carry and use firearms in the performance of their duties with respect to maintaining the security and safety of persons designated in the WPPS contract and Task Order.

Responsibility

A PSS is responsible for having a complete understanding of his or her authority and its limitations, and applicable guidelines and procedures.

Authorized Firearms and Related Equipment

PSS may carry only handguns, holsters, support weapons, and ammunition that the Department of State has issued or approved. Under no circumstances will a PSS modify any weapon or ammunition that the Department of State has issued.

Qualification

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In order to carry a Department-issued or approved firearm, a PSS shall qualify by meeting or exceeding a specified score with a Department-issued or approved firearm in accordance with the contract. ~~Under no circumstance shall a PSS carry a firearm if he or she has not successfully completed the required firearms qualification procedures.~~

Firing Range Procedures

The firing range instructor shall ensure that all training is conducted safely in accordance with only DS approved guidelines, lesson plans, and manuals. Failure to follow range safety procedures may result in dismissal from the WPPS program. Team Leaders will also be responsible for ensuring the proper conduct of their personnel, and ensuring that the range is cleaned and inspected at the end of training.

Prescription Medication

A PSS who is taking prescription medication, except for short-term antibiotics, anti-malarial prophylaxis, or oral contraceptives, which are not already a matter of record with the Contractor, shall notify his or her supervisor and submit a medical certificate or other administratively acceptable documentation of the prescription and its effect(s) to the Regional Security Officer and DS/OPO/HTP. The Regional Security Officer with the assistance of DS/OPO/HTP shall determine whether such PSS shall be allowed to continue to carry a firearm while taking the medication. Pending written approval the PSS shall not perform PSS duties.

Standards of Conduct for Armed PSS Personnel

- PSS shall remember at all times the serious responsibility and potential dangers attendant to their authority to carry firearms and conduct themselves accordingly;
- PSS are accountable for their actions and shall conduct themselves in a manner, which shall not bring discredit to the Department of State or to themselves;
- A PSS shall treat a firearm at all times as if it were loaded; and
- All incidents involving misconduct with a firearm shall be reported immediately to the Regional Security Officer. Any such incidents shall be considered serious, and the PSS involved may be subject to criminal, civil penalties and disciplinary action.
- A PSS will not consume alcohol within six hours prior to carrying a firearm.

Availability of Firearms

PSS personnel are only authorized to carry their government issued firearms within Iraq while performing official duties. No other firearms are authorized. PSS will only use ammunition ~~provided by the government, and under no circumstances will a PSS modify a government provided weapons without the permission of the Regional Security Officer.~~ USG firearms may not be carried outside of Iraq.

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Securing Firearms

- A PSS is responsible for maintaining and securing his or her firearm.
- If a PSS loses his or her firearm, or if the firearm is stolen, the PSS shall immediately notify the Regional Security Officer. Within 24 hours of losing the firearm, the PSS shall prepare a memorandum, through his or her immediate supervisor, to the Regional Security Officer that thoroughly explains the circumstances surrounding the loss.
- PSS personnel will secure their firearms with the armorer prior to departing on leave, R and R, or other travel outside of Iraq. *Weapons will be turned in to the armorer when contract personnel depart the country for any reason.*

Drawing Firearms

A PSS will not draw his or her firearm unless confronted with the threat of deadly force or serious physical injury.

Discharges

A PSS who has discharged a firearm shall orally report such discharge immediately to his or her direct supervisor and the Regional Security Office. The PSS shall submit a written report to the Regional Security Office delineating the circumstances of the discharge within 24 hours.

Internal investigations of all discharges of firearms shall be under the direction of the Regional Security Officer and DS/OPO/HTP. Pending the results of the investigation, the PSS who has discharged his or her firearm may be placed on administrative leave or may be assigned duties that do not require the carrying of a firearm.

PSS on the scene at the time of the discharge shall not investigate the discharge but may be asked by the investigating agent to provide a formal statement in writing on the incident. The firearm that was discharged shall be secured, preserved as evidence, and relinquished to the Regional Security Officer.

Disciplinary and Other Actions

The Regional Security Officer shall be kept fully informed of any discharge of a firearm by a PSS, or of any incident, which results in an allegation of misconduct with a firearm by a PSS.

The Regional Security Officer may ask the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) to reassign a PSS to duties that do not require the carrying of a firearm, require the PSS to undergo remedial training, or ask the Contractor to reassign the PSS to another contract other than the WPPS contract with the Department of State.

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The Regional Security Officer or the Chief of the High Threat Protection Division may refer matters to relevant law enforcement authorities, when appropriate.

Firearms Modifications

The RSO armorer is the only person authorized to modify government furnished weapons. Modifications will only be performed in accordance with approved DS standards. Modifications will only be performed with DS procured/provided equipment.

Modification/Alteration of government furnished weapons by unauthorized personnel is strictly forbidden. This includes but is not limited to the addition of unauthorized sights, lights and rail systems.

Firearms may not be painted.

Weapon System and Radio Storage

All Embassy PSS personnel who depart on leave or at the end of contract must turn their radios and weapons into the armorer/logistics specialist prior to their departure from post. The armorer/logistics specialist will retain the radio, weapon and weapon systems until the PSS returns to post. Weapons systems include firearms, sighting systems, magazines and other weapon accessories. At no time will PSS personnel depart post with any government furnished equipment.

Restrictions on the use of Alcohol and Drugs

PSS personnel will not consume alcoholic beverages while armed or consume alcohol six hours prior to duty. When a PSS's employer has a more restrictive policy regarding the consumption of alcohol, the more restrictive policy will apply.

PSS personnel using prescription medication that would impair their judgment may not carry a firearm. Use of illegal drugs or controlled substances is strictly prohibited. Use of controlled substances or prescription drugs without a prescription and without notifying your supervisor is prohibited. The use of prescription drugs includes the use of steroids that are controlled substances, require a prescription and all controlled substances that whether alone or combined produce steroid like effects.

Violation of these policies will be grounds for immediate dismissal.

Personal Firearms

Personal firearms are not authorized at Post. This includes firearms that have been procured locally, imported into Iraq or acquired from any source other than official U.S. Government procurement. Any violation of this policy may result in the contractor being removed from the work site.

Applicability of Policy and Regulation

Nothing contained in this policy shall be construed to limit or impair the authority or responsibility of any other Federal law enforcement agency of the United States or host country with respect to investigative, protective, or intelligence activities.

This policy will be used in conjunction with an Embassy's firearm policy written by the Regional Security Officer and approved by the Chief of Mission. If any provision of this policy conflicts with the Embassy's firearm policy, the Embassy's firearm policy is controlling.

PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS

The primary mission of the High Threat Protection Office is to protect personnel under COM authority by providing an appropriate level of protection when traveling outside of controlled areas within Iraq. This mission is accomplished by providing protective details in support of the COM personnel who must travel through contested areas.

The office maintains numerous protective details in Baghdad and throughout Iraq at the various Regional Embassy Offices and State Embedded Teams.

HTPO protective details will operate closely with other protective details. Other details operating within Iraq include the Army's Criminal Investigations Division, the Navy's Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and a host of private contractors providing protective details to other governmental organizations, the Iraqi government and private industry.

Ambassador's Detail

The Ambassador's protective detail (APD) is assigned to provide 24-hour protection to the US Ambassador to Iraq. APD has two DS special agents assigned as the Agents-in-Charge. PSS personnel assigned to the detail may work in a variety of capacities.

APD's Tactical SOPs are maintained in a separate Annex.

Protective Details

Protective details will usually be composed of [REDACTED]
 Protective missions will usually be composed of [REDACTED]
 cars. Details with assigned principals may be augmented with additional personnel, armored vehicles and resources to meet a specific requirement.
 Protective detail SOPs are maintained in a separate Annex

Pool Details

[REDACTED]

The RSO office will maintain a number of protective details to be used in general support of the US Embassy. These details will receive their tasking from the Tactical Operations Cell. They may also be used to support special visits to include VIPS, CODELS and other visitors as assigned by the Protection Office.

Pool requests will be assigned by the Operations Chief and approved by the Operations Officer. The requests will be sent electronically to [redacted] and then the missions will be assigned the High Threat Protection Operations Office. b7E

Assigned Details

Only the Ambassador and DCM will have dedicated PSD support.

Patriots

[redacted] b7E

Escort Details

Under certain circumstances, protective security specialists will perform escort details. An escort detail is a protective detail with [redacted] personnel.

Escort details may be used, as appropriate, within the International Zone or when escorting principals who are under the protective umbrella of another protective detail.

Quick Reaction Force

[redacted] b7E, F

Mission Planning

[redacted]

Teams are expected to conduct mission planning for all protective missions. This includes filing all appropriate paperwork with the RSO TOC. Additional mission planning SOPs and forms are available in the Annexes.

Quick Missions

Details will be expected to execute missions within a short period of time. Approval of these "Quick Missions" will be based on a variety of factors to include time of day, threat, venue to be visited and the importance of the mission to the overall diplomatic effort. Only the RSO may authorize missions that are submitted within the mandatory 48-hour window for PSD missions in the Red Zone.

ZONES

International Zone

Protective operations in the International Zone (IZ) can utilize vehicle configurations consisting of one or more vehicles.

Escort details (of at a minimum two PSS personnel) may be utilized, as appropriate, for movements to controlled locations within the IZ.

Depending on the current level of threat, protective vests may or may not be required within the IZ. Only the RSO or the Protection Manager can authorize a change in the current uniform posture. If ballistic vests are not required while operating in the IZ, they must still be carried in the vehicles for use during an emergency.

PSD support in the IZ will only be provided to the Chief of Mission, DCM, and visiting dignitaries.

Red Zone

All motorcade movements into the Red Zone will be composed of a minimum of fully armored vehicles. Additional vehicles will be used, as needed, based on threat, location, time of day, etc.

Unarmored vehicles are **NOT/NOT** authorized for protective operations in the Red Zone.

There will be a minimum of PSS personnel assigned to each motorcade. All PSS personnel are required to wear appropriate protective equipment including helmets for all movements into the Red Zone.

Any deviation from these requirements must receive prior approval from the RSO and will be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

OPERATIONS

Operations Officer

A DS Special Agent will be designated the Operations Officer for protective operations. He/She will serve as the Operations Officer for both the Future Operations and Planning Cell and the Protection Cell within the Tactical Operations Center.

The Operations Office is responsible for coordinating the approval of written SOPs by the RSO office.

Future Operations and Planning Cell

The Future Operations and Planning Cell is the focal point for all future protective operations. The cell also coordinates all training requirements. The cell is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing all future protective details, allocating RSO assets and assisting with mission planning.

The Future Operations and Planning Cell will consist of one DS Special Agent and at least one PSS from DynCorp and Blackwater. RSO Intelligence Analysts will assist with threat assessments, planning, route analysis and record maintenance.

The cell will maintain all advance files, points of contact, maps and any other material that will assist with mission planning.

Tactical Operations Center – Protection Cell

The RSO TOC Protection Cell is the focal point for command and control of current protective operations under COM authority. The Protection Cell is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing protective details, allocating RSO assets, assisting with mission planning and assisting protective details and the RSO office during emergency situations.

COMPUTER SYSTEMS

Personnel who are authorized computer logons must comply with all pertinent DOS and DOD regulations. Any unauthorized use of USG computer systems is grounds for disciplinary action.

Available classified computer systems include the DOD SIPER Net and DOS CLASS Net. Available unclassified systems include DOD NIPER Net and DOS OPEN Net+.

Personnel authorized use of USG computer systems include but are not necessarily limited to the following personnel:

- Program Manager
- Deputy Program Manager
- Intelligence Analyst
- Operations Chief
- Future Operations and Planning Chief
- Detail Leader
- Deputy Detail Leader
- Shift Leaders

DOS Computer Networks

Personnel may not disconnect DOS computers, printers or peripherals from any DOS network. Additionally, personnel may not connect unauthorized computers or peripherals to any DOS system.


HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

Classified material will only be processed and stored within approved areas of the U.S. Embassy. Personnel are not authorized to remove classified material from these areas. This includes but is not limited to classified cables, documents, memorandums, satellite imagery and maps.

Any violation of this policy will result in the immediate removal from the work site.

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio communications are vital to protective operations. There are several communication links available for protective details to include radio, cell phone and satellite phones. Most vehicles have [] different radio systems installed - [] All PSS personnel will carry [] Most protective operations will operate on the [] nets.

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Satellite PhonesPRC-117FCell PhonesEncryption**VEHICLES**

The RSO Logistics Manager is responsible for all vehicle assets under control of the RSO and all armored vehicles under COM authority. He/She will publish separate SOPs for the use, maintenance, dispatch and reporting requirements for vehicles in use by the Protection Office.

Vehicle Modifications

Personnel are not authorized to conduct any vehicle modifications or alterations without prior written approval from the Protection Manager and the Logistics

Manager. All requests to modify/alter vehicles must be submitted in writing to the Logistics Manager via the Protection Manager.

For purposes of this policy, vehicle modifications include any change to the original factory condition of the vehicle. This includes the removal of seats, doors, glass, etc.

All modifications/alterations must be conducted under the supervision of authorized mechanics that are under contract to the US Embassy.

Armored Vehicles



b7E, F

Vehicle Equipment

The following equipment will be carried in all vehicles while conducting protective operations:

- Tow Strap
- Vehicle Medical Kit
- Vehicle Jack and Lug Wrench capable of changing the tire on an FAV
- Spare Tire
- Water

Vehicle Accidents

Personnel involved in vehicle accidents will be expected to complete the appropriate vehicle accidents reports. All vehicle accidents will be investigated. Vehicle operators that are found to have acted with negligence or willful misconduct will be subject to disciplinary action. Additionally, the US Embassy may demand reimbursement from the appropriate contractor. Personnel involved in an accident will notify their chain of command and the RSO TOC as soon as possible. A written report of the incident will be provided to the High Threat Protection Office within 24 hours.

Any vehicle accident that results in injury and/or death may be treated as a criminal investigation.

RSO will notify the COR/HTP Division Chief within 24-hours of the incident and provide a written report within 48-hours.

MEDICAL

Medical personnel assigned to protective details are not authorized to perform medical treatment beyond the level permitted by their respective medical control officer.

All personnel will carry a personal medical kit when conducting protective operations. Each vehicle will have a vehicle medical kit.

CONDUCT

General

The Contractor shall notify the COR or his designated representative (Protection Manager) of all misconduct incidents by providing an incident report that delineates the incident. All incident reporting will be required within (24) twenty-four hours of the incident's occurrence.

The Contractor shall maintain satisfactory standards of employee competency, conduct, cleanliness, appearance, and integrity. The Contractor shall take all necessary disciplinary action against its employees. Each Contract employee is expected to adhere to standards of conduct that reflect credit on themselves, their employer, and the United States Government. Contractors must, at all times, use politeness and courtesy when dealing with U.S. citizens, U.S. military personnel, coalition forces, TCNs, host country citizens, and all others with whom Contractors shall have contact.

The Government reserves the right to direct the Contractor to remove an employee from the work site for failure to comply with the standards of conduct. Standards of conduct must be included in this document as ANNEX or paragraph. Upon written direction of the COR or CO, the Contractor shall immediately replace such employee to maintain continuity of services at no additional cost to the Government. This cost to the Contractor shall include, but not be limited to, repatriation of the terminated employee, all training and deployment costs of the replacement employee, and other General and Administrative (G&A) overhead costs for the replacement.

Appearance

The Government requires a favorable image and considers it to be a major asset of a protective force. The employee's attitude, courtesy, and job knowledge are influential in creating a favorable image. The Contractor shall ensure that contract personnel at all times present a neat appearance, paying particular attention to their personal hygiene, bearing, clothing, and equipment.

Required Reporting of Significant Incidents

All PSS personnel are advised that significant incidents must be reported to your supervisor. Supervisors must ensure that all significant incidents are reported immediately to the RSO office, and a written report will be submitted to the High Threat Protection Office within 24 hours. Significant incidents include but are not limited to:

- Injuries
- Discharge of weapon for any reason
- Loss of equipment such as weapon, ammunition or radio
- Vehicle accidents or incidents which damage Embassy vehicles
- Verbal or physical altercations with Embassy personnel, Coalition Forces Iraqi Forces or personnel known to represent other diplomatic missions.

Clothing and Personal Equipment

The Contractor's employees shall wear clean, neat, and complete civilian clothes or other dress as appropriate, when on duty. The Contractor shall bear the cost of purchasing,

cleaning, pressing, and repairing clothing worn by contract personnel while performing their duties. No camouflage clothing will be worn at any time on or off duty.

Neglect of Duties

Neglect of duties is considered unacceptable performance under this contract. This includes sleeping while on duty, unreasonable delays, or failures to carry out assigned tasks, conducting personal affairs during duty hours, and refusing to render assistance or cooperate in upholding the integrity of the work site security.

Disorderly Conduct

Use of abusive or offensive language, quarreling, intimidation by words, actions, or fighting, is considered unacceptable performance under this contract. Participation in disruptive activities that interfere with normal and efficient protective detail operations is also considered unacceptable performance and shall be grounds for termination from this contract.

Drug Screening

Contract personnel may be required to submit to random drug testing in accordance with the provisions of their contract. "Random drug screening" is defined as unannounced and immediate submission of an appropriate contractor employee sample (i.e., urine, blood, hair, etc.) without prior notification. Contract employees testing positive shall have the right to submit to a second examination immediately upon notification that he/she has failed the first drug test. A positive drug test indicating use of drugs other than medication provided by a physician for the employee shall result in immediate termination of the employee, and the Contractor shall bear all costs for repatriation and replacement of the employee.

Intoxicants

The Contractor shall not allow its employees while on duty to possess, sell, consume, or be under the influence of intoxicants, drugs, or substances producing similar effects. This includes medication legally prescribed by a physician to the contractor employee when it may affect judgment and endanger the safety of others in the event of an emergency.

Consumption of Alcohol

Contract employees shall not drink alcoholic beverages while on duty or at least **six (6) hours** before a period of duty.

Relief by an Intoxicated Person

If contract personnel have reason to believe that his or her relief is intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or intoxicants, that individual shall not allow the relief to proceed. The Detail Leader shall immediately consult with the RSO.

Narcotics

The Contractor shall not allow its employees to use narcotics or other controlled substances without a prescription from a licensed physician.

Use of Prescription Drugs

Any contract employee using prescription drugs shall report this condition to a supervisor before assuming guard duty.

Contact with Third Country Nationals

There may be contact with nationals from countries identified by the Department of State as a critical counterintelligence threats. The contractor must report to the RSO any attempt by such nationals to establish recurring contact or a close personal association beyond professional or personal courtesies. Contractors must receive a counterintelligence briefing from the RSO and follow Department reporting guidelines available from RSO.

Use of "Little Bird" Helicopters

The "Little Bird" helicopters are only for official use. Only personnel approved through the Embassy RSO Office are authorized transport on the "Little Birds". RSO approval may be direct from the RSO staff or from RSO staff incorporated into mission planning through the TOC operations officer or senior Blackwater management.

Activities Specifically Prohibited

The following activities are specifically prohibited for personnel while armed:

- Careless or irresponsible behavior;
- Careless or unnecessary display of a firearm in public;
- Dry-firing or practicing quick draws will only be authorized under the supervision of a certified firearms instructor other than during training or qualification practice;
- Threatening a person, or making an unwarranted allusion to being armed, in any situation not directly related to an official purpose;
- Consumption of alcoholic beverage while armed, or six hours prior to being armed, or at any time prior to being armed sufficient to impair a person's judgment or ability to perform his or her duties;
- Use of medications or drugs that may impair judgment or ability while on duty;
- Carrying or using any firearm, ammunition, or related equipment not specifically issued or approved by the Department of State; and
- Carrying or using a modified firearm not previously approved by the DS armorer.

Criminal Actions

Contract employees may be subject to criminal charges as allowed by law in certain circumstances. These include but are not limited to the following:

- False Statements;
- Removal, mutilation, or destruction of any official documents or records

- Concealment of material facts by willful omission from official documents or records
- Unauthorized use of Government property, theft, vandalism, or immoral conduct
- Unethical or improper use of official authority or credentials
- Security violations – mishandling of classified documents
- Knowledge of, participation in, or profiting from any sexual activities, which would be illegal within the United States or in the Host Country
- Organizing or participating in illegal gambling in any form
- Misuse of lethal and non-lethal weapons

Acknowledgment

All contract employees shall sign a certification prior to issuance of firearms in country that their employment shall be dependent upon compliance with this policy, and violation shall be terms for immediate termination for cause. Violation of this requirement shall immediately be reported to the RSO and the employee shall be immediately terminated from employment. The Contractor shall bear all costs for repatriation and replacement of the employee.

Disciplinary Action

Project Managers are expected to develop and maintain a program for maintaining discipline amongst PSS personnel. In cases where disciplinary action is warranted, the Project Manager will investigate, recommend and implement appropriate disciplinary action.

The Regional Security Officer reserves the right to review all cases and take additional disciplinary action, as needed.

Iraqi Nationals

Contract personnel will treat Iraqi nationals with the same degree of respect they would expect from others. As a representative of the United States government, contract personnel are guests in Iraq and must behave accordingly.

Offensive behavior will not be tolerated. This includes inappropriate/offensive graffiti, slogans, photographs, drawing or any other means of verbal or written communications that other persons may deem offensive.

Situations may arise in which Iraqi nationals or other foreign nationals accompany PSS principles and would fall under the umbrella of Embassy PSS operations.

Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment exists when a supervisor or a coworker subjects an employee to inappropriate language or conduct of a sexual nature that is considered offensive by the employee. Such words or conduct may have the effect of creating an intimidating and/or hostile work environment that interferes with the victim's work performance.

The victim, like the harasser, can be a man or a woman. The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex.

Examples of questionable or inappropriate behavior in the workplace include but are not necessarily limited to the following:

- Touching of intimate body parts
- Hugs, kisses
- Sexual comments, flirtation
- Photos or magazines of naked people
- Sexual vulgarities
- Repeatedly inviting a coworker to go out on a date when he/she is not interested

Sexual harassment will not be tolerated. Personnel who violate this policy will be subject to disciplinary action to up to and including removal from contract.

Tobacco Use

Contract personnel are not authorized to use tobacco products of any kind while in the performance of their official duties. Tobacco products may not be used inside government owned vehicles or government buildings.

Health and Welfare Inspections

The RSO office reserves the right to conduct unannounced health and welfare inspections of the DynCorp man-camp. All inspections will be conducted with DynCorp and Blackwater management present.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

General

One vital component of protective operations is exercising good operational security. Contract personnel are expected to be aware of their surroundings at all times and to not divulge sensitive or classified information to persons who do not have a need to know.

Proper operational security includes not discussing or releasing sensitive or classified information on cell phones, telephones or in email. Personnel are warned that friendly and enemy forces are monitoring all electronic conversations and that there is no expectation of privacy on government owned telephones, computers and other electronic devices.

When discussing operational issues via unsecured communications channels, personnel must not divulge times, places, dates, names or any other data that may compromise the security of a protective mission or endanger the lives of coalition forces operating in Iraq.


Press

Contract personnel are forbidden from speaking with the press while either on or off duty or on R&R. This includes written correspondence with press entities to include Internet sites or periodicals. Personnel are to report any instances in which they have been approached or contacted by the press, to the RSO. The Embassy Public Affairs Officer will make all

statements to the press. Personnel who are found to have violated this basic tenant of operational security will be dismissed from the WPPS contract.

Reporting Requirements

Personnel who become aware of violations of operational security must report the violation immediately through their chain of command.



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ACRONYMS

ADV	Advance
AIC	Agent-in-Charge
AMB	Ambassador
ARSO	Assistant Regional Security Officer
AV	Armored Vehicle
CSH	Combat Army Surgical Hospital
CFE	Contractor Furnished Equipment
CID	Criminal Investigations Division (US Army)
CLASS Net	Classified Network (State Department System)
COM	Chief Of Mission
CODELS	Congressional Delegation(s)
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DRSO	Deputy Regional Security Officer
DS	Diplomatic Security
DSS	Diplomatic Security Service
FAV	Fully Armored Vehicle
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
GSO	General Services Officer General Services Office
HTPD	High Threat Protection Division
HTPO	High Threat Protection Office
IMO	Information Management Officer
IRM	Information Resource Management
IRMO	Iraqi Reconstruction and Management Office
IZ	International Zone
MFP	Mission Firearms Policy
MNCI	Multi-National Corps Iraq
MNFI	Multi-National Forces Iraq
MSD	Mobile Security Division
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigation Division (US Navy)
NIPR Net	(DOD unclassified network)
OSI	Office of Special Investigations (US Air Force)
PCO	Project Contracting Office
PSD	Protective Security Detail
PSS	Protective Security Specialist
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RCLO	Regional Crimes Liaison Office

R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RSO	Regional Security Officer Regional Security Office
SL	Shift Leader
SIPR Net	(DOD classified network)

SET	State Embedded Team
SPE	Special Protective Equipment
TC	Tactical Commander
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TST	Tactical Support Team
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International development
USG	United States Government

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